- Moderatism and Truth.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):271-287.details
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Introduction: Disagreement—Epistemological and Argumentation-Theoretic Perspectives.Patrick Bondy & David Godden - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):963-969.details
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The Weirdness of the World.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2024 - Princeton University Press.details
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Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement.Annalisa Coliva & Louis Doulas - forthcoming - In Maria Baghramian, Adam Carter & R. Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Disagreement. Routledge.details
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Trust Responsibly: Non-Evidential Virtue Epistemology.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2023 - New York City: Routledge.details
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Pluralism and Perspectivism in the American Pragmatist Tradition.Matthew Brown - 2019 - In Michela Massimi (ed.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Springer Verlag.details
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Veridicalism and Scepticism.Yuval Avnur - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):393-407.details
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The Skeptical Paradox and the Generality of Closure (and other principles).Yuval Avnur - 2022 - In Duncan Pritchard & Matthew Jope (ed.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge.details
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Wittgenstein on Skepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2017 - In Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 563–575.details
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Rationalism.Jakob Ohlhorst - forthcoming - In Ema Sullivan Bissett (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Routledge.details
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Closure, deduction and hinge commitments.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3533-3551.details
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Determinism and Judgment. A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Luca Zanetti - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):33-54.details
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Scepticism, closure and rationally grounded knowledge: a new solution.Ju Wang - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2357-2374.details
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Extended Rationality: Some Queries about Warrant, Epistemic Closure, Truth and Scepticism.Giorgio Volpe - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):258-271.details
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Book symposium: Nuno venturinha. Description of situations: An essay in contextualist epistemology.Nuno Venturinha, Marcelo Carvalho, Marcos Silva, João V. G. Cuter & Darlei Dall’Agnol - 2020 - Manuscrito 43 (3):164-258.details
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Ist der Naturalismus eine Ideologie?Thomas Jussuf Spiegel - 2020 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (1):51-71.details
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Epistemic norms, closure, and no-Belief hinge epistemology.Mona Ioana Simion, Johanna Schnurr & Emma C. Gordon - 2021 - Synthese 198 (15):3553-3564.details
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Hinges, Disagreements, and Arguments: (Rationally) Believing Hinge Propositions and Arguing across Deep Disagreements.Harvey Siegel - 2019 - Topoi 40 (5):1107-1116.details
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A Plea for the Theist in the Street.Kegan J. Shaw - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (1):102-128.details
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Scepticism About Scepticism or the Very Idea of a Global ‘Vat-Language’.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2023 - Topoi 42 (1):91-105.details
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A Kantian virtue epistemology: rational capacities and transcendental arguments.Karl Schafer - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3113-3136.details
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Wittgensteinian Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism.Nicola Claudio Salvatore - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):53-80.details
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What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):983-998.details
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Moral hinges and steadfastness.Chris Ranalli - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):379-401.details
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Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Synthese:1-33.details
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Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.details
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Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1117-1125.details
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Understanding Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):301-317.details
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Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3635-3664.details
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Hinge commitments and common knowledge.Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-16.details
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Can Hinge Epistemology Close the Door on Epistemic Relativism?Oscar A. Piedrahita - 2021 - Synthese (1-2):1-27.details
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An analysis of bias and distrust in social hinge epistemology.Anna Pederneschi - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):258-277.details
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Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
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On Extended Rationality.Alan Millar - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):235-245.details
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The Methodologically Flawed Discussion about Deep Disagreement.Guido Melchior - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.details
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Bortolotti on Epistemic Innocence. [REVIEW]Robin McKenna - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):368-376.details
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On The Hypothetical Given.Adam Marushak - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):497-514.details
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The Self-Hollowing Problem of the Radical Sceptical Paradox.Changsheng Lai - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1269-1288.details
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Epistemic relativism, scepticism, pluralism.Martin Kusch - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4687-4703.details
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Inquiry And The Transmission Of Knowledge.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):298-310.details
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The symmetry problem for testimonial conservatism.Matthew Jope - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6149-6167.details
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Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility.Drew Johnson - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):353-372.details
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How to solve Hume's problem of induction.Alexander Jackson - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):157-174.details
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Metatheories of disagreement: Introduction.Péter Hartl & Ákos Gyarmathy - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):337-347.details
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Universal hinges and the bounds of sense.Mark Fortney - 2019 - Philosophia:1-13.details
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Universal Hinges and the Bounds of Sense.Mark Fortney - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):967-979.details
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What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on.Annalisa Coliva & Louis Doulas - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-14.details
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What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein.Annalisa Coliva - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):198-207.details
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Strange bedfellows: on Pritchard’s disjunctivist hinge epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3521-3532.details
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Replies to: Commentators.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):343-352.details
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