New words have found their way into the public sphere: we now commonly talk about “confinement”, “barrier-gesture” or “distancing”. The very idea of public space has been transformed: with restrictions on movement and interaction in public; with the reintegration of lives (certain lives) into the home (if there is one) and private space; with the publicization of private space through internet relationships; with the cities’ space occupied, during confinement, by so-called “essential” workers; with the restriction of gatherings and political demonstrations (...) in public space. With these and other recent changes, it is imperative to revisit the concept of public space, which continues to be used as if it were self-evident, despite its profound transformation over the past few decades, in a process of realization and “literalization”. No longer just a comfortable metaphor for reasonable debates, public space has become a concrete reality in the 21th century. This transformation in the various phenomena, such as the occupation of squares and public spaces; the demand for spaces of conversation and expression for those without a voice; the transition of private matters into the public realm through verbal expression; and the expression and circulation of public issues within popular cultures. As a result, the question of public space is increasingly intertwined with that of private spaces, such as the home or individual subjectivities, forming an internal, logical relationship. (shrink)

Despite the general applicability of philosophical concepts of the subject and subjectivity among philosophers, there is no unanimity in their understanding, even if we are talking about representatives of one philosophical trend. The subject of this article is the different understandings of subjectivity by two well-known French authors of analytical inspiration, V. Descombes and S. Laugier, which are united by the critique of the reflexive subject of the philosophy of mind, defending the idea of social mental nature, as well as (...) appeal to the methodological resources of later Wittgenstein’s philosophy to develop the idea of a social subject. Despite their common attitudes, Descombes and Laugier are inspired by different traditions — Descombes, in general, develops the ideas of the French School of Sociology, while Laugier works in line of linguistic phenomenology, defined by the ordinary language philosophy and skeptical interpretations of Wittgenstein’s thought. Descombes builds the conception of the subject as an actor, formed not by his inside world, but by his action, the model of which is the institution of social life. Descombes’s practical subjectivity grows out of his critique of the reflexive paradigm of the philosophy of mind (consciousness) and is the actor’s ability to take the responsibility for his own actions. Instead, Laugier’s concept of «depsychologized subjectivity » focuses on the other side of the actor’s ability to act following some rule within the institutional paradigm of practice, namely the fragility and vulnerability of any human action, its defeats and difficulties, and the subject’s reluctance to be an actor and take the responsibility for his actions. Laugier defends the skeptical understanding of subjectivity as a property of the action of the delocalized subject of language and knowledge, his ability even by his inability to express the social naturalness of the human way of life. (shrink)

Contrairement à Auguste Compte qui voyait dans la famille organisé autour d’un couple hétérosexuel procréateur non seulement la véritable base de la société, mais aussi, par déduction, la justification des différences naturelles des sexes jusqu’à la subordination de la femme à l’homme, Durkheim s’emploie à démontrer que les différences observables entre les deux sexes ne sont en aucun cas naturelles, mais bien le produit de la division sexuée du travail, ce qui revient à rompre radicalement avec les représentations dominantes à (...) son époque. Par ailleurs, la famille conjugale n’est pas, selon lui, la modèle vers lequel tendrait notre nature, mais bien une institution sociale, autrement dit une construction, dont la cohérence normative résulte avant tout de la division du travail. Marcel Mauss poursuivra le travail de distanciation de son oncle en franchissant une autre étape. Les progrès fulgurants de l’ethnographie au début du XXe siècle permirent en effet à ce dernier de démontrer que plus on s’éloigne du modèle des sociétés modernes, plus la division par sexes est forte. Loin d’être le produit d’une conception naturelle des différences, les rapports entre les sexes dans les sociétés polysegmentaires relèvent en réalité de la règle et par conséquent d’une division "par sexes". Ce n’est pas à la perfection de la nature humaine et à la civilisation que l’on doit la distinction des qualités masculines et féminines puisque la division par sexes était déjà réglementée dans les sociétés dites "primitives". (shrink)

The term “social cognition” can be construed in different ways. On the one hand, it can refer to the cognitive faculties involved in social activities, defined simply as situations where two or more individuals interact. On this view, social systems would consist of interactions between autonomous individuals; these interactions form higher-level autonomous domains not reducible to individual actions. A contrasting, alternative view is based on a much stronger theoretical definition of a truly social domain, which is always defined by a (...) set of structural norms; moreover, these social structures are not only a set of constraints, but actually constitute the possibility of enacting worlds that would just not exist without them. This view emphasises the heteronomy of individuals who abide by norms that are impersonal, culturally inherited and to a large extent independent of the individuals. Human beings are socialised through and through; consequently, all human cognition is social cognition. The article argues for this second position. Finally, it appears that fully blown autonomy actually requires heteronomy. It is the acceptance of the constraints of social structures that enables individuals to enter new realms of common meaningfulness. The emergence of social life marks a crucial step in the evolution of cognition; so that at some evolutionary point human cognition cannot but be social cognition. (shrink)

Der Beitrag fragt danach, was einem Subjekt durch ein psychisches Trauma angetan wird. In diesem Zusammenhang setzt er sich mit Tendenzen auseinander, die derzeit in der Psychoanalyse im Umgang mit Traumata zu beobachten sind: Steht ein Trauma im Zentrum ihrer Aufmerksamkeit, tendierten Psychoanalytiker dazu, darin ein für ihre klinische Arbeit spezielles oder gar außergewöhnliches Problem zu sehen, das nach »etwas Anderem« als der grundlegenden Methode der Psychoanalyse verlangt. Demgegenüber wird die Auffassung vertreten, dass ein Trauma untrennbar mit dem Seelenleben verwoben (...) ist. So etwas wie eine nichttraumatische Psychopathologie, so der Autor, gibt es nicht. Jede traumatisierte Psyche, unabhängig von der Intensität des Traumas, stehe darum im Grunde vor demselben Problem: Wie lässt sich der grundsätzliche Mechanismus der Wiederholung überwinden und eine ergebnisoffene Symbolisierung erreichen? Um diese Prozesse beschreiben zu können – die auch anhand einer Vignette illustriert werden –, schlägt der Autor die Unterscheidung zwischen »Subjektivität« und »Subjektalität« vor. (shrink)

The erosion of educational authority is less than a crisis. The first two sections of this text involve the clarification of the concept of educational authority. It’s also an opportunity to refute critical theses derived from psychological or pedagogical writings that aim to purify educational acts all forms of authority. These approaches, which often characterise authority as a form of coercion, weaken the anthropological perspective, which is at the heart of the educational process. If authority is necessary, this is quite (...) simply because this never authorises present day behaviour. In the third and final section, we present three lectures in order to understand this phenomenon of erosion. (shrink)

This article discusses the integrative function frequently assigned to festive events by scholars. This function can be summed up in a proposition: experiencing similar emotions during collective gatherings is a powerful element of socialization. The article rejects this oft-developed idea according to which popular fervor could be an efficient tool to measure civic engagement. It raises the following question: what makes enthusiasm “civic”, “patriotic”, “republican” or simply “political”? Based on a study of French presidential tours in France from 1888 to (...) 2007, this article casts a different light on the topic. The enthusiasm of the crowds interacting with the successive French presidents is not civic because an inquiry may find “patriotism” into participants’ minds. It can be called civic simply because the forms and meaning of the festive jubilation, which may be summarized into the formula: “if spectators applaud, it means they support,” necessarily preexist its multiple manifestations. (shrink)

resumo Esse artigo investiga a leitura que Shaftesbury fez de Marco Aurélio, a fim de comparar a visão estóica da individual ida de e da ide nt ida de pessoal com o conceito lockia no de “self” e, de ma ne i ra mais ge ral, com os mo dos pelos quais a filosofia mo de rna entendeu o si-me s mo. A ênfase recai sobre a conexão int r í nseca ent re sistema e s u b j e (...) t i v ida de no estoicismo imperial. Discute-se a re s i s t ê nc ia de autores cont e m p o r âneos em aceitar a descrição da alma ra c io nal dos estóicos como um “self”. Também se discute a aplicação que Mic hel Foucault fez do seu conceito de “subjetivação” à id é ia estóica de “si-me s mo ”. palavras-chave Estoicismo; self; identidade pessoal; Shaftesbury; Marco Aurélio; Foucault. (shrink)

The concept of personal identity is one of the most sensitive questions in Paul Ricoeur’s oeuvre. In this article we show what makes originality of Ricoeur’s conception of narrative identity by analyzing the way it is presented in Oneself as Another and by pointing out the difference between the ricoeurian concept and the concept of narrative identity, introduced by Alasdair MacIntyre. For this reason we would like to focus on the analysis of configuration and refiguration, studied by Ricoeur in his (...) oeuvre Time and Narrative. We would also include the notion of narrative identity into the conception of hermeneutics and demonstrate that the originality of the ricoerian concept is based on the possibilities offered by the theory of narration explicated in the debates with structuralism and literary theory. This sets the issue of subjectivity, in which the problematic of narrative identity is inscribed. This “philosophy of the first person” makes the key object of the second part of the research. The article shows how the self applies the narrative intrigue to his/her own life by identifying himself with a storyteller or with a character. A reader or a storyteller constructs his/her narrative identity so that the process of self-understanding becomes possible. (shrink)