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Practical Reason in Historical and Systematic Perspective.James Conant & Dawa Ometto (eds.) - 2023 - De Gruyter.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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Practical Knowledge without Luminosity.Bob Beddor & Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):917-934.details
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The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Joint Action.Facundo M. Alonso - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.details
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Taking Something as a Reason for Action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.details
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Weakness of will.Sarah Stroud - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Präferenzen, Nutzen und ihre Aggregation.Christoph Lumer - 2021 - In Christian Hiebaum (ed.), Interdisziplinäres Handbuch "Gemeinwohl". Springer Fachmedien. pp. 177-193.details
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Meaning, Evidence, and Objectivity.Olivia Sultanescu - 2020 - In Syraya Chin-Mu Yang & Robert H. Myers (eds.), Donald Davidson on Action, Mind and Value. Springer. pp. 171-184.details
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Agency and Mistakes.Santiago Amaya - 2022 - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 149-150.details
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Anscombe on Practical Knowledge.Kieran Setiya - 2016 - In Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays. New York, New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Intention, Action, and De Se Indexicality.Robert Francescotti - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-16.details
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‘Ought’: The correct intention account.Heath White - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):297-317.details
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A Defence of the Manifestation Requirement: An Application of Anscombe's Theory of Practical Knowledge.Takeshi Yamada - 2022 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 49 (2):111-130.details
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Autonomous Machine Agency.Don Berkich - 2002 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Self-Determination: The Ethics of Action, Volume 1.Thomas Pink - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Intentions are mental states.Jing Zhu & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242.details
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Setiya on reasons and causes.Ben Wolfson - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (3):276-289.details
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Radical ethical naturalism.Tom Whyman - 2018 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 44 (2):159-178.details
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An occurrent theory of practical and theoretical reasoning.Arthur F. Walker - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (2):199 - 210.details
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A problem for causal theories of action.Mark Thomas Walker - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):84–108.details
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Akrasia and self-control.David Wall - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):69 – 78.details
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Knowledge Out of Control.Markos Valaris - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):733-753.details
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Quasi-realism's problem of autonomous effects.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):392–409.details
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Silencing Desires?Attila Tanyi - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):887-903.details
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Intention-sensitive semantics.A. Stokke - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):383-404.details
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Intentions: past, present, future.Matthew Noah Smith - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):1-12.details
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Autonomous weapons systems and the moral equality of combatants.Michael Skerker, Duncan Purves & Ryan Jenkins - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 22 (3):197-209.details
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The Calendar Paradox.Sam Shpall - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):801-825.details
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Knowing How.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3):285-307.details
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Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details
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Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Ethics 117 (4):649-673.details
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Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.details
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Lucky joint action.Julius Schönherr - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):123-142.details
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Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
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The Intention Principle and the Doctrine of Double Effect.Amir Saemi - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):91-99.details
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John Buridan and Donald Davidson on Akrasia.Risto Saarinen - 1993 - Synthese 96 (1):133-154.details
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In defense of a strong persistence requirement on intention.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10289-10312.details
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Is it rational to carry out strategic intentions?Michael H. Robins - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):191-221.details
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A Retributive Justification for not Punishing Bare Intentions or: On the Moral Relevance of the 'Now-Belief'.Federico Picinali - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (4):385-403.details
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Contrastive Intentions.Andrew Peet - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (4):24.details
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Trying slips: Can Davidson and Hornsby account for mistakes and slips?Kay Peabody - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):173-216.details
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Practical knowledge first.Carlotta Pavese - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.details
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The conclusion of practical reasoning: the shadow between idea and act.Sarah K. Paul - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):287-302.details
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Non‐Accidental Knowing.Niall J. Paterson - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):302-326.details
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III*—The Anomalism of Psychology.Sarah Patterson - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):37-52.details
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The content of intentions.Elisabeth Patherie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (4):400-432.details
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The modern guise of the good.Francesco Orsi - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (1):1-4.details
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Intending Recalcitrant Social Ends.Carlos Núñez - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):477-498.details
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Intending Recalcitrant Social Ends.Carlos Núñez - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):477-498.details
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