Historically the concept of risk is rooted in Renaissance lifestyles, in which autonomous agents such as sailors, warriors, and tradesmen ventured upon dangerous enterprises. Thus, the concept of risk inseparably combines objective reality (nature) and social construction (culture): Risk = Danger + Venture. Mathematical probability theory was constructed in this social climate in order to provide a quantitative risk assessment in the face of indeterminate futures. Thus we have the famous formula: Risk = Probability (of events) × the Size (of (...) future harms). Because the concept of harm is always observer relative, however, risk assessment cannot be purely quantitative. This leads to the question, What are the general conditions under which risks can be accepted? There is, after all, a difference between incurring a risk and bearing the costs of risks selected for by other agencies. Against this background, contours of a theology of risk emerge. If God creates a self-organizing world of relatively autonomous agents, and if self-organization is favored by cooperative networks of autopoietic processes, then the theological hypothesis of a risk-taking God is at least initially plausible. Moreover, according to the Christian idea of incarnation, God is not only taking a risk but is also bearing the risks implied by the openness of creation. I thus argue for a twofold divine kenosis---in creation as well as in redemption. I discuss some objections to this view, including the serious counterargument that risk taking on behalf of others remains, even for God, a morally dubious task. What are the conditions under which the notion of a risk-taking God can be affirmed without leaving us with the picture of God as an arbitrary, cosmic tyrant? And what are the practical implications for the ways in which human agents of faith, hope, and love can learn to cope with the risks of everyday life and of political decisions? (shrink)

Looking back over the last 40 years of work in the philosophy of religion provides a fascinating vantage point from which to assess the state of the discipline today. I describe central features of American philosophy of religion in 1970 and reconstruct the last 40 years as a progression through four main stages. This analysis offers an overarching framework from which to examine the major contributions and debates of process philosophy of religion during the same period. The major thinkers, topics, (...) positions, and controversies are presented, analyzed, and critiqued. In the concluding section I offer a critical appraisal of the state of the field today based on the results of these historical analyses. (shrink)

On the assumption that theistic religious commitment takes place in the face of evidential ambiguity, the question arises under what conditions it is permissible to make a doxastic venture beyond one’s evidence in favour of a religious proposition. In this paper I explore the implications for orthodox theistic commitment of adopting, in answer to that question, a modest, moral coherentist, fideism. This extended Jamesian fideism crucially requires positive ethical evaluation of both the motivation and content of religious doxastic ventures. I (...) suggest that, even though the existence of horrendous evil does not resolve evidential ambiguity in favour of atheism, there are reasonable value commitments that would preclude those who hold them from satisfying extended Jamesian fideist conditions for committing themselves to classical theism. I then begin a discussion of a possible revisionary theistic alternative (in the Christian tradition) which – one might hope – may meet those conditions. An earlier, shorter, version of this paper was delivered as a keynote address at the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)

Compares and contrasts Open Theism with Theological Determinism, Molinism, and Process Theism.

یکی از مهم‌ترین مسائل کلام و فلسفۀ دین مشکل وجود «شر» و ارتباط آن با خدا و صفات خیرخواهی مطلق و قدرت مطلق اوست. الهی‌دان و فیلسوف معاصر، دیوید ری گریفین، تلاش‌هایی را که تاکنون برای پاسخگویی به مسئله شر انجام شده، چندان مثمر ثمر نمی‌داند. او خداباوران سنتی را که به دخالت ماوراء طبیعی خداوند در سلسلۀ علت و معلولی حوادث قائل‌اند «فراطبیعی‌گرایان» می‌خواند و بر این باور است که آنها وقوع شر را به گونه‌ای توجیه می‌کنند که گویی (...) اصلاً شر واقعی وجود ندارد و در ظاهر شر می‌نماید. گریفین تلاش کرده تا آموزه‌هایی از الهیات سنتی را که برای سازگاری وجود خدا و شر مشکل‌ساز هستند ریشه‌یابی کند و عدم صحت آنها را نشان دهد. وی با وارد آوردن نقدهایی بر جهان‌بینی‌های سنتی، نشان می‌دهد که الهیات سنتی بر اثر انتساب قدرت مطلق به خداوند، با مشکل تناقض افعال خدا دربارۀ شرور مواجه است که نهایتاً منجر به توجیه این نوع از افعال خداوند می‌شود، و با پذیرش آموزۀ خلق از عدم، در عمل نمی‌تواند مسئلۀ شر را حل کند. اساس اندیشه‌های گریفین دربارۀ مسئله شر این باور است که به طور کلی دفاعیه نمی‌تواند پاسخ مناسبی برای خداباوران معاصر فراهم آورد، بلکه ارائۀ تئودیسۀ مقبولی از جانب الهی‌دانان فلسفی لازم است تا اثبات کند تفسیر خداباورانه می‌تواند همۀ تجارب ما، از جمله تجربۀ شر، را بهتر از تفاسیر خداناباورانه روشن کند. (shrink)