- Whence the Demand for Ethical Theory?Damian Cueni & Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):135-46.details
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Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective.Sinan Dogramaci - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):523-550.details
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Neo-Pyrrhonism.Markus Lammenranta - 2016 - In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 565-580.details
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Williams’s Debt to Wittgenstein.Matthieu Queloz & Nikhil Krishnan - forthcoming - In Marcel van Ackeren & Matthieu Queloz (eds.), Bernard Williams on Philosophy and History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Steps to an Ecology of Knowledge: Continuity and Change in the Genealogy of Knowledge.Axel Gelfert - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):67-82.details
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Varieties of Testimonial Injustice.Jeremy Wanderer - 2016 - In Ian James Kidd, Gaile Pohlhaus & José Medina (eds.), The Routledge Handbook on Epistemic Injustice. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. pp. 27-40.details
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Slim Epistemology with a Thick Skin.Pekka Väyrynen - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):389-412.details
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Two purposes of knowledge-attribution and the contextualism debate.Matthew McGrath - 2015 - In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Understanding and Its Role in Inquiry.Benjamin T. Rancourt - unknowndetails
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Understanding and Testimony.Allan Hazlett - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Social Epistemology and Knowing-How.Yuri Cath - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - In John Greco & David Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Contrastive knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.details
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Wittgenstein's Later Nonsense.Daniel Whiting - 2022 - In Christoph C. Pfisterer, Nicole Rathgeb & Eva Schmidt (eds.), Wittgenstein and Beyond: Essays in Honour of Hans-Johann Glock. New York: Routledge.details
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What's the Point of Understanding?Michael Hannon - 2019 - In What's the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Know-how and non-propositional intentionality.Katalin Farkas - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 95-113.details
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Vrijednosti u psihijatriji i pojam mentalne bolesti (Eng. Values in psychiatry and the concept of mental illness).Luca Malatesti & Marko Jurjako - 2016 - In Snježana Prijić-Samaržija, Luca Malatesti & Elvio Baccarini (eds.), Moralni, Politički I Društveni Odgovori Na Društvene Devijacije (Eng. Moral, Political, and Social Responses to Antisocial Deviation). Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Rijeka. pp. 153-181.details
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Knowledge, Noise, and Curve-Fitting: A methodological argument for JTB?Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2017 - In Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter David Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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The World Wide Web.Paul Smart - 2018 - In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 15–27.details
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An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
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Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science.John Turri - 2016 - Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.details
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Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.details
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What is the characteristic wrong of testimonial injustice?Richard Pettigrew - manuscriptdetails
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La naturaleza de la mentira. [REVIEW]Jesús Navarro - 2024 - Análisis Filosófico 1.details
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The skeptical paradox and the indispensability of knowledge-beliefs.Wai-Hung Wong - 2005 - Synthese 143 (3):273-290.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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The internalist virtue theory of knowledge.Ralph Wedgwood - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5357–5378.details
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Knowledge first, stability and value.Barnaby Walker - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3833-3854.details
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The Concept of Knowledge: What is It For?Jesús Vega-Encabo - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):187-202.details
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A priori knowledge, experience and defeasibility.Hamid Vahid - 1999 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (2):173 – 188.details
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The Radicalism of Truth‐insensitive Epistemology: Truth's Profound Effect on the Evaluation of Belief.John Turri - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):348-367.details
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Restricting factiveness.Fredrik Stjernberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):29 - 48.details
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Are there any conceptual truths about knowledge?Finn Spicer - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):43-60.details
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Against Credibility.Joseph Shieber - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):1 - 18.details
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The irrelevance of the subject: Against subject-sensitive invariantism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):87-107.details
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Third-person internalism: A critical examination of externalism and a foundation-oriented alternative. [REVIEW]Gerhard Schurz - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (1):9-28.details
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Semantic blindness and error theorizing for the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’.Mark Satta - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):275-284.details
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A linguistic grounding for a polysemy theory of ‘knows’.Mark Satta - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1163-1182.details
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Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims, written by Krista Lawlor. [REVIEW]Patrick Rysiew - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1):65-72.details
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¿Puede el conocimiento ser un estado mental?Florencia Rimoldi - 2014 - Análisis Filosófico 34 (2):171-201.details
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On Ordered Pluralism.Matthieu Queloz - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3):305-11.details
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Genealogy, Evaluation, and Engineering.Matthieu Queloz - 2022 - The Monist 105 (4):435-451.details
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Introduction: Social Cognitive Ecology and Its Role in Social Epistemology.Mikkel Gerken, Jesper Kallestrup, Klemens Kappel & Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):1-5.details
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Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Problem of Epistemic Descent.Duncan Pritchard - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):327-349.details
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Philosophical thought experiments as heuristics for theory discovery.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Sara Kier Praëm - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2827-2842.details
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Prejudice, Harming Knowers, and Testimonial Injustice.Timothy Perrine - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (1):53-73.details
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The disvalue of knowledge.David Papineau - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5311-5332.details
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In defense of the conditional probability solution to the swamping problem.Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):93-114.details
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Making it Public: Testimony and Socially Sanctioned Common Grounds.Paula Olmos - 2007 - Informal Logic 27 (2):211-227.details
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