La exposición y crítica de las doctrinas antiguas tiene un lugar importante en los escritos de Aristóteles. Sin embargo, ciertas dudas se han vuelto corrientes acerca de la confiabilidad de sus descripciones. Más aún, se ha sostenido que Aristóteles deforma la comprensión histórica a través de la introducción de conceptos y términos propios. En este libro se aborda el problema a través de un análisis de las críticas que Aristóteles dirige a la teoría platónica de las Ideas, que permite explicar (...) la constitución y desarrollo de importantes conceptos aristotélicos a partir de la confrontación dialéctica con las doctrinas de su maestro. En efecto, las dificultades genuinas que Aristóteles descubre en el platonismo constituyen el motor para gestar nuevos conceptos, que no son ajenos, sino que surgen como implicaciones del examen crítico. Así, la imposición de términos propios no debe interpretarse como distorsión, sino como el modo que Aristóteles adopta para exhibir su particular solución a los problemas que los filósofos anteriores dejaron sin solución. (shrink)

Despite intensive exegetical work, Plato’s description of dialectic in the Sophist still raises many questions. Through a close reading of this passage that contextualizes it in the general organisation of the Sophist, this paper provides answers to these questions. After presenting the difficult text, I contend that the “vowel-kinds” are necessary conditions for the blending of kinds. Then, I interpret the “cause of divisions” mentioned by the Stranger as the kinds responsible of the dichotomous division in the first half of (...) the dialogue. In the next part, I show that 235d5-e2 does not describe a procedure of “meta-divison” as some commentators have it, but that it describes the method of division itself. Finally, I connect the difficulty and the obscurity of the passage to the fact that dialectic is the supreme science and I explain why dialectic is the science of free men. (shrink)

The sentence setting the stage for the philosophical investigation within the Philebus is, naively translated, “He says that to enjoy is good.” Instead of the predicate adjective “good,” most interpreters prefer to translate with a definite description, “the good,” with consequences that affect the interpretation of the dialogue as a whole. Part one defends the naïve translation, both in the context of Socrates’ first seven speeches and viewing the dialogue as a whole. Part two considers and rejects the reasons given (...) against the naïve translation on the basis of grammar, idiosyncratic Platonic style, immediate context, and later restatements. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este trabajo defendemos la siguiente tesis: la argumentación dada en el Filebo sobre los placeres falsos está fundamentada en la exposición de una fisiología ad hoc del alma. Para desarrollar tal idea realizamos el siguiente recorrido. Primero, exponemos dos definiciones de placer y dolor. Luego pasamos al estudio de los conceptos de memoria, sensación y deseo. Como tercer punto, por una parte, analizamos tres argumentos: el de la semejanza entre placer y opinión, el de los placeres falsos por (...) anticipación y el de los placeres falsos por apariencia sobreestimada. Por otra parte, analizamos, partiendo de la exposición precedente, las definiciones ya dadas de las afecciones psíquicas y las relaciones que tienen entre sí, entendiendo estas definiciones y relaciones como la fisiología del alma. Terminamos explicando qué lugar ocupa esta fisiología dentro del objetivo general del diálogo. ABSTRACT In the present work, we defend the following idea: the argument given in Philebus on false pleasures is based on an ad hoc physiology of the soul. To develop this idea, we proceed as follows: first, we introduce two definitions on pleasure and pain ; after that, we study the concepts of memory, perception, and desire ; thirdly, on one hand, we analyze three arguments: the relation between opinion and pleasure, false pleasures by anticipation, and false pleasures by an overestimated appearance ; on the other hand, we analyze, based on the preceding points, the definitions already given on psychic affections and the relations between them, understanding this definitions and relations as the soul's physiology. We end explaining the place given to this physiology in the dialogue's general frame. (shrink)

The inclusion of De astrologia in the Lucianic corpus has been disputed for centuries since it appears to defend astrological practices that Lucian elsewhere undercuts. This paper argues for Lucian’s authorship by illustrating its masterful subversion of a captatio benevolentiae and subtle rejection of Stoic astrological practices. The narrator begins the text by blaming phony astrologers and their erroneous predictions for inciting others to “denounce the stars and hate astrology” (ἄστρων τε κατηγοροῦσιν καὶ αὐτὴν ἀστρολογίην μισέουσιν, 2). The narrator assures (...) readers that he, the knowledgeable astrologer, will correct for the “stupidity and laziness” (ἀμαθίῃ καὶ ῥαθυμίῃ, ibid.) that bring about false predictions. The narrator’s credibility quickly decays when he attempts to recast Orpheus, Bellerophon, Icarus, Daedalus, and a host of other mythological figures as Greek astrologers. Lucian’s audience would expect such far-fetched interpretations of myth from the stereotypical Stoic philosopher, a character lampooned elsewhere in the Lucianic corpus. (shrink)

This paper transposes for evaluation in relation to the concerns of Plato’s Politicus a claim developed by Verity Harte in the context of his Philebus, that ‘external imposition of a practical aim would in some way corrupt paideutic [philosophical] knowledge’. I argue that the Politicus provides a case for which the Philebus distinction may not allow: ruling, or statecraft, as embodying a form of knowledge that can be answerable to practical norms in a way that does not necessarily subordinate or (...) corrupt its epistemic norms. I argue further that while Harte shows that the Philebus develops a view of the ethical value for a knower in being a knower, the Politicus for its part does not develop any view of the ethical value for a knower in being a ruler. (shrink)

Many scholars have denied that Plato’s argument about desire at Philebus 34c10–35d7 is related to his recollection arguments in the Meno and Phaedo, because it is concerned only with postnatal experiences of pleasure. This paper argues against their denial by showing that the desire argument in question is intended to prove the soul’s possession of innate memory of pleasure. This innateness interpretation will be supported by a close analysis of the Timaeus, where Plato suggests that our inborn desires for food (...) and drink derive from the primitive experiences of pleasure that have naturally been incorporated into the appetitive part of the soul. (shrink)

In modern epistemology, one ‘value of knowledge’ problem concerns the question why knowledge should be valued more highly than mere true belief. Though this problem has a background in Plato, the present paper, focused on Philebus 55–9, is concerned with a different question: what questions might one ask about the value of knowledge, and what question does Plato ask here? The paper aims to articulate the kind of value Plato here attributes to ‘useless’ knowledge, knowledge pursued without practical object; and (...) why, according to him, there is value in being a knower. Though his answer to this question requires commitments we may resist, it has a structure of general philosophical interest. (shrink)

In the Philebus, Socrates maintains two theses about the relationship between pleasure and the good life: the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is better than the unmixed life of intelligence, and: the unmixed life of intelligence is the most divine. Taken together, these two claims lead to the paradoxical conclusion that the best human life is better than the life of a god. A popular strategy for avoiding this conclusion is to distinguish human from divine goods; on such a (...) reading, pleasure has merely instrumental value, and it benefits human beings only as a result of their imperfect nature. I argue that certain ‘pure’ pleasures are full-fledged, intrinsic goods in the Philebus, which are even worthy of the gods . This positive evaluation of pure pleasure results from a detailed examination of pleasure, which reveals that different types of pleasures have fundamentally different natures. (shrink)

The great speech of the Protagoras still leaves many questions open. Particularly striking is the presence of doctrines that later on will be taken up and further developed by Plato in such dialogues as the Politicus, the Timaeus and the Laws. For this reason, many scholars tend to think that the words of Protagoras are just a product of Plato’s invention that bear no relation to Protagoras’ actual doctrines. Nevertheless, it is possible to propose a different interpretation. At the beginning (...) of the Protagoras, Socrates develops the image of the sophist as the merchant of various μαθήματα: to sell his products, the sophist praises them all indiscriminately without knowing which of them are useful and which are harmful. But he who has the ability to make this distinction can still purchase the μαθήματα from Protagoras or anyone else. Through the dialectic, Plato is able to examine them without any danger in the Protagoras and then take them up and further develop in new ways in his later dialogues. (shrink)

Recent scholarship has recognized some thematic connections related to onto-cosmological issues between two late Platonic dialogues, such as Philebus and Timaeus, and has tried to explain them in different ways. The aim of this paper is to contribute to such a debate by analysing an ancient exegesis of Timaeus 35a1-b4, that of Plutarch of Chaeronea, which made use of the ontological sections of the Philebus in his treatise on the cosmogony of the Timaeus. More specifically, this analysis will show that (...) the notions of ‘limit’ and ‘unlimitedness’ played a decisive role in the shaping of the “essence” of the world-soul according to Plutarch. (shrink)

El propósito de este ensayo es presentar una interpretación deflacionaria de la línea dividida en República VI-VII. Argumento que una parte importante de las dificultades existentes entre la διάνοια y la νόησις radica en el hecho de que se leen las diferentes secciones de la línea dividida como si fueran compartimientos cerrados. Mi afirmación es que uno de los problemas cruciales y de difícil solución es cómo entender que un alma que opere según la νόησις pueda llevar a cabo sus (...) actividades cognitivas prescindiendo completamente de cualquier ingrediente sensible, toda vez que el alma que procede “noéticamente” está en un cuerpo. Para intentar explicar este importante detalle utilizo un pasaje del Fedón, en el que Platón intenta mostrar que es posible desentenderse del cuerpo “en la medida de lo posible”. La tesis de que el alma va ganando “claridad” a medida que va ascendiendo desde la εἰκασία hasta la νόησις, sostengo, podría entenderse como “certeza”: como algunos epistemólogos contemporáneos, Platón parece haber visualizado la idea de que, si hay conocimiento, tal conocimiento debe ser cierto, y tal certeza, sugiero, no se entiende como una mera certeza ‘psicológica’, sino como una certeza ‘epistémica’. Es decir, las razones que el sujeto cognoscente platónico posee son lo suficientemente fuertes como para creer que lo que cree es verdadero. (shrink)

En este artículo trato de mostrar la diferencia entre el concepto de tò posón, la cantidad determinada o proporción matemática, válida en el terreno de las realidades cuantificables, y el concepto de tò métrion, la justa medida, válida en el terreno de las acciones humanas, no cuantificables. Argume..