This paper examines the place of metaphorical interpretation in the current Contextualist-Literalist controversy over the role of context in the determination of truth-conditions in general. Although there has been considerable discussion of 'non-literal' language by both sides of this dispute, the language analyzed involves either so-called implicit indexicality, loose or loosened use, enriched interpretations, or semantic transfer, not metaphor itself. In the first half of the paper, I critically evaluate Recanati's (2004) recent Contextualist account and show that it cannot account (...) for the metaphorical-literal dependence characteristic of metaphor. I then turn to Carston's (2002), and Bezuidenhout's (2001) Contextualist accounts and show that they place no constraints on metaphorical interpretations. In the second half of the paper I sketch a Literalist theory of metaphor elaborated in Stern (2000) and respond to two kinds of Contextualist criticisms of that account by Camp (2005) and Stanley (2005). (shrink)

Modem theories of metaphor seem to be pretty unanimous in taking the "death" of a metaphor literally. By doing so they too easily wipe out sedimented, past meanings and so ignore semantic memory. A further consequence of this stand is that meanings are reduced to a one-dimensional (either metaphoric or literal), static structure. This article, in a procedure that resembles a sort of "archeology of meaning," is critical of such an attitude, for which conventionalization of metaphors means their burial in (...) the graveyard of language. It attempts to provide a ground for the assumption that labeling of metaphors as "dead" is not lethal, for their meanings can be revitalized and recreated, according to our linguistic competence, diachronic perspective, interests, and needs. It contains implicit support for the thesis that semantic mechanisms are flexible, dynamic, and subject to evolutionary growth. Not even the death of a metaphor can be exempt from this overall scheme. (shrink)

Metaphor is an issue for the philosophy of language not only for its own sake, as a linguistic phenomenon deserving of analysis and interpretation, but also for the light it sheds on non‐figurative language, the domain of the literal which is the normal preoccupation of the philosopher of language. If all we mean by paraphrase is the ability to say what one means in other words, then it does seem true that there is a difference between idiom and metaphor here. (...) In a paper that has attracted a great deal of commentary, Donald Davidson has argued that we should indeed cease talking about figurative meaning in connection with metaphor altogether; and he seems prepared to accept the consequences that follow from this rejection. The theory of figurative language prompting the rethinking of some of the basic concepts in the philosophy of language generally. (shrink)

Metaphors are expressions in artificial, contrived, alien languages, and we understand metaphors by constructing translation schemes linking our natural, literal languages to these theoretically contrived metaphorical languages. The relation between a literal natural language and a metaphorical contrived language is like the relationship between a natively known language and a system of subsequently acquired languages etymologically emerging from that basic natural language. This model for understanding metaphorically contrived language is kin to the familiar model explaining how speakers of a language (...) such as Latin may come to decipher a language like Spanish through projecting to Spanish what they know of Latin without the aid of a translation manual. A metaphor is, thus, seen as a sentence in a nonnatural language, itself derived from and at least partially translatable with the natural, literal language of the metaphor's author or audience. (shrink)

Članak tematizira ulogu kompleksnog mišljenja u razvoju znanstvene spoznaje i mišljenja općenito. Po Vigotskom, kompleksno mišljenje je početna faza u ontogenezi, pa i filogenezi, ljudskog mišljenja i ono je u tom slijedu predpojmovno. Prema istom autoru, ono ima svoju unutarnju genezu koja započinje asocijativnim kompleksima, a završava pseudopojmovima. Kompleksno mišljenje je po svojoj bitifluidno, neograničeno i omogućuje prenošenje značenja. Smatramo da kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izraza prije svega u uporabi metafora i analogija. Metafore i analogije imaju važnu eksplanatornu i ponekad (...) čak heurističku ulogu u znanstvenom mišljenju. Kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izražaja na svim razinama i etapama razvoja znanstvenog mišljenja. Metafore mogu biti dijelom kompleksnog mišljenja kao dominantnog načina mišljenja ili u pojmovnoj strukturi kao pomoćni elementi objašnjenja. Analogije predstavljaju izvjesno strukturiranje kompleksnog i pojmovnogmišljenja.Članak tematizira ulogu kompleksnog mišljenja u razvoju znanstvene spoznaje i mišljenja općenito. Po Vigotskom, kompleksno mišljenje je početna faza u ontogenezi, pa i filogenezi, ljudskog mišljenja i ono je u tom slijedu predpojmovno. Prema istom autoru, ono ima svoju unutarnju genezu koja započinje asocijativnim kompleksima, a završava pseudopojmovima. Kompleksno mišljenje je po svojoj bitifluidno, neograničeno i omogućuje prenošenje značenja. Smatramo da kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izraza prije svega u uporabi metafora i analogija. Metafore i analogije imaju važnu eksplanatornu i ponekad čak heurističku ulogu u znanstvenom mišljenju. Kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izražaja na svim razinama i etapama razvoja znanstvenog mišljenja. Metafore mogu biti dijelom kompleksnog mišljenja kao dominantnog načina mišljenja ili u pojmovnoj strukturi kao pomoćni elementi objašnjenja. Analogije predstavljaju izvjesno strukturiranje kompleksnog i pojmovnogmišljenja. (shrink)