Intellectual history still quite commonly distinguishes between the episode we know as the Scientific Revolution, and its successor era, the Enlightenment, in terms of the calculatory and quantifying zeal of the former—the age of mechanics—and the rather scientifically lackadaisical mood of the latter, more concerned with freedom, public space and aesthetics. It is possible to challenge this distinction in a variety of ways, but the approach I examine here, in which the focus on an emerging scientific field or cluster of (...) disciplines—the ‘life sciences’, particularly natural history, medicine, and physiology —is, not Romantically anti-scientific, but resolutely anti-mathematical. Diderot bluntly states, in his Thoughts on the interpretation of nature, that “We are on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences. Given the taste people seem to have for morals, belles-lettres, the history of nature and experimental physics, I dare say that before a hundred years, there will not be more than three great geometricians remaining in Europe. The science will stop short where the Bernoullis, the Eulers, the Maupertuis, the Clairauts, the Fontaines and the D’Alemberts will have left it.... We will not go beyond.” Similarly, Buffon in the first discourse of his Histoire naturelle speaks of the “over-reliance on mathematical sciences,” given that mathematical truths are merely “definitional” and “demonstrative,” and thereby “abstract, intellectual and arbitrary.” Earlier in the Thoughts, Diderot judges “the thing of the mathematician” to have “as little existence in nature as that of the gambler.” Significantly, this attitude—taken by great scientists who also translated Newton or wrote careful papers on probability theory, as well as by others such as Mandeville—participates in the effort to conceptualize what we might call a new ontology for the emerging life sciences, very different from both the ‘iatromechanism’ and the ‘animism’ of earlier generations, which either failed to account for specifically living, goal-directed features of organisms, or accounted for them in supernaturalistic terms by appealing to an ‘anima’ as explanatory principle. Anti-mathematicism here is then a key component of a naturalistic, open-ended project to give a successful reductionist model of explanation in ‘natural history’, a model which is no more vitalist than it is materialist—but which is fairly far removed from early modern mechanism. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis paper makes use of the 1860 clash between T. H. Huxley and Richard Owen to examine the role of social context in scientific advance in the biological sciences. It shows how the social context of nineteenth-century England first favored the Coleridge-Owenite interpretation of the biological world and then, at mid-century and subsequently, allowed the Darwin-Huxley interpretation to win through. It emphasizes the complexity of the clash. Professional, personal, and generational agendas as well as scientific theory and fundamental philosophical (...) intuition were at stake. The history, ultimately, provides a useful instance of Schutz ‘s and Scheler ‘s concept of societal factors controlling and selecting between flows of idealfactoren. Although Huxley is conventionally regarded as the victor I conclude by suggesting that the issue is not yet closed and that profound philosophical issues remain unresolved. (shrink)

The article deals with the argument about free will and determinism between A. I. Herzen (1812—70) and his son, the physiologist A. A. Herzen (1839—1906). The topic, sufficiently familiar to Herzen scholars, interests me above all for its relevance to the history of science. The polemics between father and son touched upon such burning questions of the day as materialism in understanding human beings, positivism as scientific methodology, and the relation of the human sciences to the natural sciences. Seeing physiological (...) materialism as a threat to the values he shared, Herzen the father sought to convince his son of the limitations of mechanistic explanation. At first, Herzen had invested his hopes in the human sciences which were then in the course of forming disciplines — psychology, sociology, and history. He believed they would encompass freedom and consciousness, rejected by the natural sciences, as their subject-matter. But, when it had become clear that these disciplines were following the model of the natural sciences, Herzen then abandoned arguments taken from science and turned towards literature. His argument with his son, which was to do with rethinking rationality, was both critical and constructive for the nascent human sciences. (shrink)

How is moral thinking, ethics, related to evolutionary theorizing? There are two approaches, epitomized by Charles Darwin who works under the metaphor of the world as a machine, and by Herbert Spencer who works under the metaphor of the world as an organism. Although the author prefers the first approach, the aim of this paper is to give a disinterested account of both approaches.

This article introduces to a wider public a hitherto unknown report written by the “Romantic” natural philosopher and mineralogist Henrik Steffens (1773–1845). In the 1811 report Ideas on Medical Meteorology, commissioned by the Prussian Ministry of the Interior via the physician Johann Christian Reil (1759–1813), Steffens argued for a new, “organic” perspective on meteorology focusing on interrelations between the atmosphere and diseases among humans and animals. This new outlook, he argued, was to be realized via a series of observations directed (...) by the state administration. Excerpts from the report are translated and commented upon in order to illuminate their context. These show the report to be part of a significantly older European tradition of inquiry into the connection between changes in the atmosphere and health. A speculative variation of this tradition, for which the general term “Organic Meteorology” is introduced here, was ignited in German-speaking regions through Schelling’s natural philosophy. The report and its context show that the Prussian state was willing to engage with “Romantic” natural philosophy, that Steffens gladly provided expertise for this purpose, and that this was part of a more general effort to professionalize medicine. (shrink)

These reflections range over some distinctive features of the journal Science & Education, they acknowledge in a limited way the many individuals who over the past 25 years have contributed to the success and reputation of the journal, they chart the beginnings of the journal, and they dwell on a few central concerns—clear writing and the contribution of HPS to teacher education. The reflections also revisit the much-debated and written-upon philosophical and pedagogical arguments occasioned by the rise and possible demise (...) of constructivism in science education. (shrink)

ArgumentBetween 1838 and 1863 the Grimm brothers led a collaborative research project to create a new kind of dictionary documenting the history of the German language. They imagined the work would present a scientific account of linguistic cohesiveness and strengthen German unity. However, their dictionary volumes (most of which were arranged and written by Jacob Grimm) would be variously criticized for their idiosyncratic character and ultimately seen as a poor, and even prejudicial, piece of scholarship. This paper argues that such (...) criticisms may reflect a misunderstanding of the dictionary. I claim it can be best understood as an artifact of romanticist science and its epistemological privileging of subjective perception coupled with a deeply-held faith in inter-subjective congruence. Thus situated, it is a rare and detailed case of Romantic ideas and ideals applied to the scientific study of social artifacts. Moreover, the dictionary's organization, reception, and legacy provide insights into the changing landscape of scientific practice in Germany, showcasing the difficulties of implementing a romanticist vision of science amidst widening gaps between the public and professionals, generalists and specialists. (shrink)

During the 1840s and 1850s the British embryologist and histologist Martin Barry (1802-1855) propounded a bold and original thesis about the microscopic structure of animal and vegetable tissue. He maintained that minute double spirals were virtually ubiquitous in the makeup of a wide range of structures. This paper considers how a claim of this kind was consonant with a romantic image of scientific creativity with which Barry identified. It describes his partially successful strategies to convince contemporaries of the veracity of (...) his claims. Major figures in the field, such as Richard Owen and Jan Evangelista Purkyně, affirmed that Barry's spirals were real objects in nature. Others, notably William Sharpey, became convinced that the spirals were mere artefacts and that Barry was deeply flawed as a scientific investigator. The ultimate rejection of his hypothesis had much to do with the moral repugnance that Barry's attempts to gain credit for a major discovery evoked among influential medical scientists. This negative assessment of Barry as an investigator reveals the lineaments of an alternative ethic of scientific practice. (shrink)

El presente trabajo reconstruye algunos de los momentos principales del debate acerca del concepto de "raza humana" que tuvo lugar hacia finales del siglo xviii entre Kant, Forster y Herder. El objetivo de esta reconstrucción es mostrar, en una primera instancia, que esa polémica se hallaba determinada por la necesidad de adaptar las herramientas histórico-naturales heredadas a la emergencia de una concepción irreversible de la variable temporal. En un segundo momento, es analizada la posición asumida por Kant frente a los (...) problemas epistémicos que generaba la progresiva temporización de los fenómenos naturales. Según se demuestra a partir del presente análisis, la introducción de principios regulativos y el giro kantiano hacia el ámbito de la subjetividad se hallaban orientados a respaldar la vigencia de la comprensión clásica de las formas orgánicas naturales, de modo a garantizar el carácter sistemático del orden natural en un contexto en el cual las transformaciones histórico-naturales ya no resultaban concebibles bajo el modelo clásico de la reversibilidad temporal. This work reconstructs some key moments of the debate on the concept of "human race" that took place in the late eighteenth century among Kant, Forster and Herder. It aims to show, first, that this controversy was defined by the need to adapt the natural-historical tools inherited from the emergence of a conception of irreversible temporality. Secondly, it analyses Kant´s position regarding the epistemic problems generated by the progressive temporization of natural phenomena. Based on this analysis, it is shown that the introduction of regulative principles and the Kantian turn toward subjectivity tended to support the validity of the classic understanding of natural-organic forms, and thus, to guarantee the systematic character of natural order in a context in which historical and natural transformations could no longer be conceived under the classic model of temporal reversibility. (shrink)

The celebrated “creation” of transfinite set theory by Georg Cantor has been studied in detail by historians of mathematics. However, it has generally been overlooked that his research program cannot be adequately explained as an outgrowth of the mainstream mathematics of his day. We review the main extra-mathematical motivations behind Cantor's very novel research, giving particular attention to a key contribution, the Grundlagen (Foundations of a general theory of sets) of 1883, where those motives are articulated in some detail. Evidence (...) from other publications and correspondence is pulled out to provide clarification and a detailed interpretation of those ideas and their impact upon Cantor's research. Throughout the paper, a special effort is made to place Cantor's scientific undertakings within the context of developments in German science and philosophy at the time (philosophers such as Trendelenburg and Lotze, scientists like Weber, Riemann, Vogt, Haeckel), and to reflect on the German intellectual atmosphere during the nineteenth century. (shrink)

ArgumentD’Arcy Thompson has often been portrayed as a loner. His science of form has frequently been labeled anachronistic, idiosyncratic, and unconnected to his contemporary biology. This article aims to challenge this interpretation. Thompson's representation as a loner did not lie in the idiosyncrasies of his science, but in our own historiography. Through the use of unedited archival sources, this study shows that Thompson's biology was well-connected to an international research program – a program mainly shared by developmental biologists, physiologists, and (...) morphologists. In addition, this article also aims to propose a new interpretation of Thompson'sOn Growth and Form. Drawing on his private correspondence and published sources, the paper re-contextualizes the contents and conclusions of Thompson's seminal work. We will see that Thompson defended a particular kind of organismal biology. The bio-science he supported stemmed not only from Aristotle's zoology or Pythagorean mathematics, but had many allies among twentieth-century naturalists. (shrink)

The ArgumentUsing a pernicious Foucaultian reading of Weber's rationalization theories, I endeavor in this essay to illuminate academic acts as kept in the Brandenburg-Prussian state archive in Berlin, with some comparison to others, chiefly those in the Bavarian state archive in Munich. The essay concerns the microtechniques of marking, collecting and keeping records, and the form and content of archives of academic acts – interesting for the reason that paperwork circumscribes the state ministry's ability to recollect academic acts and hence (...) its power and knowledge over academics. I consider mostly acts relating to the early modern “Arts and Philosophy Faculty,” which corresponds more or less to the present-day “Division of Arts, Letters and Sciences.” The transformation, traced from the Baroque to the Romantic era, is understood as a process of “ministerial-market rationalization” of German academia: I try to show how central German ministries, as reflected in archival acts, altered the academic persona to suit themselves and the market, and how professorial appointments were rationalized accordingly. (shrink)

The physician, sexologist and psychical researcher Albert von Schrenck-Notzing (1862-1929) was without a doubt one of the most unusual and controversial figures in the history of late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century German medicine and science. As a young student, he sought – together with his one-time mentor Carl du Prel, the philosopher-psychologist Max Dessoir and others – to expand the methodological and epistemological scope of fledgling German professionalized psychology by serving as an important conduit for strands of psychological experimentation from France (...) and England as alternatives to the physiologically grounded experimental psychology of Wilhelm Wundt and its offshoots (Kurzweg, 1976; Sommer, 2013). An early leading proponent of sexology and medical hypnotism, his work was well received in- and outside Germany by authors such as Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Albert Moll, Sigmund Freud (with whom he had studied hypnotism under Bernheim in the 1880s), Auguste Forel, Morton Prince and Havelock Ellis (see, e.g., Gauld, 1992; Sommer, 2012a; Sulloway, 1992). After obtaining economic independence by marrying into one of the richest families in Germany, he abandoned his promising medical career and began to focus his energies on the study of probably the most controversial and disputed area of psychical research, i.e. physical mediumship. Thanks to his immense wealth and former academic credentials, shortly after World War 1 Schrenck-Notzing began to dominate German psychical research and became its doyen and sponsor. (shrink)