Resumen Propongo interpretar la inversión de Deleuze del platonismo como la creación de conceptos nuevos a partir de elementos teóricos tomados de la filosofía del propio Platón. En primer lugar, consideraré el origen nietzscheano de la inversión y su interpretación heideggeriana, de la cual, creo, Deleuze se vale para ciertos argumentos. En segundo lugar, me basaré en la hipótesis de Francis Wolff e Isabelle Ginoux de que la filosofía platónica tiene un carácter ambiguo en la obra deleuziana para analizar esa (...) ambigüedad en términos de la pregunta por los elementos positivos que Deleuze rescata para la creación de una nueva imagen del pensamiento.I propose to interpret the deleuzian reversal of Platonism as the creation of new concepts from the same elements the French philosopher extracts from Plato’s thought. To justify this I will first examine the nietzschean origins of the reversal as well as Heidegger’s interpretation of it, which I think inspires Deleuze. Then, based on the works of Francis Wolff and Isabelle Ginoux, I will explore the ambiguity of Plato’s role in Deleuze’s philosophy, especially in those elements he recovers and exploits to build a new image of thought. (shrink)

This article tries to elucidate the Deleuzian project of the reversal of Platonism in relation to that of Nietzsche. To this aim, I have made a predominantly historiographic sketch of the question in both authors. In the case of Nietzsche, I inquired about both the relationship that the reversal of Platonism presents in his philosophy with the problem of nihilism and the evolution that the topic undergoes throughout his vast intellectual production, until it reaches its final formulation. With regard to (...) Deleuze, I offer a broad overview of his work aimed at tracing the subject, from his interpretation of the Nietzschean formulation, as opposed to that of Heidegger, to the meticulous way in which it fits into his own philosophy as a shift of the essence in favour of the event as a source of singularities. (shrink)

Deleuze’s reversal of Platonism shifted the traditional emphasis on thinking that which participates in a concept to that in which a claim to participation occurs. The first part of this article presents a reading of this reversal that highlights the implications of Deleuze’s ontology for his non-ontological account of participation, highlighting how this ontology builds on aspects of Plato’s philosophy recovered from beneath the later Platonic tradition of philosophy and supports Deleuze’s account of the rival claims of philosophy and opinion (...) to participate in thought. The second part outlines the difficulties presented by philosophy’s constitutive participation in friendship, love, and rivalry for it to be able to achieve its distinctive task of creating concepts that defeat opinion’s rival claims to address the problems that present themselves to thought. (shrink)

This article argues for a new interpretation of the relation between Deleuze’s engagements with Nietzsche and Plato in the first chapter of Différence et répétition (1968). It (a) argues scholarship has overlooked important features of this relation, (b) reconstructs the text’s motivating problem of the reduction of difference to identity, (c) rethinks Deleuze’s use of “faire la différence” to show its methodological significance relative to Nietzsche and Plato, (d) proposes an account of the basic movement of differential being or becoming (...) figured as the Nietzschean “test” of the eternal return, (e) examines Deleuze’s derivation of the concept of simulacrum from Platonism for his revisionist theory of beings, and (f) proposes a solution to a problem unresolved in existing interpretations of the text: namely, how the text’s theory of beings as simulacra and its theory of being or becoming as the differential movement of the eternal return can have systematic unity. (shrink)