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  1. A classically-based theory of impossible worlds.Edward N. Zalta - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):640-660.
    The appeal to possible worlds in the semantics of modal logic and the philosophical defense of possible worlds as an essential element of ontology have led philosophers and logicians to introduce other kinds of `worlds' in order to study various philosophical and logical phenomena. The literature contains discussions of `non-normal worlds', `non-classical worlds', `non-standard worlds', and `impossible worlds'. These atypical worlds have been used in the following ways: (1) to interpret unusual modal logics, (2) to distinguish logically equivalent propositions, (3) (...)
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  • Propositional Identity and Logical Necessity.David B. Martens - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Logic 2:1-11.
    In two early papers, Max Cresswell constructed two formal logics of propositional identity, pcr and fcr, which he observed to be respectively deductively equivalent to modal logics s4 and s5. Cresswell argued informally that these equivalences respectively “give . . . evidence” for the correctness of s4 and s5 as logics of broadly logical necessity. In this paper, I describe weaker propositional identity logics than pcr that accommodate core intuitions about identity and I argue that Cresswell’s informal arguments do not (...)
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  • A Lewisian Semantics for S2.Edwin Mares - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (1):53-67.
    This paper sets out a semantics for C.I. Lewis's logic S2 based on the ontology of his 1923 paper ‘Facts, Systems, and the Unity of the World’. In that article, worlds are taken to be maximal consistent systems. A system, moreover, is a collection of facts that is closed under logical entailment and conjunction. In this paper, instead of defining systems in terms of logical entailment, I use certain ideas in Lewis's epistemology and philosophy of logic to define a class (...)
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  • Modal Logics in the Vicinity of S.Brian F. Chellas & Krister Segerberg - 1996 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (1):1-24.
    We define prenormal modal logics and show that S1, S1, S0.9, and S0.9 are Lewis versions of certain prenormal logics, determination and decidability for which are immediate. At the end we characterize Cresswell logics and ponder C. I. Lewis's idea of strict implication in S1.
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  • Wittgenstein on Incompleteness Makes Paraconsistent Sense.Francesco Berto - 2008 - In Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications. Springer. pp. 257--276.
    I provide an interpretation of Wittgenstein's much criticized remarks on Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem in the light of paraconsistent arithmetics: in taking Gödel's proof as a paradoxical derivation, Wittgenstein was right, given his deliberate rejection of the standard distinction between theory and metatheory. The reasoning behind the proof of the truth of the Gödel sentence is then performed within the formal system itself, which turns out to be inconsistent. I show that the models of paraconsistent arithmetics (obtained via the Meyer-Mortensen (...)
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  • Making Sense of Paraconsistent Logic: The Nature of Logic, Classical Logic and Paraconsistent Logic.Koji Tanaka - 2013 - In Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications. Springer. pp. 15--25.
    Max Cresswell and Hilary Putnam seem to hold the view, often shared by classical logicians, that paraconsistent logic has not been made sense of, despite its well-developed mathematics. In this paper, I examine the nature of logic in order to understand what it means to make sense of logic. I then show that, just as one can make sense of non-normal modal logics (as Cresswell demonstrates), we can make `sense' of paraconsistent logic. Finally, I turn the tables on classical logicians (...)
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