Contemporary interpretations of Zhuangzi’s 莊子 philosophy as adumbrating a relativist position are legion. However, what is the scope and nature of the relativism that can be gleaned from a comprehensive analysis of relevant passages in the Zhuangzi? In this essay, I shall explain Zhuangzi’s alleged relativist position as motivated from a primary concern about disagreement. He in effect claims that since any disputant can foresee her assertion to be refuted by an opponent, the recourse to a higher tribunal in adjudicating (...) the debate is futile. The consequence of an apparent lack of justification for assertion is, in my opinion, what needs elucidation. For example, is “truth relativism” an apt label for the nature of assertion in a debate without the verdict of a judge? Or, is it more appropriate to shun the concept of truth altogether in our explanation? I deem the contemporary explanation of Zhuangzi’s relativism either trivializes disputation or fails to account for the difference between a claim’s being right and being acceptable. Hence, I shall argue that without the intrusion of a judge as an arbiter of truth, the kind of disputation Zhuangzi practices promulgates faultless disagreement, which does not appeal to the correctness of any perspective in a comparative or absolute sense. In this understanding, Zhuangzi’s advice of harmonizing with both right and wrong is indeed a viable alternative to relativism and dogmatism, both of which do not properly take heed of the point of disagreeing in a disputation. (shrink)

The “happy fish” passage in the Zhuangzi 莊子 is often interpreted as endorsing some form of perspectivism which precludes objective claims of knowledge and displaces the significance of human perspectives. Relativism has gained particular currency in contemporary readings. However, this essay aims to show the limited explanatory power of such relativist positions, with focus on Chad Hansen’s “perspectival relativism” and Lea Cantor’s “species relativism.” I will also offer a new, “transitional contextualist” reading, which intends to demonstrate that Zhuangzi’s utterance is (...) grounded in his epistemic context and that Huizi’s 惠子 disputation arises from his changing of the epistemic context, from one with quotidian “low standards” to one with “high-standards” skeptical demands. I further argue that when “wandering” (you 遊) is understood as a freedom from one’s partial perspective, it becomes clear how Zhuangzi analogizes a parallel with the fish’s “wandering” through a continuity between his “world” and that of the fish. (shrink)

This essay examines the concept of the wandering heart-mind in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi 莊子. This essay examines the problems caused by a collection of behaviors in the heart-mind: the ability to make distinctions, the tendency to fix distinctions and language, and the need to act for the sake of fixed ends. Zhuangzi treats these problems with emptying, wandering, and mirroring. These techniques release the heart-mind from fixation and conflict, enabling the heart-mind to respond to conditions without acting (...) for fixed ends. Letting the heart-mind wander provides the receptivity and creativity necessary for responding to a complex world of constant change. Letting the heart-mind wander also opens the possibility of an intrinsically beneficial moral psychology, one where the heart-mind not only adapts to but enjoys a world of transformation and uncertainty. This interpretation of the heart-mind has important consequences for psychology, language, and ethics. In terms of psychology this interpretation diagnoses the limitations of knowledge and proposes therapeutic techniques to treat uncertainty and fixation. In terms of language this interpretation reveals different linguistic attitudes in the text, such as usefulness and play. In terms of ethics this interpretation provides a basis for Zhuangzi’s ethical vision of nourishing living and free-and-easy wandering. (shrink)

Playfulness and humor are often recognized as key components of the Zhuangzi. Despite this, the text itself is rarely read in a playful or humorous manner. It is commonly treated, even in its most...

ABSTRACTThe perspective on zhi 知 is often identified as a key distinction between the Zhuangzi 莊子 and its most famous commentator, Guo Xiang 郭象. Many scholars who recognize this distinction observe that zhi almost always has negative connotations in Guo Xiang’s writing, whereas certain types of knowledge can be positive in the Zhuangzi In this way, Guo Xiang’s comments on zhi seem to stray from the ‘original meaning’ of the Zhuangzi, and are often dismissed as inaccurate mis-readings, imbued with mysticism (...) and relativism. However, by taking into consideration some aspects of Guo Xiang’s socio-historical context, and the larger structure of his complex philosophical system, we find a project quite distinct from that of the Zhuangzi. Like many other Wei-Jin period thinkers, Guo aims bridging some of the gaps the Daoist classic creates between itself and the Confucian tradition. This exposes Guo Xiang’s first goal, which,... (shrink)

Contemporary Anglophone scholarship on the Zhuangzi 莊子 tends to reject intellectualism, the view that all knowledge is propositional. Scholars usually state that Zhuangzi values practical knowledge more than propositional knowledge. This valuation, however, seems to presuppose that the Zhuangzi or its interpreters must recognize the distinction between these two kinds of knowledge. In this article, I argue that Zhuangzi sees all knowledge as practical, and if we situate him in the contemporary philosophical field we can extract several ideas from the (...) text in arguing against the postulation of propositional knowledge. First, Zhuangzi’s idea of spontaneity and forgetting defy attempts to explain our practice in terms of propositional knowledge, because spontaneous acts admit different levels and can be improved by forgetting. Second, Zhuangzi’s perspectivism implies that the relationship between our language and the world is not fixed, and there is a theoretical price to pay if intellectualists want to avoid this indeterminacy. (shrink)

The “happy fish” passage concluding the “Autumn Floods” chapter of the Classical Chinese text known as the Zhuangzi has traditionally been seen to advance a form of relativism which precludes objectivity. My aim in this paper is to question this view with close reference to the passage itself. I further argue that the central concern of the two philosophical personae in the passage – Zhuangzi and Huizi – is not with the epistemic standards of human judgements (the established view since (...) Hansen, “The Relatively Happy Fish”), but with the more basic problem of species-specific perspectives. On my reading, Zhuangzi’s emphatic positionality in the passage – on the dam, accompanied by his friend Huizi – plausibly suggests a circumspect reflection on the limitedness of human knowledge. It is significant that Zhuangzi’s knowledge of fish happiness is avowedly from a certain place, and not absolute. But there is still a sense in which this view is objective: namely, insofar as it adequately accounts for an inherently human perspective on the world. I call this modest form of relativism ‘Species Relativism’, which, crucially, leaves room for objectivity, even though a fully objective (i.e. absolute) view of the world is not accessible to humans. (shrink)

As this study elucidates, Daoist philosophy provides an account of how and why desires are morally and epistemologically suspect. The Daoist critique of desire is itself informed by a processual un...

This paper explores a few of the ways that the Zhuang-Zi can inform contemporary analytic epistemology. I begin, in section 1, by briefly outlining and summarizing the case for my fictionalist interpretation of the text. In section 2, I discuss how the Zhuang-Zi can be brought into productive dialogue with the question of how we should respond to skeptical arguments. Specifically, I argue that the Zhuang-Zi can be reasonably interpreted as exemplifying an approach that is different from dominant contemporary responses (...) to skeptical arguments in three ways: it is fictionalist; it motivates a skeptical perspective rather than a claim; and it accomplishes its aims in an atypical, but nonetheless contextually appropriate, way. However, the Zhuang-Zi is relevant to contemporary debates about skeptical arguments because it can be used: to respond to the same sorts of skeptical arguments that occupy contemporary commentators; to address a number of questions that arise in connection with such arguments; and to suggest important new questions for epistemologists to pursue. (shrink)