Astrophysicist Abraham Loeb suggests that the interstellar interloper 1I/2017 ‘Oumuamua, detected in our solar system in 2017, is alien space debris or even an alien operational probe. Does this conjecture have significant epistemic support, such that it can be justified as a viable hypothesis? In this paper, I propose that the meta-empirical confirmation approach, developed and defended by philosopher and physicist Dawid, provides an appropriate framework to answer this question. I defend this proposal by elucidating how meta-empirical confirmation applies to (...) the ‘Oumuamua case and what specific meta-empirical arguments could support Loeb’s hypothesis. Even though Loeb would not himself endorse meta-empirical confirmation, because it is not traditional empiricism, this case shows that meta-empirical confirmation is not in fact a threat to empiricism. (shrink)

In science and everyday life, we often infer that something is true because it would explain some set of facts better than any other hypothesis we can think of. But what if we have reason to believe that there is a better way to explain these facts that we just haven't thought of? Wouldn't that undermine our warrant for believing the best available explanation? Many philosophers have assumed that we can solve such underconsideration problems by stipulating that a hypothesis should (...) not only be 'the best' explanation available; rather, it should also be 'good enough'. Unfortunately, however, the only current suggestion for what it might mean to say that an explanation is 'good enough' is, well, not good enough. This paper aims to provide a better account of what is required for an explanatory hypothesis to be considered 'good enough'. In brief, the account holds that a `good enough' hypothesis is one that has gone through a process that I call explanatory consolidation, in which accumulating evidence and failed attempts to formulate better alternatives gradually make it more plausible that the explanation we currently have is better than any other that could be formulated. (shrink)

While $$\Lambda $$ Λ CDM has emerged as the standard model of cosmology, a small group of physicists defends modified newtonian dynamics (MOND) as an alternative view on cosmology. Exponents of MOND have employed a broad, at times explicitly philosophical, conceptual perspective in arguing their case. This paper offers reasons why that MONDian defense has been ineffective. First, we argue that the defense is ineffective according to Popperian or Lakatosian views–ostensibly the preferred philosophical views on theory assessment of proponents of (...) MOND. Second, we argue that the defense of MOND can instead best be reconstructed as an instance of meta-empirical theory assessment. The formal employment of meta-empirical assessment by MONDians is unconvincing, however, because it lacks a sufficient epistemic foundation. Specifically, the MONDian No Alternatives Argument relies on falsifiability or explanation conditions that lack epistemic relevance, while the argument from Unexpected Explanatory Success fails since there is a known alternative to MOND. In the last part of the paper, we draw some lessons for applications of meta-empirical assessment more generally. (shrink)

The word “effective” has become the standard label attached to scientific theories these days. An effective theory allows us to make accurate predictions about a physical system at a certain (energy, length) scale while being largely ignorant of the details at more fundamental levels. One does not need to know anything about the deeper, quantum structure of water molecules to describe the macroscopic behaviour of waves or water in a glass. Although effective descriptions so broadly construed have been part of (...) research in physics since the earliest stages of modern science, it is particle physics that has most clearly relied on and brought to the fore some of the most interesting and admittedly puzzling aspects of this way of looking at theories. Indeed, the effective field theory (EFT) program in QFT has established itself as the most natural way to understand renormalisation and dissipate initial reservations about the status of these techniques by treating higher-order processes as contributions suppressed at lower energy scales. QFT is thus treated as the “effective” framework par excellence with the decoupling of scales constituting its permeating tenet. The goal of this project is to attempt a philosophical appraisal of EFTs as currently used in high energy physics as well as assess the possibility that the whole program eventually breaks down, i.e. fails to apply when certain preconditions do not hold. Accordingly, the dissertation is logically divided into two parts with the first two chapters dedicated to discussion of the relation between EFTs and traditional questions in the philosophy of science concerning the structure of scientific theories, the formulation and defence of scientific realism as well as its connection to possible ontological readings of EFTs. The second part constitutes an analysis of two well-known problems that have been accorded the status of crises in the physics literature: the hierarchy problem and the cosmological constant problem. Our main focus will be to uncover those assumptions responsible for undermining the validity of the EFT techniques in their respective context. In light of this analysis, we will ultimately lean towards a more cautionary or “reserved” approach to EFTs. (shrink)

The goal of this dissertation is to reconstruct, critically evaluate, and apply the pluralism of Paul Feyerabend. I conclude by suggesting future points of contact between Feyerabend’s pluralism and topics of interest in contemporary philosophy of science. I begin, in Chapter 1, by reconstructing Feyerabend’s critical philosophy. I show how his published works from 1948 until 1970 show a remarkably consistent argumentative strategy which becomes more refined and general as Feyerabend’s thought matures. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend develops a persuasive (...) case against rationalism, or the thesis that there exist normative and exclusive rules of scientific rationality. In Chapter 2, I reconstruct Feyerabend’s pluralism and detail its relationship to his humanitarianism and epistemological anarchism. I understand Feyerabend’s pluralism as the combination of the principles of proliferation and tenacity. I show the evolution and justification of these principles from Feyerabend’s early papers until the late 1970s. In Chapter 3, I defend Feyerabend’s pluralism from its most prominent criticisms. I then clarify that Feyerabend’s pluralism amounts to a conception of the logic of theory pursuit and modify his view using insights from C.S. Peirce, Pierre Duhem, and Michael Polanyi. From Peirce, I show how economic, sociological, and value-laden features of theory pursuit may be used to constrain proliferation and tenacity. From Duhem and Polanyi, I try to show the proper role of tacit knowledge within a Feyerabendian framework. Finally, I show what implications Feyerabend’s pluralism has for models of distributing funds within scientific communities. I contend that it provides a more promising model that the ‘well-ordered science’ proposal advanced by numerous philosophers and social scientists. Specifically, I aim to understand what taking Feyerabend’s pluralism seriously entails for principles of balancing funding allocation decisions and the role of peer-review in evaluating the potential success of research proposals. I conclude by suggesting future lines of research for further analyzing and applying Feyerabend’s pluralism. (shrink)

Eliminative reasoning is a method that has been employed in many significant episodes in the history of science. It has also been advocated by some philosophers as an important means for justifying well-established scientific theories. Arguments for how eliminative reasoning is able to do so, however, have generally relied on a too narrow conception of evidence, and have therefore tended to lapse into merely heuristic or pragmatic justifications for their conclusions. This paper shows how a broader conception of evidence not (...) only can supply the needed justification but also illuminates the methodological significance of eliminative reasoning in a variety of contexts. (shrink)