People walk, build, paint and otherwise act together with a purpose in myriad ways. What is the relation between the actions people perform in acting together with a purpose and the outcome, or outcomes, to which their actions are directed? We argue that fully characterising this relation will require appeal not only to intention, knowledge and other familiar philosophical paraphernalia but also to another kind of representation involved in preparing and executing actions, namely motor representation. If we are right, motor (...) representation plays a central role in the story of acting together. (shrink)

Many of the things we do are, or could be, done with others. Mundane examples favoured by philosophers include painting a house together (Bratman 1992), lifting.

The ability to distinguish between an individual's own actions and those of another person is a requirement for successful joint action, particularly in domains such as group music making where precise interpersonal coordination ensures perceptual overlap in the effects of co-performers' actions. We tested the hypothesis that such coordination benefits from simultaneous integration and segregation of information about ‘self’ and ‘other’ in an experiment using a musical joint action paradigm. Sixteen pairs of individuals with little or no musical training performed (...) a dyadic synchronization task on a pair of electronic music boxes. The relationship between pitches produced by paired participants (same vs. different) and the relationship between movement frequencies required to trigger synchronous tones (congruent vs. incongruent) were varied in a repeated measures design. The results indicate that interpersonal coordination was most accurate when sounds were different in pitch but movement frequency was congruent. Under other conditions, participants often drifted apart, resulting in poor coordination, especially with same sounds and incongruent movements across co-performers. These findings suggest that interpersonal coordination was facilitated when simultaneous self-other integration and segregation occurred across sensory modalities in an asymmetrical manner where pitch relations favoured segregation via auditory streaming while movement congruence favoured integration via visuo-motor coupling. Such self-other representational balance may enable co-performers to maintain autonomous control while attending, anticipating, and adapting to each other's timing when joint action requires precise temporal coordination. (shrink)

The evaluation of motor imagery in persons with prolonged Disorders of Consciousness (pDOC) is a practical approach to differentiate between patients with Minimally Conscious State (MCS) and Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS) and to identify residual awareness even in individuals with UWS. Investigating the influence of motor observation on motor imagery could be helpful in this regard. Objective:In order to corroborate the clinical diagnosis and identify misdiagnosed individuals, we used EEG recordings, to assess the influence of the low-level perceptual and motoric (...) mechanisms on motor observation on motor imagery, taking into account the role of the high-level cognitive mechanisms in patients with pDOC. Methods:We assessed the influence of motor observation of walking in first-person or third-person view (by a video provision) on motor imagery of walking in the first-person view on the visual N190 (expression of motor observation processing), the readiness potential (RP) (expressing motor preparation), and the P3 component (high-level cognitive processes) in a sample of 10 persons with MCS, 10 with UWS, and 10 healthy controls (CG). Specifically, the video showed a first-view or third-view walk down the street while the participants were asked to imagine a first-view walking down the street. Results:CG showed greater N190 response (low-level sensorimotor processing) in the non-matching than in the matching condition. Conversely, the P3 and RP responses (high-level sensorimotor processing) were greater in the matching than in the non-matching condition. Remarkably, 6 out of 10 patients with MCS showed the preservation of both high- and low-level sensorimotor processing. One UWS patient showed responses similar to those six patients, suggesting a preservation of cognitively-mediated sensorimotor processing despite a detrimental motor preparation process. The remaining patients with MCS did not show diversified EEG responses, suggesting limited cognitive functioning. Conclusions:Our study suggests that identifying the low-level visual and high-level motor preparation processes in response to a simple influence of motor observation of motor imagery tasks potentially supports the clinical differential diagnosis of with MCS and UWS. This might help identify UWS patients which were misdiagnosed and who deserve more sophisticated diagnoses. (shrink)

Sense of Agency, the phenomenology associated with causing one's own actions and corresponding effects, is a cornerstone of human experience. Social Agency can be defined as the Sense of Agency experienced in any situation in which the effects of our actions are related to a conspecific. This can be implemented as the other's reactions being caused by our action, joint action modulating our Sense of Agency, or the other's mere social presence influencing our Sense of Agency. It is currently an (...) open question how such Social Agency can be conceptualized and how it relates to its nonsocial variant. This is because, compared with nonsocial Sense of Agency, the concept of Social Agency has remained oversimplified and underresearched, with disparate empirical paradigms yielding divergent results. Reviewing the empirical evidence and the commonalities and differences between different instantiations of Social Agency, we propose that Social Agency can be conceptualized as a continuum, in which the degree of cooperation is the key dimension that determines our Sense of Agency, and how it relates to nonsocial Sense of Agency. Taking this perspective, we review how the different factors that typically influence Sense of Agency affect Social Agency, and in the process highlight outstanding empirical questions within the field. Finally, concepts from wider research areas are discussed in relation to the ecological validity of Social Agency paradigms, and we provide recommendations for future methodology. (shrink)

What is the key to successful interaction? Is it sufficient to represent a common goal, or does the way our partner achieves that goal count as well? How do we react when our partner misbehaves? We used a turn-taking music-like task requiring participants to play sequences of notes together with a partner, and we investigated how people adapt to a partner’s error that violates their expectations. Errors consisted of either playing a wrong note of a sequence that the agents were (...) playing together (thus preventing the achievement of the joint goal) or playing the expected note with an unexpected action. In both cases, we found post-error slowing and inaccuracy suggesting the participants’ implicit tendency to correct the partner’s error and produce the action that the partner should have done. We argue that these “joint” monitoring processes depend on the motor predictions made within a (dyadic) motor plan and may represent a basic mechanism for mutual support in motor interactions. (shrink)