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Knowing why

Mind and Language 33 (2):177-197 (2018)

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  1. The role of semiotics in the unification of langue and parole: an Agentive Cognitive Construction Grammar approach to English modals.Sergio Torres-Martínez - 2022 - Semiotica 2022 (244):195-225.
    This article introduces Agentive Cognitive Construction Grammar, an emerging field that seeks to connect the linguistic system with speaker-meaning. The stated purpose is thus to tackle a pervasive disconnect in both cognitive linguistics and construction grammar, whereby the linguistic system and speaker selections are separated in the belief that language is essentially a mental process associated with the brain, and hence, separated from bodily experience. I contend this view by introducing a triadic model of construction in which form and function (...)
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  • The transparency method and knowing our reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):613-621.
    Subjects can know what their attitudes are and also their motivating reasons for those attitudes – for example, S can know that she believes that q and also that she believes that q for the reason that p. One attractive account of self-knowledge of attitudes appeals to the ‘transparency method’. According to TM, subjects answer the question of whether they believe that q by answering the world-directed question of whether q is true. Something similar also looks intuitive in the case (...)
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  • Knowing our Reasons: Distinctive Self‐Knowledge of Why We Hold Our Attitudes and Perform Actions.Sophie Keeling - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):318-341.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  • Believing for a Reason is (at least) Nearly Self-Intimating.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Erkenntnis.
    This paper concerns a specific epistemic feature of believing for a reason (e.g., believing that it will rain on the basis of the grey clouds outside). It has commonly been assumed that our access to such facts about ourselves is akin in all relevant respects to our access to why other people hold their beliefs. Further, discussion of self-intimation - that we are necessarily in a position to know when we are in certain conditions - has centred largely around mental (...)
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  • Confabulating Reasons.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini & Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):189-201.
    In this paper, I will focus on a type of confabulation that emerges in relation to questions about mental attitudes whose causes we cannot introspectively access. I argue against two popular views that see confabulations as mainly offering a psychological story about ourselves. On these views, confabulations are the result of either a cause-tracking mechanism or a self-directed mindreading mechanism. In contrast, I propose the view that confabulations are mostly telling a normative story: they are arguments primarily offered to justify (...)
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