When questioning whether political deception can be ethically warranted, two competing intuitions jump to the fore. First, political deception is a fact of human life, used in the realpolitik of governance. Second, the ethical warrant of truth asserts itself as inexorably and indefatigably preferable to falsehood. Unfortunately, a cursory examination of the history of philosophy reveals a paucity of models to marry these basic intuitions. Some thinkers (e.g., Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Kant, Mill, and Rawls) privilege the truth by neglecting the (...) realpolitik, i.e., the truth is inviolate. Others (e.g., Machiavelli, Bentham, and the often infamous caché of 20th century dictators) focus upon the realpolitik to the exclusion of the primacy of the truth. A third group of critical thinkers (e.g., Arendt and Bok) examine the topic but offer no positive, systematic treatment of deception. Lacking are theories which simultaneously recognize that political untruth is often necessary, but that untruth is only justified when a) truth is politically impossible, b) the necessity of untruth is demonstrable, and c) the truth can be replaced with a minimally injurious untruth. Plato offers one such account in the Republic, arguing that deceit must be applied medicinally to the city. However, his account is problematic in detail. One of Plato’s inheritors, the 10th century thinker al-Fārābī, advanced Plato’s theoretical account, arguing that political governance requires restrained political deception. This deception, the expression of philosophical truths through the symbols of religion, meets the criteria mentioned above, being necessary, demonstrably necessary, and minimally injurious. But while al-Fārābī provides a valuable model for what justified political deception could look like, the lengths to which he must go in order to create a viable model for political deception reveals the untenability of the notion of justified political deception writ large. One must orchestrate an entire cosmos around the notion, notably a cosmos that does not match our own. One must adopt very specific conceptions of human nature, association, and happiness, as well as a particular metaphysics and epistemology. For, while al-Fārābī shows that political deception can be justifiable, he also reveals its unjustifiability outside an idealized setting. (shrink)

Rozprawa podkreśla związek między językową argumentacją a logiką. Argumentacja językowa jest systemem językowym, który stosuje znaczenie wyrażeń ujętych w zdania do zarysowania pełnego znaczenia zdań, w nich bowiem konstytuują się zależności między wyrażeniami. Rzeczywiście, to powiązanie między wyrażeniami wzmacnia całościowe znaczenie począwszy od samych podstaw struktury zdania w logicznym powiązaniu idei. W nim znajduje się relacja między słowami a umysłem, zależna od logiki powiązanych ze sobą wypowiedzi. Aby podkreślić znaczenie przedstawionego wyżej sposobu myślenia, autorka zwraca się ku teorii wczesnej gramatyki (...) arabskiej, ogniskującej się raczej wokół analogii niż anomalii. Nastawienie w systemie na analogię opiera się na podstawowej teorii, która implikuje wspomnianą wyżej relację, choć niektóre współczesne ujęcia odrzucają tę interpretację. W podsumowaniu swojej analizy, autorka uwzględnia podobne teorie gramatyki łacińskiej, które wykazują nastawienie logiczne, będące następstwem powiązania językowej argumentacji z logiką. Konkludując, autorka stwierdza, iż powiązanie słów i logiki okazuje się pojęciem uniwersalnym. (shrink)

This paper clarifies the significance of philosophy for traditional societies and modern societies and their evolution. In this paper ethics is the mainstream philosophy which studies and analyses the values of both the traditional societies and modern ones. This paper is only the ethical study of the traditional values and modern values. There are three ways to philosophize societies as traditional and modern: Ethical perspective, economical and theological, but this paper deals only with the ethical approach. Philosophers from ancient to (...) modern era played an important part in the transformation of traditional into modern. Morality and religion changed the mind of the nations towards development and ethical progress. In this article ancient philosophy, medieval philosophy, modern philosophy and others religious philosophies of India, china, and Muslim philosophies exercised key attempts to study traditional societies and modern societies. This paper highlights the factors that are responsible for the vices in traditional societies and also the elements that are productive for the promotion of modern societies. (shrink)

In his seminal Orientalism and Religion, Richard King argues that Western scholars of religion have constructed a conceptual dichotomy between “mysticism” and “rationality” that has caused them to systematically distort the claims and arguments of Eastern thinkers. While King focuses primarily on Western scholarship on the Buddhist and Hindu traditions, this essay shows that his argument can also be extended to apply to Western scholarship on al-Ghazālī, whose sympathy for Sufism and apparent rejection of Greek philosophy has often earned him (...) the reputation of being a champion of Islamic mysticism. I argue that al-Ghazālī transcends the dueling categories of ‘rationality’ and ‘mysticism’ that have been imposed on him by offering a conception of experiential knowledge that retains its roots in the ‘mystical’ Sufi tradition, even while also highlighting the rational merits of experientially-grounded modes of knowing. In particular, I argue that al-Ghazālī shows us how experiential knowledge is both important to providing motivation for rational action and also critical to underwriting persons’ genuine understanding of the evaluative properties of that which is known. (shrink)

Happiness ) materializes as the ultimate goal of man in Abū NaṣrMuḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Tarkhān al-Fārābīs Mabādi' Arā' Ahl Al-Madīna Al-Fāḍila. Buthappiness, i.e., happiness in this life and happiness in the afterlife, is onlyattainable by the virtuous citizen. The prevailing academic vision of Fārābī'sVirtuous City essentially can be placed into two categories: either it is an idealas found in Plato’s Republic or it is an actual city that has been founded or willbe established at some time in the future. (...) The difficulty with both of theseinterpretations is that they limit who can attain happiness. (shrink)