Relaxed naturalism and liberal naturalism both invite us to adopt a philosophy of nature that includes a range of non-scientific phenomena in its inventory while nevertheless keeping the supernatural at bay. This paper considers the question of how relaxed naturalism relates to liberal naturalism and what refinements are required if they are to succeed in their joint cause of developing a tenable alternative to scientific naturalism. Particular attention is given to what might be added to the naturalist’s toolbox when it (...) comes to identifying and dealing with supernatural excesses and clarifying how philosophers can do positive metaphysical work in support of the naturalistic project. (shrink)

This dissertation considers the “strategic naturalism” of Sandra Harding’s standpoint theory in the philosophy of science, and it should be applied to epistemology. Strategic naturalism stipulates that all elements of inquiry are historically and culturally situated, and thereby subject to critical reflection, analysis, and revision. Allegiance to naturalism is de rigueur, yet there is no clear agreement on the term’s meaning. Harding’s standpoint theory reads the lack of definition as indicative of its generative possibilities for epistemic progress. The driving question (...) is why Harding’s approach has not been considered a viable candidate for determining progress in epistemology. Beyond the fact that epistemic labor, in its scientific and non-scientific forms, is a social activity, Harding’s approach recognizes that it is situated in and reinforced by a broader network of social institutions, beliefs, and practices. Harding’s strategic naturalism would invigorate epistemology by increasing the awareness, acceptance, and respect for epistemic difference and drive epistemic progress that not only acknowledges pluralistic ways of knowing but also gives a more accurate account of the knowing subject. Chapter one is a discussion of non-naturalized epistemology and Quinean Naturalized Epistemology (QNE), framed by Harding’s historical account of the related projects of modern epistemology and science. This chapter highlights two important issues. The first issue is that epistemology is more complex than the story Quine offers. The second, and decisive issue is that the shared history of modern epistemology and science demonstrates the influence of social and cultural values on that history, and the long shadows they cast on naturalism debates in epistemology, science, and philosophy of science. Chapter two is an exegetical account of the origins of and motivations for critical feminist responses to both the received epistemological theory and QNE discussed in chapter one. The justifications for the feminist critiques and the problematic issues that motivate these critiques provide the backdrop for the initial, positive response to QNE, as well as their disenchantment with Quine’s influential proposal. Ultimately, feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science assess QNE as not naturalized enough to address their concerns. Chapter three considers several feminist standpoint theories to show that they are more naturalistic and better at providing a multi-faceted theory that is based on actual scientific practice, and re-introduces social values and interests as having a positive influence on epistemology and philosophies of science. This chapter shows that given the closely shared histories and assumptions of modern epistemology and science, FSE would be a viable resource for a more naturalistic epistemology. The final chapter argues that the project of naturalizing epistemology could incorporate FSE insights and the positive role FSE’s controversiality would play in naturalizing epistemology and philosophies of science. If we are to take seriously the concept of situatedness and what that entails, then naturalism must also be situated, and revisited with a critical and reflective eye. The implications on both our epistemic theories and our accounts of what kinds of knowing subject we are would foster epistemic progress. (shrink)

The infamous fact/value dichotomy has been a controversial thesis that, especially during the twentieth century, has influenced the ethical andepistemological reflections within analytic philosophy, several non-philosophicaldisciplines like law and economics, and also the laymen way of thinking about moralsubjects. The dichotomy basically says that our statements of fact are objective and 103 Néstor Rodríguez  La cruzada de Putnam contra La Dicotomía Hecho/Valor… rational while our value judgments are, necessarily, subjective and, therefore, don`tdeserve to be rationally discussed. This way of (...) thinking has been largely detrimentalto ethical reflection in general and various philosophers have been looking for a wayto argue against it and to promote its abandonment in order to recover talk of moralobjectivity. This article serves as a general review of the discussion concerning thefact/value dichotomy and its alleged collapse. We follow, as a guide, the work of the late American philosopher Hilary Putnamsince his has become the most significant when it comes to favor the abandonment ofthe dichotomy and the one most prominent in sketching an alternative perspective.According to this, the structure of the article puts forwards three sections. In the firstwe consider the arguments Putnam has in favor of the collapse of the fact/valuedichotomy. In the second we take a look at the ethical and metaethical landscapemodeled by the defense of the dichotomy and also at some of the assumptions thathave been linked to it. Finally, the third section presents briefly the alternativeposition Putnam offers in face of the inevitable collapse. (shrink)