- Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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How to Make Correct Predictions in False Belief Tasks without Attributing False Beliefs: An Analysis of Alternative Inferences and How to Avoid Them.Ricardo Augusto Perera & Sofia Inês Albornoz Stein - 2018 - Philosophies 3 (2):10.details
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How to Make Correct Predictions in False Belief Tasks without Attributing False Beliefs: An Analysis of Alternative Inferences and How to Avoid Them.Ricardo Augusto Perera & Sofia Inês Albornoz Stein - 2018 - Philosophies 3 (2):10.details
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De Se Content and Action Generalisation.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):315-344.details
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Knowing mental states: The asymmetry of psychological prediction and explanation.Kristin Andrews - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Agency.Timothy Nailer - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Adelaidedetails
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The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.details
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Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.details
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Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.details
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Against a normative view of folk psychology.Meredith R. Wilkinson - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
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Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.details
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Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.details
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Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.details
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What i s Folk Psychology?Stephen Stich & Ian Ravenscroft - 1994 - Cognition 50 (1-3):447-468.details
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Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.details
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The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.details
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The Phenomenology of Semiosis: Approaches to the Gap between the Encyclopaedia and the Porphyrian Tree Spanned by Sedimentation.Göran H. Sonesson - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (5):114.details
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Knowing children's minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.details
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Special access lies down with theory-theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.details
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Disenshrining the Cartesian self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.details
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On leaving your children wrapped in thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76-77.details
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Qualities and relations in folk theories of mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.details
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Why presume analyses are on-line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.details
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Theories of mind: Some methodological/conceptual problems and an alternative approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.details
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Theory-theory theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.details
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Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.details
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Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.details
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Limitations on first-person experience: Implications of the “extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.details
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First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.details
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A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.details
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The role of concepts in perception and inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65-66.details
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The meaning of illness in nursing practice: a philosophical model of communication and concept possession.Halvor Nordby - 2016 - Nursing Philosophy 17 (2):103-118.details
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Developmental evidence and introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.details
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The quest of parsimonious XAI: A human-agent architecture for explanation formulation.Yazan Mualla, Igor Tchappi, Timotheus Kampik, Amro Najjar, Davide Calvaresi, Abdeljalil Abbas-Turki, Stéphane Galland & Christophe Nicolle - 2022 - Artificial Intelligence 302 (C):103573.details
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Mismatching categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.details
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Heuristics and counterfactual self-knowledge.Adam Morton - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):63-64.details
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Knowledge of the psychological states of self and others is not only theory-laden but also data-driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.details
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Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.details
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On Seeing That Someone is Angry.William McNeill - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):575-597.details
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Inferentialism and our knowledge of others’ minds.William E. S. McNeill - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1435-1454.details
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The fallibility of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60-60.details
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Connecting Twenty-First Century Connectionism and Wittgenstein.Charles W. Lowney, Simon D. Levy, William Meroney & Ross W. Gayler - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):643-671.details
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Functionalism can explain self-ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.details
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Three inferential temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57-58.details
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Even a theory-theory needs information processing: ToMM, an alternative theory-theory of the child's theory of mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.details
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Inside Doubt: On the Non-Identity of the Theory of Mind and Propositional Attitude Psychology. [REVIEW]David Landy - 2005 - Minds and Machines 15 (3-4):399-414.details
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Self-attributions help constitute mental types.Bernard W. Kobes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-56.details
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Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation.Joshua Knobe - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325.details
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