This paper argues for the pragmatic construction of Confucian democracy by showing that Chinese philosophers who wish to see Confucianism flourish again as a positive dimension of Chinese civilization need to approach it pragmatically and democratically, otherwise their love of the past is at the expense of something else Confucius held in equal esteem, love of learning. Chinese philosophers who desire democracy for China would do well to learn from the earlier failures of the iconoclastic Westernizers, and realize that a (...) Chinese democracy cannot come about by ignoring or dismissing such an important part of China's history, its Confucian tradition. The best chances for democracy in China lie in transforming that tradition without destroying it. Eagerness to learn from others must be united with a proper appreciation of one's own past to nurture democracy as a way of life. (shrink)

This essay attempts a philosophical reflection of the Confucian ideal of “scholar-official” in Joseon Korea’s neo-Confucian context. It explores why this noble ideal of a Confucian public being had to suffer many moral-political problems in reality. It argues first that because the institution of Confucian scholar-official was actually a modus-operandi compromise between Confucianism and Legalism, the Confucian scholar-officials were torn between their ethical commitment to Confucianism and their political commitment to the state; and second, that because the Cheng-Zhu neo-Confucianism vigorously (...) imported and indigenized by Joseon Koreans exalted the family over the state, Joseon neo-Confucian scholar-officials were torn between two competing moral obligations, filiality and loyalty. The essay concludes by discussing whether, given the problems with which the ideal of the Confucian scholar-official was frequently entangled, liberal individualism should be pursued as its normative alternative. (shrink)

Despite his strong commitment to the ideal of _wuwei_ statecraft, Mencius advanced a distinct yet cohesive theory of Confucian _youwei_ statecraft that can serve the ideal of _wuwei_, first by means of the principled application of individual and social responsibility under unfavorable socioeconomic conditions, and second by offering a concrete public policy (i.e. the well-field system) that contributes to a decent socioeconomic condition on which the society can be self-governing and where individuals (and families) can fully exercise their individual moral (...) and socioeconomic responsibility. My central claim is that Confucian _wuwei_ statecraft has a practical and social background, namely, a socioeoconomically and morally self-governing civil society. (shrink)

This essay critically revisits Jiwei Ci’s prudential argument for political democracy in China from the very Tocquevillian standpoint on which Ci’s core theoretical argument is predicated. I argue that Ci’s underlying assumption and argument regarding the enabling conditions of democracy actually depart significantly from Tocqueville’s own view due to Ci’s overly positive understanding of equality of conditions as directly constitutive of a democratic society and his assumed causal connection between capitalist society and political democracy. After clarifying what Tocqueville meant by (...) equality of conditions and discussing his prudential remedy for the perils of democracy, I conclude by suggesting an alternative pragmatic and prudential justification for democracy in China that is more consistent with the Tocquevillian conception of democracy. (shrink)

Recent debates on Confucian meritocracy largely center around outright normative critiques rather than its textual basis. The unflattering upshot is the lack of attention to a mode of critique that scrutinizes Confucian meritocracy by questioning the way meritocrats invoke Confucian concepts and values. Focusing on three meritocrats—Bai Tongdong 白彤東, Daniel A. Bell, and Kang Xiaoguang 康曉光, this article ventures a text-based normative approach by examining continuities and ruptures between core meritocratic arguments they make, and the messages conveyed by Confucian masters. (...) The core argument that I advance is that the meritocratic thesis about the political division of labor does not mesh with the classic Confucian understandings of voluntariness and political authority, which generates uneasy normative consequences for Confucian meritocracy. Ultimately, classic Confucianism does not provide a conceptually secure platform for the meritocratic part of Confucian meritocracy as its ardent advocates claim. (shrink)