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  1. Think about the Consequences! Nominalism and the Argument from the Philosophy of Logic.Torsten Wilholt - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):115-133.
    Nominalism faces the task of explaining away the ontological commitments of applied mathematical statements. This paper reviews an argument from the philosophy of logic that focuses on this task and which has been used as an objection to certain specific formulations of nominalism. The argument as it is developed in this paper aims to show that nominalism in general does not have the epistemological advantages its defendants claim it has. I distinguish between two strategies that are available to the nominalist: (...)
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  • Three Schools of Paraconsistency.Koji Tanaka - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Logic 1:28-42.
    A logic is said to be paraconsistent if it does not allow everything to follow from contradictory premises. There are several approaches to paraconsistency. This paper is concerned with several philosophical positions on paraconsistency. In particular, it concerns three ‘schools’ of paraconsistency: Australian, Belgian and Brazilian. The Belgian and Brazilian schools have raised some objections to the dialetheism of the Australian school. I argue that the Australian school of paraconsistency need not be closed down on the basis of the Belgian (...)
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  • The Gödelian Inferences.Curtis Franks - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (3):241-256.
    I attribute an 'intensional reading' of the second incompleteness theorem to its author, Kurt G del. My argument builds partially on an analysis of intensional and extensional conceptions of meta-mathematics and partially on the context in which G del drew two familiar inferences from his theorem. Those inferences, and in particular the way that they appear in G del's writing, are so dubious on the extensional conception that one must doubt that G del could have understood his theorem extensionally. However, (...)
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  • How to Say Things with Formalisms.David Auerbach - 1992 - In Michael Detlefsen (ed.), Proof, Logic, and Formalization. Routledge. pp. 77--93.
    Recent attention to "self-consistent" (Rosser-style) systems raises anew the question of the proper interpretation of the Gödel Second Incompleteness Theorem and its effect on Hilbert's Program. The traditional rendering and consequence is defended with new arguments justifying the intensional correctness of the derivability conditions.
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