A common objection to the Molinist account of divine providence states that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom lack grounds. Some Molinists appeal to brute counterfactual facts about the subject of the CCF in order to ground CCFs. Others argue that CCFs are grounded by the subject's actions in nearby worlds. In this article, I argue that Open Theism's account of divine providence employs would-probably conditionals that are most plausibly grounded by either brute facts about the subject of these conditionals or non-actual (...) entities. As a result, Open Theism's revision of the traditional notion of divine providence is unmotivated. The Molinist can ground CCFs just as easily as the Openist can ground would-probably conditionals but the Molinist has the advantage of maintaining a robust account of divine providence.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.On grounding God's knowledge of the probableVolume 49, Issue 1JENNIFER JENSEN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000182Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. On grounding God's knowledge of the probableVolume 49, Issue 1JENNIFER JENSEN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000182Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. On grounding God's knowledge of the probableVolume 49, Issue 1JENNIFER JENSEN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000182Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

This article explores some of the ways in which historical writings can play a substantial role in the development of ethical sensibilities and makes the more general point that since human beings are unique in understanding themselves as historical beings and value how they and others appear in historical perspective, an understanding and sense of history must play a role in an adequate account of ethics. The main focus of the article is a description and analysis of the views of (...) the Chinese philosopher Zhang Xuecheng ç« å­¸èª . After presenting an account of Zhang’s ideas concerning the relationship between history and ethics, I argue that versions of Zhang’s central claims still have the potential to make significant contributions to contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

‘Creative Involution’ posits something of a philosophical genealogy, a line of flight that has neither need for nor interest in the periodisation of Modernism, a line of which Beckett (even reluctantly) is part. Murphy, among others, is deterritorialised as much as Beckett's landscapes are, and so he/they become a ‘complexification’ of being that manifests itself in Beckett not as represented, representative or a representation, since so much of Beckett deals with that which cannot be uttered, known or represented, but whose (...) image the works (and its figures) have become, a thinking through of negativity, becoming, and multiplicity through non-Newtonian motion, of being as becoming, where every movement brings something new into the world, but in something of a reverse Darwinism that moves from complex to simple organism, from Murphy to Worm, or Watt to Pim, or among the nameless figures in the short prose, a ‘becoming-animal’, in something not so much of a creative devolution but rather a ‘neoevolution’, or to adopt another term from Deleuze and Guattari, an ‘involution’, which ‘is in no way confused with regression’ (1987: 238), becomings creating nothing less than new worlds. Writing casually to his post-war confidant Georges Duthuit on 26 July 1951, Beckett noted in the midst of gardening chores, ‘Never seen so many butterflies in such worm-state, this little central cylinder, the only flesh, is the worm’ (2011: 271). The observation comes after the writing but before the premiere performance of Waiting for Godot in which Gogo tells Didi, ‘You and your landscapes! Tell me about the worms!’ (1954: 67). Such ‘becoming-animal always involves a pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in short a multiplicity’ (1987: 239), Deleuze and Guattari tell us. For Beckett it defines creativity as well, only possible through such un-tethered selves or beings, amid the generation of varieties and differences, accessible through moments of deterritorialisation, characterised by, ‘A fearsome involution calling us toward unheard-of becomings’ (240). (shrink)

Using a sample of 12,061 firm-year observations from the Chinese stock market for the period of 2001–2011 and geographic-proximity-based Confucianism variables, this study provides strong evidence that Confucianism is significantly negatively associated with minority shareholder expropriation, implying that Confucianism does mitigate agency conflicts between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. This finding suggests that Confucianism has important influence on business ethics, and thus can serve as an important ethical philosophy or social norm to mitigate the controlling shareholder’s unethical expropriation behavior. (...) Moreover, my findings reveal that the nature of the ultimate owner attenuates the negative association between Confucianism and minority shareholder expropriation, suggesting that Confucianism’s negative impact on minority shareholder expropriation is less pronounced for state-owned enterprises than for non-state-owned enterprises. The above results are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests and my findings are valid after controlling for the potential endogeneity between Confucianism and minority shareholder expropriation. (shrink)