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  1. Energy Requirements Undermine Substrate Independence and Mind-Body Functionalism.Paul Thagard - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):70-88.
    Substrate independence and mind-body functionalism claim that thinking does not depend on any particular kind of physical implementation. But real-world information processing depends on energy, and energy depends on material substrates. Biological evidence for these claims comes from ecology and neuroscience, while computational evidence comes from neuromorphic computing and deep learning. Attention to energy requirements undermines the use of substrate independence to support claims about the feasibility of artificial intelligence, the moral standing of robots, the possibility that we may be (...)
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  • Responses to critics.Thomas Polger & Lawrence Shapiro - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):446-457.
    In response to points raised by our critics in this book symposium, we offer some clarifications about how to understand the role of science in assessing the multiple realization thesis. We also consider the connection between functionalism and multiple realization in the contexts of both psychological and biological sciences.
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  • Multiple Realization in Systems Biology.Wei Fang - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (4):663-684.
    Thomas Polger and Lawrence Shapiro claim that unlike human-made artifacts cases of multiple realization in naturally occurring systems are uncommon. Drawing on cases from systems biology, I argue t...
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  • Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism.Rosa Cao - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-31.
    Multiple realizability says that the same kind of mental states may be manifested by systems with very different physical constitutions. Putnam ( 1967 ) supposed it to be “overwhelmingly probable” that there exist psychological properties with different physical realizations in different creatures. But because function constrains possible physical realizers, this empirical bet is far less favorable than it might initially have seemed, especially when we take on board the richer picture of neural and brain function that neuroscience has been uncovering (...)
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  • Multiple realizability.John Bickle - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.