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Definite Descriptions and the Gettier Example.Christoph Schmidt-Petri & London School of Economics and Political Science - 2002 - CPNSS Discussion Papers.details
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(Mis)Understanding scientific disagreement: Success versus pursuit-worthiness in theory choice.Eli I. Lichtenstein - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 85:166-175.details
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Endorsement and assertion.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.details
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Epistemic Infrastructure for a Scientific Metaphysics.Amanda Bryant - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (1):27-49.details
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Quine's Naturalism.Alan Weir - 2013 - In Ernie Lepore & Gilbert Harman (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 114–147.details
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How can belief be akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.details
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On an argument for irrationalism.Alan Weir - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (2):95-114.details
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The Structure of Phenomenal Justification.Uriah Kriegel - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):282-297.details
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Perception and Imagination.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In S. Miguens, G. Preyer & C. Bravo Morando (eds.), Prereflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. New York: Routledge. pp. 245-276.details
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La logique peut-elle mouvoir l'esprit?Pascal Engel - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (1):35-54.details
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The myth of self-deception.Steffen Borge - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-28.details
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Why believe the truth? Shah and Velleman on the aim of belief.José L. Zalabardo - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):1 - 21.details
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The Point of Political Belief.Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder - 2021 - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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'Explicating ways of consensus-making: Distinguishing the academic, the interface and the meta-consensus.Laszlo Kosolosky & Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In Martini Carlo (ed.), Experts and Consensus in Social Science. Springer. pp. 71-92.details
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Two notions of epistemic normativity.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2009 - Theoria 75 (3):161-178.details
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Argument, Inference and Dialectic: Collected Papers on Informal Logic.Robert Pinto - 2001 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Collective Guilt Feeling Revisited.Anita Konzelmann Ziv - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):467-493.details
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Scientific Discovery from the Perspective of Hypothesis Acceptance.Eric Martin & Daniel Osherson - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S331-S341.details
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Scientific discovery from the perspective of hypothesis acceptance.Eric Martin & Daniel Osherson - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S331-S341.details
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Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth.José L. Zalabardo - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):147-171.details
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Who has scientific knowledge?K. Brad Wray - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):337 – 347.details
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Belief, information and reasoning.Bruno Whittle - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):431-446.details
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Some Artificial Intelligence Tools for Argument Evaluation: An Introduction.Douglas Walton - 2016 - Argumentation 30 (3):317-340.details
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In the Space of Reasonable Doubt.Marion Vorms & Ulrike Hahn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3609-3633.details
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On the Normativity of Intentions.Bruno Verbeek - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):87-101.details
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Assertion and grounding: a theory of assertion for constructive type theory.Maria van der Schaar - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):187-210.details
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Aiming at Truth: Doxastic vs. Epistemic Goals.Hamid Vahid - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):303-335.details
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The extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality.Cody Turner - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):747-774.details
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Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology.John Turri, David Rose & Wesley Buckwalter - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2507-2537.details
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How Do We Obtain Understanding with the Help of Explanations?Gabriel Târziu - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (2):173-197.details
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Belief isn’t voluntary, but commitment is.Nicholas Tebben - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1163-1179.details
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Walker on the voluntariness of judgment.Christian Stein - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):175 – 186.details
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Six levels of mentality.Leslie Stevenson - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):105-124.details
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Yablo's paradox and Kindred infinite liars.Roy A. Sorensen - 1998 - Mind 107 (425):137-155.details
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On the Relationship Between Belief and Acceptance of Evolution as Goals of Evolution Education.Mike U. Smith & Harvey Siegel - 2016 - Science & Education 25 (5-6):473-496.details
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The publicity of belief, epistemic wrongs and moral wrongs.Michael J. Shaffer - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):41 – 54.details
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Believe and Confess: Revisiting Christian Doxastic Intentionality.Nathan D. Shannon - 2013 - Heythrop Journal 54 (2):n/a-n/a.details
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Does Scientific Progress Consist in Increasing Knowledge or Understanding?Seungbae Park - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (4):569-579.details
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The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.details
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A modest solution to the problem of religious disagreement.John L. Schellenberg - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 82 (3):273-288.details
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Assertion and grounding: a theory of assertion for constructive type theory.Maria Schaar - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):187-210.details
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Stability and Scepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs.Hans Rott - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):167-197.details
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Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief.Hans Rott - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2695–2720.details
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Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief Part I: Finding the right framework.Hans Rott - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):387-412.details
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How to be a responsible slave: Managing the use of expert information systems. [REVIEW]Emma Rooksby - 2009 - Ethics and Information Technology 11 (1):81-90.details
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Ignorance is Lack of True Belief: A Rejoinder to Le Morvan.Rik Peels - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):345-355.details
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How would you answer this question? Can dispositional analyses of belief account for first-person authority?Nicole Https://Orcidorg Rathgeb - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):204-219.details
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The norms of acceptance.Joëlle Proust - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):316-333.details
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Epistemic Deflationism.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):103-134.details
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