This article argues that church colleges of higher education, in their desire to be distinctive, can benefit from rethinking the relationship between the philosophical and the religious in order to retrieve a view of higher education as ‘upbuilding’. This will be achieved by illustrating how the central idea of speculative philosophy—that our learning about truth occurs in and through the phenomenology of aporetic experiences of the conditions of possibility—can contribute to the debate within church colleges regarding what is different about (...) their higher education. In short I will argue that Hegel and Kierkegaard (amongst others) find the aporetic experience of contingency to be of absolute significance. In what follows I will show how the religious and the philosophical are both constitutive of that absolute significance and how, when allowed to re-form each other, then together (and apart) they commend the kind of ‘upbuilding’ higher education that church colleges espouse. (shrink)

This article argues that church colleges of higher education, in their desire to be distinctive, can benefit from rethinking the relationship between the philosophical and the religious in order to retrieve a view of higher education as ‘upbuilding’. This will be achieved by illustrating how the central idea of speculative philosophy—that our learning about truth occurs in and through the phenomenology of aporetic experiences of the conditions of possibility—can contribute to the debate within church colleges regarding what is different about (...) their higher education. In short I will argue that Hegel and Kierkegaard (amongst others) find the aporetic experience of contingency to be of absolute significance. In what follows I will show how the religious and the philosophical are both constitutive of that absolute significance and how, when allowed to re-form each other, then together (and apart) they commend the kind of ‘upbuilding’ higher education that church colleges espouse. (shrink)

This essay considers the legacy of Kant’s philosophy of religion as appropriated by Jacques Derrida in his recent, “Foi et savoir: les deux sources de la ‘religion’ aux limites de la simple raison.” Derrida’s adoption of this Kantian framework raises the question of how one might describe this as a postmodern account of religion, which in turn raises the question of the relationship between modernity and postmodernity in general, and Derrida’s relationship to Kant in particular. Following an exposition of Derrida’s (...) notion of a formal “ethical” religion as a repetition of Kant’s critique in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, I offer a critique of Derrida’s (and Kant’s) “formalization” of religion and the relationship between faith and reason, arguing that a more persistent postmodernism requires a de-formalization of the modern concern for justice, appreciating its determinate prophetic origin. (shrink)

This paper examines the relation or, more precisely, tension between postmodern deconstruction and ethics by elaborating upon the ethico-political dimensions of deconstructionism. It embarks on a critical assessment of postmodern discourse on ethics in view of its political implications by analyzing Jacques Derrida''s and Richard Rorty''s arguments with an assumption that their positions represent a certain logic in the postmodern discourse on ethics. Postmodern ethics is based on incredulity with regard to traditional metanarratives, and it defines ethics in terms of (...) sensitivity or responsibility to otherness and difference. Its proponents believe that the negation of modern metanarratives opens a way to the Other which has been marginalized and suppressed both in thought and in social practice. Derrida and Rorty represent this position with their emphasis on the ethical nature of deconstruction and the need to elaborate new languages for ethics. Despite postmodern appeal to ethics of this sort, however, postmodern thinking shows its limits in dealing with most ethical-political matters in the contemporary world. The postmodern approach to ethics, being restricted within the perspective of the individual, does not provide any determinate framework for deciding how to adjudicate conflicting ethical claims or how to link the unconditional affirmation of emancipatory ideals, enlightened social criticism, and democratic accountability in determinate political terms. In the main, this paper contends that philosophical deconstruction and responsibility to otherness undermine each other in the public sphere. (shrink)

This paper examines Jacques Derrida's analysis of Walter Benjamin's ‘Critique of Violence’ in the context of their respective theories of the university. Whereas Derrida foregrounds the complex ways that the university and law are intertwined, Benjamin claims that the ‘educative power’ stands removed from the law by identifying the university with ‘divine violence’. ‘Force of Law’ not only questions the possibility of a neutral, pre-legal space that Benjamin's theory warrants, ‘Force of Law’ also draws attention to the laws structuring the (...) colloquia that gave rise to Derrida's text. This paper claims that Derrida's analysis of justice, law, violence, and justesse is thus informed by a theory of the university, and that the ways in which Derrida's theory of law stands opposed to Benjamin's parallels the ways in which Derrida's theory of the university questions Benjamin's understanding of the ‘educative power’. This paper concludes by drawing attention to the demand posed by the absence of justice in the academy. Although the laws of the academy produce justesse in the present, this negatively affirms justice in the future, which cannot wait. (shrink)

Recently, Derrida has pointed to the university to come and the future of the professions within a place of resistance, and yet maintained the historical link to two ideas that mediate and condition both the humanities and the performative structure of acts of profession: human rights and crimes against humanity. Derrida maintains that the ‘modern university should be unconditional’, by which he means that it should have the ‘freedom’ to assert, to question, to profess, and to ‘say everything’ in the (...) manner of a literary fiction. This article reviews what Derrida calls ‘the future of the profession or the university without conditions’. Second, it focuses on a series of criticisms raised by Richard Rorty against Derrida’s concept of literature and on Derrida’s status as a ‘private ironist’. Third, the article examines Derrida in relation to the ends of literature and the university, under the impact of globalization and new technologies of communication. Finally, in a postscript the article returns to the concept of the university and its postcolonial possibilities. (shrink)

SummaryAs a great deal of contemporary discussion reveals, there is an ongoing interest in determining the ethical and political relevance of Jacques Derrida's work. From standpoints deconstructive and otherwise, critics have tended to converge upon some version of a single question: What is the ethico-political significance of deconstruction? In this paper I shall aim to specify the difficulties of thus evaluating Derrida's work. The difficulties to which I refer stem largely from the inadequacy of established forms of critique to evaluate (...) the ethico-political impact of deconstruction. Rather than abandon such critique, I suggest that a close attention to what constitutes this disproportion is most productive here. Hence I shall argue that if one is to address issues of the ethical and political with regard to deconstruction, and not simply to insist from the outset on the very questioning mode which Derrida strives to interrupt, then another approach is needed. I shall propose that taking up Derrida's notion of ‘excessive’ responsibility attends not only to the main features of the Derridian problematic, but to the political and quasi-ethical aspect of his thinking. Most simply, if Derrida is successful in showing the supplementary structure of responsibility, such that responsibility can no longer be presented as an object or theme of knowledge, then it remains to explore the task of rethinking ethics and politics this initiates. (shrink)

At the heart of the relationship between philosophy and poetry, and of the philosophical and the literary tout court, is the relationship between poetry and prose. In the increasingly influential work of Giorgio Agamben, whose impact continues to grow across a wide range of disciplines, the relationship between philosophy and poetry, poetry and prose, receives renewed attention and significance. Situating Agamben's philosophical, poetic prose in relation to the legacy of the prose poem from Charles Baudelaire through Walter Benjamin and Rosmarie (...) Waldrop, ?Philosophy, Poetry, Parataxis? explores the implications of what Agamben calls ?whatever being? or ?whatever singularity? for our understanding of the potentialities inherent in the relationship between contemporary writing practices and what Agamben calls The Coming Community. In contributing to the development of innovative, alternative forms of textuality at once ?philosophical? and ?poetic,? contemporary writers such as Agamben and Waldrop share an understanding of the informing role of parataxis in inflecting philosophy and poetry, poetry and prose, toward what we might call an aesthetics and politics of apposition. (shrink)

In his published lectures Civilizations: Nostalgia and Utopia, Daya Krishna criticizes postmodern thought and especially the writings of Jacques Derrida. By outlining similarities between the two, I would claim that, indeed, it was Daya Krishna’s unexpected proximity to Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’ project that triggered his scathing critique of the latter. Moreover, Daya Krishna’s response to Derrida reveals an ongoing inner conflict in his own thinking. On the one hand, he provides us with a harsh critique of Derrida the ‘postmodern’; on the (...) other hand, he concedes that the ‘modern’ notion of knowledge has been totally transformed, and the ‘deconstruction’ of its old formulations was the major catalyst that provoked and directed his own philosophical enterprise in the last years of his life, reformulating knowledges. Reconstructing in this way, the dialogue which never happened might prove beneficial, not only for understanding the distinctive works of its participants, but also for carrying their writings and us one step further towards a productive, ‘relevant’ philosophical discourse in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

It is commonly supposed that acting and judging ought to rest on a community-wide, binding definition of what is right and respectable, that is, a substantial consensus. Such consensus is thought possible only when we engage shared values and criteria, when we use knowledge and abilities appropriated through education. On this view, education deals with the reproduction of consensus and, hence, with the passing on of traditions and norms. On my view, we need to question the framework in which the (...) debate over social erosion takes place. I take a cue from remarks of Hannah Arendt and question the presupposition that acting and judging in a right way requires both common values and the appropriation of what we call ‘knowledge’ of criteria and principles. I do not suggest that ‘knowledge’ has nothing to do with acting and judging. Rather, I wish to draw attention to thinking as a condition for acting and judging. Here, thinking has nothing to do with knowledge or with appropriation. Rather, it has to do with living-together with somebody. Educa-tion for thinking is, then, a ‘public thinking’ which leads out of the serf and into communal responsibility. On this treatment, the educator is to be a ‘faithful guardian’ of this calling out into responsibility. (shrink)

In the age of web 2.0, the university is constantly challenged to re-adapt its ‘old-fashioned’ pedagogies to the new possibilities opened up by digital technologies. This article proposes a rethinking of the relation between university and (digital) technologies by focusing not on how technologies function in the university, but on their constituting a meta-condition for the existence of the university pedagogy of inquiry. Following Ivan Illich’s idea that textual technologies played a crucial role in the inception of the university, we (...) will first show the structural similarities between university thinking and the text as a profanation of the book. Secondly, we describe university thinking as a type of critical thinking based on the materiality of the text-on-the-page, explaining why the text has been at the centre of university pedagogy since the beginning. In the third part, we show how Illich came to see the end of the culture of the text as a challenge for the university, by describing the new features of the text-as-code incompatible with the idea of reading as study. Finally, we challenge this pessimistic reading of Illich’s and end with a call for a profanatory pedagogy of digital technologies that could mirror the revolutionary thinking behind the mediaeval invention of the text. (shrink)

Kittler was among the first to invite Derrida to lectures in Germany, and to translate Derrida’s texts into German. Yet a cursory tally in his references does not always do justice to what Kittler’s media theory owes to deconstruction. Discourse Networks credits Derrida with a mere ‘rediscovery’ of grammatology, although Wellbery’s foreword labors mightily to identify the deconstructive traits in Kittler’s work. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter reduces The Post Card’s complex networks to an allegation that ‘voice remains the other of typescripts' (...) – as if Kittler had not in fact taken a much more subtle evaluation of hearing oneself speak from Derrida. What happens to the writability and citability of texts if they are sorted into such neat binary distinctions of logical or poetic orientation? What, to Kittler, is the quotability and readability of the body of work titled Derrida? (shrink)

This essay suggests an alternative accountability process on the basis of critiques of current evaluation practice in higher education. Using cases in the British university system, with some international commentary and thinking through experience in Asian universities in four countries in the wake of ‘audit culture’, the work of Thorstein Bunde Veblen is revived. With Veblen, the current structures and mechanics of the corporate and fully-monetised university might once more be challenged. The risk of importing the metrics and audit culture (...) of Britain, and the neoliberal managerialist administration-led university of North America, wholesale into Asian universities is questioned by acknowledgment that exiting hierarchies are persistent, and competing on Euro-American terms is a recipe for disaster. Due recognition is curtailed, hard work and standards are ignored, prospects for junior staff are constrained to a kind of intellectual and social penury. Resources based on research skills more robust than the current axiomatic research assessment calculus are suggested from within the university. The solution is not to emulate a declining system, but to innovate and invent new horizons and terms of engagement. The proposals offered here are only a suggestion for reflexive inquiry and informed self-examination—criticism-self-criticism from co-research sociology, ethnographic film and urban geography, among others—offered as alternate concurrent paths to accountability. (shrink)

This article proposes that the prime ideals of the university - those of truth, knowledge, justice, and emancipation - are also those that currently produce unjust practices "outside" and "within". Using the work of Jacques Derrida and Paul Virilio, the article argues that the central problem of the university today consists not so much of a neo-liberalisation, but of the speeding-up of these ideals through their enmeshment with techniques of calculation, vision, and prediction. The current university therefore suffers from what (...) it with Derrida identifies as an "auto-immune disease," in which the acceleration of its foundational aspirations have led to a near-total subjugation of all and everything to an oppressive quest for transparency. However, the article proposes via Virilio that this totalising transparency paradoxically also produces more blindness, accidents, and unknowability. It hopes to illustrate this with some examples in the teaching scene as well by working through some of its own conceptual tensions. The other logic of the university today, the article finally proposes, consists of a "dark" or stealth functionality, opening up the promise of a radically different future and unanticipated resistance despite itself. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates that when the concept of ethicalpolitical responsibility is taken in its modern sense as a decision or outcome based on the protocols of reason, responsibility is neither simply possible nor simply impossible. Paradoxically, it appeals to a demand that it cannot fulfil; responsibility is thus (im)possible. Moreover, insofar as a deconstructive demonstration of this aporia is itself a response to reason’s own demand, deconstruction cannot be characterized as simply responsible or irresponsible. Rather, deconstruction inscribes itself as the (...) interior limit of the order of ethics, of responsibility, as such. Deconstruction is thus characterized best as an (ir)responsible interrogation of the very principle of reason to which political philosophers such as Habermas appeal when they invoke responsibility. To this extent deconstruction enacts the strange responsibility of interrogating critically precisely what is deemed ‘just’. Key Words: critique • deconstruction • Derrida • Enlightenment • ethics • Habermas • justice • modernity • reason • responsibility. (shrink)

The argument of this paper hinges on Derrida's relation to Judaism as a religious heritage and/or as an essential experience. If he can be said to ‘appropriate his Jewish roots’ at all, as Colby Dickinson (2011) has recently proposed, this is not because Derrida concurs that all belief in an ultimate reality (‘as such’) must now be understood in merely conditional terms (‘as if’). Rather, it is because Derrida deconstructs the difference between the Jew and the non-Jew, along with the (...) differences between the ‘as if’ and the ‘as such’ and the performative and the constative, in his very demonstration of the impossibility of ‘being-jewish’. Dickinson thus misunderstands the way in which Derrida appropriates Kant's regulative ‘as if’, and thus misrepresents what is at stake in Derrida's ‘faith’ in ‘Jewishness’. What is at stake is what Derrida calls deconstructive responsibility, and it takes the form of a radical fidelity to the principle of reason (to an ‘unconditional theoreticism’). This responsibility, paradoxically, demands and impels the interrogation of critical thinking itself, with its principles, its essences and its identities. Accordingly, Derrida interrupts both the ‘as such’ and the ‘as if’ with the ‘if’ of a dangerous ‘perhaps’. (shrink)

The characterisation of Derrida’s politics as a seeking for the “lesser violence” has become an almost paradigmatic interpretation. Yet the phrase _la moindre violence_ appears only in the early essay “Violence and Metaphysics” and its meaning is not as straightforward as might initially seem. I will argue that it is a mistake to take this expression to summarise the political import of this essay let alone of deconstruction more generally. What Derrida repeatedly concerns himself on that occasion is not “the (...) lesser violence” but “worse violence” and “the worst violence,” terms that appears several times. This will be seen to be as a prefiguring of how, from the early 1980s on, following engagements with Plato and Lyotard, Derrida repeatedly names and elaborates “the worst” as that which we should seek to avoid. In order to uncover the politics of deconstruction, I will examine what Derrida has to say about “the worst” as well as what is said in the secondary literature, for it is also a term around which a number of unfortunate misinterpretations have arisen. In conclusion, it will be remarked that with the late coinage of the term _aimance_ Derrida makes clear his close proximity to the ethics of Levinas and his affirmation of an aspiration to nonviolence in the relationship with the other. (shrink)

Drawing on struggles within academe between faculty that promote critical education and advocates of New Public Management (NPM) who endorse instrumental learning, I reimagine the university as a counter-space that positions it as a counter-power to informational capitalism. Initially, I outline its twin threats: ethical, as self-entrepreneurial academics are valorised by NPM; and political, with informationalisation conflating spaces of thinking. I then detail Scott Lash’s specific account of how the info-comm society negates critique. However, his monistic understanding of informationalisation means (...) Lash’s alternative of Informationskritik risks subsumption by it. I therefore defer to Jacques Derrida’s idea of the university. To ensure the autonomy of the principle of reason in a world of info-comm flows, the university is a supplementary body to society, yet intimately linked to it by its critical reflexivity, which is on behalf of society. Because Derrida does not elaborate the requisite institutional architecture, I conclude with Michel Foucault’s notion of heterotopia as a quasi-illicit site that is different and other. Such an institutional design enables the university as a counter-space that is a bank of reason and an archive of its manifestation in social practices. It also upholds a space for thinking, which in the form of nominalist critical history proffers a counter-power to society as an informational homotopia. (shrink)

The main research question that this paper aims to answer is: ‘In what does today’s attack on humanities consist and how can humanities be defended?’ In order to answer this research question, one needs first to describe how the humanities have argued for their usefulness before the Bologna Process; second, provide reasons for the claim that the Bologna Process would be a new type of attack; and third, analyse the new defences for the humanities, so as to discuss whether these (...) are suitable. The main finding of this study was to show that, before deciding what type of education society needs, we need to understand who we are educating through our universities. Taking a stance on “who should we educate?” is prior to being able to judge educational policies. This decision requires a previous justification that requires arguments taken from the field of social justice: Who needs to be educated and who has the right to be educated? Furthermore, we have seen that all answers we have examined to the question underlying educational policies, i.e. ‘who is being educated?’, were linked at some level with the citizenship issue. By defining who is a full citizen, an answer to the question who had the right to a humanistic education was implicitly answered. Nussbaum’s project to universalise the definition of democratic citizenship would ensure a basis for providing humanistic education for all. Such a line of arguing would provide humanities to the well-regarded status they had starting from the Renaissance times, but this time not as a device for exclusion, but inclusion for all. We have tried to show that, by defending the humanities, one defends the idea of a plurality of educational purposes, the right to build one’s life based on an education that is not submitted to the political goals of the day, ultimately the right to have a dissenting voice and a different perspective on life. By defending humanities, one defends the true ‘usefulness’ of education, namely its potential for constructing democratic citizenship for all. (shrink)