Este trabajo contiene tres diferentes tipos de objeciones al famoso "argumento del lenguaje privado" de Wittgenstein. Primero ofrezco una reconstrucción posible del argumento. Luego, como primera objeción, e inspirándome en H. N. Castañeda, presento casos donde, contra la opinión de Wittgenstein, el sujeto corrige sus propios errores basándose en distintos criterios subjetivos A continuación, como una segunda objeción, presento situaciones hipotéticas destinadas a mostrar que las experiencias subjetivas, aún si fuesen privadas, podrían en principio ser intersubjetivamente testeadas, si bien en (...) forma indirecta, tal como lo son las entidades inobservables de la ciencia. Finalmente, como tercera objeción, pongo en duda un supuesto básico del cartesianismo sobre el cual descansa el argumento del lenguaje privado. Este supuesto es la conocida tesis de la privacidad de la experiencia subjetiva. Mi argumento contra esta tesis se basa en los casos de bisección cerebral estudiados por T. Nagel, M. Lockwood y otros. This paper contains three different kinds of objections to Wittgenstein's famous "private language argument". First I offer a possible reconstruction of the argument. Then, as a first objection, drawing my ideas from H.N Castañeda, I present cases where, against Wittgenstein's opinion, the subject corrects his own errors based on different subjective criteria. Afterwards, as a second objection, I offer hypothetical examples in order to show that subjective experiences, even is they were private, could in principle be intersubjectively tested, although in a indirect way, as the unobservable entities of science are. Finally, as a third point, I challenge a basic presupposition of Cartesianism on which the private language argument rests. This presupposition is the well known thesis of the essential privacy of subjective experience. My argument against this thesis is based on the split-brain cases, studied by T. Nagel, M. Lockwood and others. (shrink)

U članku se kroz višedisciplinarni pristup kognitivnih znanosti proučava osobito ljudsko iskustvo povezano s religioznim doživljajem stvarnosti, koje se u tradiciji discipline povijesti religija naziva ‘iskustvo svetoga’. U skladu s teorijom emergencije, predlaže se definicija iskustva svetoga kao stanja svijesti sa subjektivnom kvalitetom integracije, specifičnim neurološkim korelatom i funkcionalnim obilježjima. Emergentne teorije svijesti pružaju ontološki ujednačeno tumačenje iskustava svetoga nudeći »naravna« objašnjenja bez odricanja njihove fenomenološke subjektivnosti. Prijenos iskustva svetoga iz unitarnoga, svojevrsnog intencionalno neobojenoga stanja, u izrecivi jezični kôd intencionalno (...) relevantnih pojmova sa sveprožimajućim utjecajima na opojmljivanje svijeta razmatra se pomoću kognitivne jezične teorije u tradiciji Johnsona i Lakoffa. Sposobnost izricanja značenja iskustva svetoga sagledava se kao emergentno svojstvo pojmovnog procesuiranja metaforičkoga razmišljanja uvjetovanoga utjelovljenošću uma i kulturalnim odrednicama. Predloženi pristup omogućuje tumačenje nastanka složenih mitoloških i kulturalnih modela temeljem iskustva svetoga, ali i ukazuje na njegovu kulturalnu neuvjetovanost zadanu nediskurzivnom naravi samog iskustva.In this article a multidisciplinary approach of cognitive sciences is employed for the analysis of a special category of human experience related to the religious understanding of the world, termed according to the History of Religion as the ‘experience of sacred’. The experience of sacred is defined as the state of consciousness with a subjective quality of integration, a specific neural correlate and functional features. Emergentist theory of consciousness provides ontologically consistent perspective offering a “natural” explanation for this type of experience without denying its subjective phenomenology. The linguistic expression of the experience is examined in the light of Johnson’s and Lakoff’s cognitive linguistic theory. The linguistic competence enabling the expression of the sacred experience is defined as the emergent property of conceptual processing of metaphorical thinking shaped by the embodied mind. This approach explains the seminal role of the experience of sacred in the formation of complex mythological and cultural models, but also points to its non discursive nature. (shrink)