The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate a new approach to transcultural postcomparative philosophy, which may be tentatively called “the method of sublation,” using the example of Adorno and Gong Sunlong’s respective views on the relationship between concepts and objects. The term sublation is a neologism commonly used to translate Hegel’s idea of Aufhebung. It is derived from the Latin term sublatio, for its original meaning covered all three crucial connotations of Hegel’s Aufhebung – to lift up, to preserve (...) and to eliminate. The method thus encompasses all three of these three notions that are crucial to any process of creating something new from the interactions between two or more distinct discourses. In this philosophical sense, it has the three meanings of producing, eliminating, and preserving arguments, propositions, or ideas. Moreover, unlike “synthesis” the term “sublation” refers to a process rather than a stage. The sublation method aims to develop new forms of transcultural philosophizing and to overcome the impasses of traditional comparative approaches through procedures of “conceptual comparison” rather than relying only on the “comparison of concepts”. It starts from similarities and differences identified in the basic paradigms of different culturally and semantically defined frames of reference, and uses the method of discursive translation to transfer meanings across different languages and ideational traditions. Through a contrastive analysis of the similarities and differences between Adorno’s and Gongsun Longs conceptions of concepts and objects (or names and realities, respectively), the paper demonstrates the importance of considering different culturally conditioned paradigms and frames of reference in order to gain new, more complex, and more pluralistic philosophical insights. (shrink)

In this article I argue against Chad Hansen’s version of the “White Horse Dialogue” (Baimalun) of Gongsun Longzi as intelligible through writings of the later Moists. Hansen regards the Baimalun as an attempt to demonstrate how the compound baima, “white horse,” is correctly analyzed in one of the Moist ways of analyzing compound term semantics but not the other. I present an alternative reading in which the Baimalun arguments point out, via reductio, the failure of either Moist analysis; in particular (...) they point out how neither analysis accounts for ordinary, acceptable inferences like “There is a white horse; therefore there is a horse.” At issue for Gongsun Longzi is a fundamental problem with atomic terms: none of them seems capable of referring to a particular, “stand-alone” individual. (shrink)

The so-called “white horse is not horse” debate, or “white horse” dialogical argument, is beyond doubt the most famous case of argumentation in the history of Classical Chinese philosophy. The somewhat disorienting statement at the center of this debate is discussed at length by two anonymous fictive characters, a persuader and their opponent, in the ‘Báimǎ lùn’ 白馬論. The ‘Báimǎ lùn’ usually appears as the first chapter in the received text Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ 公孫龍子. The Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ is a composite collection (...) of heterogeneous materials in six chapters. The collection includes an anecdotal preface, three partially incomplete and/or corrupted dialogues, and two short and extremely intricate treatises. In particular, the dialogues included in the collection are structured in a fairly similar way and focus on what have been defined as paradoxes or sophisms belonging to the repertoire of a rather loose group of thinkers, the so-called Logicians or Chinese “Sophists”, allegedly active during the Warring States period. (shrink)