Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Whose purposes? Biological teleology and intentionality.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4507-4524.
    Teleosemantic theories aspire to develop a naturalistic account of intentional agency and thought by appeal to biological teleology. In particular, most versions of teleosemantics study the emergence of intentionality in terms of biological purposes introduced by Darwinian evolution. The aim of this paper is to argue that the sorts of biological purposes identified by these evolutionary approaches do not allow for a satisfactory account of intentionality. More precisely, I claim that such biological purposes should be attributed to reproductive chains or (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Teleosemantics and the Epiphenomenality of Content.Eric Saidel - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (sup1):139-166.
    The naturalistically inclined philosopher of mind faces two related challenges: show how mental content could be part of the natural world, and show how content can be one of the factors responsible for producing behaviour, that is, show that content is not epiphenomenal. One might pursue the first goal with the intent of showing that mental content is epiphenomenal, but it is more likely that the philosopher concerned with showing how content can be naturalized also expects content to be causally (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Still Unsuccessful: The Unsolved Problems of Success Semantics.Javier González de Prado - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (1).
    Success semantics is a theory of content that characterizes the truth-conditions of mental representations in terms of the success-conditions of the actions derived from them. Nanay : 151-165, 2013) and Dokic and Engel have revised this theory in order to defend it from the objections that assailed its previous incarnations. I argue that both proposals have seemingly decisive flaws. More specifically, these revised versions of the theory fail to deal adequately with the open-ended possibility of unforeseen obstacles for the success (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•