Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Retribution and Organic Unities.Michael Clark - 2006 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (3):351-358.
    Moore argued that his principle of organic unities, according to which the value of a whole is to be distinguished from the value of the sum of its parts, is consistent with a retributivist view of punishment: both crime and punishment are intrinsic evils but the combination of the crime with the punishment of its perpetrator is less bad in itself than the crime unpunished. Moore’s principle excludes any form of retributivism that regards the punishment of a guilty person as (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Neither Generalism nor Particularism: Ethical Correctness is Located in General Ethical Theories.Jane Singleton - 2004 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2):155-175.
    In this article I shall be supporting two main claims. The first is that the essence of the difference between particularism and generalism lies in where they locate ethical correctness. The second is that generalism, although to be preferred to particularism, is not the final resting place for ethical correctness. Ultimately, ethical correctness resides in ethical theories that provide the rationale for generalism. Particularism is presented as a theory that allows attention to be paid to specific cases and shows a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Turning on Default Reasons.Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):55-76.
    Particularism takes an extremely ecumenical view of what considerations might count as reasons and thereby threatens to ‘flatten the moral landscape’ by making it seem that there is no deep difference between, for example, pain, and shoelace color. After all, particularists have claimed, either could provide a reason provided a suitable moral context. To avoid this result, some particularists draw a distinction between default and non-default reasons. The present paper argues that all but the most deflationary ways of drawing this (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Putting Particularism in its Place.Joshua Gert - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324.
    Abstract: The point of this paper is to undermine the support that particularism in the domain of epistemic reasons might seem to give to particularism in the domain of practical reasons. In the epistemic domain, there are two related notions: truth and the rationality of belief. Epistemic reasons are related to the rationality of belief, and not directly to truth. In the domain of practical reasons, however, the role of truth is taken by the notion of objective rationality. Practical reasons (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • What Do Reasons Do?Jonathan Dancy - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (s):95-113.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • What Do Reasons Do?Jonathan Dancy - unknown
  • Strangers to Ourselves: A Nietzschean Challenge to the Badness of Suffering.Nicolas Delon - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Is suffering really bad? The late Derek Parfit argued that we all have reasons to want to avoid future agony and that suffering is in itself bad both for the one who suffers and impersonally. Nietzsche denied that suffering was intrinsically bad and that its value could even be impersonal. This paper has two aims. It argues against what I call ‘Realism about the Value of Suffering’ by drawing from a broadly Nietzschean debunking of our evaluative attitudes, showing that a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Good-Making and Organic Unity.Johan Brännmark - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1499-1516.
    Since G. E. Moore introduced his concept of organic unity there has been some discussion of how one should best understand this notion and whether there actually are any organic unities in the Moorean sense. Such discussions do however often put general questions about part-whole relations to the side and tend to focus on interpreting our intuitive responses to possible cases of organic unity. In this paper the focus lies on the part-whole relation in valuable wholes and it is suggested (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Holism About Value: Some Help for Invariabilists.Daniel Halliday - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1033-1046.
    G.E. Moore’s principle of organic unity holds that the intrinsic value of a whole may differ from the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. Moore combined this principle with invariabilism about intrinsic value: An item’s intrinsic value depends solely on its bearer’s intrinsic properties, not on which wholes it has membership of. It is often said that invariabilism ought to be rejected in favour of what might be called ‘conditionalism’ about intrinsic value. This paper is an attempt to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Value Invariabilism and Two Distinctions in Value.Zak A. Kopeikin - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):45-63.
    Following Moore, value invariabilists deny that the intrinsic value of something can be affected by features extrinsic to it. The primary focuses of this paper are to examine the invariabilistic thesis and expand upon how we ought to understand it, in light of contemporary axiological distinctions, and to argue that distinguishing between different kinds of invariabilism provides resources to undermine a prominent argument against variabilism. First, I use two contemporary axiological distinctions to clarify what kind of value the invariabilism debate (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Significance of Value Additivity.Campbell Brown - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-24.
    Whether value is “additive,” that is, whether the value of a whole must equal the sum of the values of its parts, is widely thought to have significant implications in ethics. For example, additivity rules out “organic unities,” and is presupposed by “contrast arguments.” This paper reconsiders the significance of value additivity. The main thesis defended is that it is significant only for a certain class of “mereologies”, roughly, those in which both wholes and parts are “complete”, in the sense (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Reason Holism, Individuation, and Embeddedness.Peter Tsu - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1091-1103.
    The goal of this paper is to promote what I call ‘the embedded thesis’ as a general constraint on how moral reasons behave. Dancy’s reason holism will be used as a foil to illustrate the thesis. According to Dancy’s reason holism, moral reasons behave in a holistic way; that is, a feature that is a moral reason in one context might not be so in another or might even be an opposite reason. The way a feature manages to switch its (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • System Consequentialism.Avram Hiller - 2013 - In Avram Hiller, Leonard Kahn & Ramona Ilea (eds.), Consequentialism and Environmental Ethics. pp. 85-111.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Metaethics After Moore.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Metaethics, understood as a distinct branch of ethics, is often traced to G. E. Moore's 1903 classic, Principia Ethica. Whereas normative ethics is concerned to answer first order moral questions about what is good and bad, right and wrong, metaethics is concerned to answer second order non-moral questions about the semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of moral thought and discourse. Moore has continued to exert a powerful influence, and the sixteen essays here represent the most up-to-date work in metaethics after, and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • What Makes Writing Academic.Julia Molinari - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Nottingham
    This thesis contextualises academic writing in EAP (English for Academic Purposes) and subjects it to an interdisciplinary (educational and philosophical) analysis in order to argue that what makes writing academic are its socio-academic practices and values, not its conventional forms. In rejecting dominant discourses that frame academic writing as a transferable skill which can be reduced to conventional forms, I show that academic writings are varied and evolve alongside changing writer agencies and textual environments. This accounts for the emergence of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Defense of Organic Unities.Noah Lemos - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (2):125-141.
    In this essay, I defend the Moorean position on organic unities. I will present some plausible examples of organic unites and consider some objections to them. In particular, I will consider an objection from evaluative inadequacy and an objection from Holism or Conditionalism. I will also examine one line of criticism that claims the Moorean position is incoherent.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Two Kinds of Holism About Values.Campbell Brown - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):456–463.
    I compare two kinds of holism about values: G.E. Moore's 'organic unities', and Jonathan Dancy's 'value holism'. I propose a simple formal model for representing evaluations of parts and wholes. I then define two conditions, additivism and invariabilism, which together imply a third, atomism. Since atomism is absurd, we must reject one of the former two conditions. This is where Moore and Dancy part company: whereas Moore rejects additivism, Dancy rejects invariabilism. I argue that Moore's view is more plausible. Invariabilism (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations