I review the classic skeptical challenges of Foole in Leviathan and the Lydian Shepherd in Republic against the prudential rationality of justice. Attempts to meet these challenges contribute to the reconciliation project (Kavka in Hobbesian moral and political theory , 1986 ) that tries to establish that morality is compatible with rational prudence. I present a new Invisible Foole challenge against the prudential rationality of justice. Like the Lydian Shepherd, the Invisible Foole can violate justice offensively (Kavka, Hobbesian moral and (...) political theory , 1986 ; Law and Philosophy , 14:5–34, 1995 ) without harming his reputation for justice. And like the Foole, the Invisible Foole dismisses the possibility that being just preserves goods intrinsic to justice, and will be just only if he fears that others will punish his injustice by withholding the external goods like labor and material goods that he would otherwise receive for their performance in covenants. I argue that given a plausible folk-theorem interpretation , Hobbes’ response to the Foole’s challenge is inconclusive, and depends crucially upon common knowledge assumptions that may or may not obtain in actual societies. I present two analogous folk-theorem arguments in response to the Invisible Foole’s challenge, one using the idea that the Invisible Foole’s power of concealment might be transitory, and the other using the idea that members of society might stop performing in covenants with anyone, thus punishing the Invisible Foole indirectly, if the Invisible Foole commits sufficiently many injustices. (shrink)

Epicurean contractarianism is an attempt to reconcile individualistic hedonism with a robust account of justice. The pursuit of pleasure and the requirements of justice, however, have seemed to be incompatible to many commentators, both ancient and modern. It is not clear how it is possible to reconcile hedonism with the demands of justice. Furthermore, it is not clear why, even if Epicurean contractarianism is possible, it would be necessary for Epicureans to endorse a social contract. I argue here that Epicurean (...) contractarianism is both possible and necessary once we understand Epicurean practical rationality in a new way. We are left with an appealing version of teleological, individualistic contractarianism that is significantly different from Hobbesian contractarianism. (shrink)

This article reassesses Hobbes’s place in the history of ethics based on the first systematic analysis of his various classifications of formal goodness. The good was traditionally divided into three: profitably good, pleasurably good, and morally good. Across his works, Hobbes replaced the last with pulchrum—a decidedly non-moral form of goodness on his account. I argue that Hobbes’s dismissal of moral goodness was informed by his hedonist conception of the good and accompanied by reinterpretations of right reason and natural law. (...) By dispensing moral goodness and insisting on the hedonist and relational nature of the good, Hobbes moreover recast and rendered more urgent the question of why we should be moral. Hobbes is commonly thought to have raised this question so starkly because of his general insensitivity to the demands of justice. My analysis suggests that it may also, or rather, have been due to his restrictive conception of the good. A comparison with other moral philosophers from the period—including Suárez, Gassendi, Locke, and Pufendorf—indicates how unusual Hobbes’s jettisoning of moral goodness was. (shrink)

El primer objetivo del presente artículo es reconstruir el concepto de obligación política en Hume a partir de lo expuesto en el _Tratado de la naturaleza humana_ y en algunos de sus ensayos políticos. Hume es crítico del contractualismo y su idea del consentimiento como fundamento de la legitimidad de la autoridad, proponiendo en su lugar lo que llama “aquiescencia precaria”. El segundo objetivo es analizar el alcance del escepticismo humeano respecto de la obligación política y verificar si se extiende (...) a la obligación de cumplir las reglas de justicia. Para ello analizaremos la figura del _sensible knave_ introducida en la Investigación de los principios de la moral, y la respuesta que Hume le da a quienes se resisten a cumplir las reglas. Concluiremos que el escepticismo humeano que se ve reflejado en su comprensión de la obligación política, afecta también a su respuesta a los potenciales infractores de las reglas, sin embargo, más que un fallo en el argumento de Hume sería una ventaja para pensar la política más allá de los dogmatismos. (shrink)

InMorals by Agreement, David Gauthier (1986) argues that it is rational to intend to cooperate, even in single-play Prisoner's Dilemma games, provided (1) your co-player has a similar intention; (2) both intentions can be revealed to the other player. To this thesis four objections are made. (a) In a strategic decision the parameters on which the argument relies cannot be supposed to be given. (b) Of each pair ofa-symmetric intentions at least one is not rational. But it is impossible to (...) form symmetric intentions to cooperate conditionally. For the condition on which the decision depends cannot be fulfilled without deciding. (c) If one's intention has to be ascertained on the basis of information about one's past performance, it is straightforwardly rational to intend to cooperate, but there is no reason to do so in a single-play PD. (d) The argument cannot be extended ton-person games which are Gauthier's principal concern. (shrink)

We share our world with many people who ignore the principles of justice and who regularly take advantage of others by breaching trust or breaking agreements. This dissertation is about the irrationality of the actions of these covenant-breakers. A covenant-breaker typically believes that unjust behavior is to his advantage and that only a fool would act in any other way. Would it not be disturbing if this were true? My central claim will be that adherence to the precepts of justice (...) is a rational strategy for a self-interested actor. I intend to demonstrate that con men and covenant-breakers do not act rationally when violating an agreement. I will trace the concept of justice as it evolves through philosophical history and show that, while the concept of justice changes as the underlying concept of human nature and psychology changes, the argument in favor of the rationality of just behavior remains coherent throughout. Each historical interpretation will advance some form of the claim that the consistent observance of cooperative agreements is a rational strategy, and at each point an interlocutor will object. I will show that these interlocutors are mistaken. My motivating goal is to show that justice, understood as the consistent observance of cooperative agreements, is rational. I want to respond to the clandestine cheaters and other skeptics who believe that just behavior is for suckers, because, if the skeptics are right, and justice is indeed irrational, then those among us who are acting in a just manner are paying an unnecessary cost. (shrink)