Research into the roots of ideological extremism has traditionally focused on the social, economic, and demographic factors that make people vulnerable to adopting hostile attitudes toward outgroups. However, there is insufficient empirical work on individual differences in implicit cognition and information processing styles that amplify an individual’s susceptibility to endorsing violence to protect an ideological cause or group. Here we present original evidence that objectively assessed cognitive inflexibility predicts extremist attitudes, including a willingness to harm others, and sacrifice one’s life (...) for the group. Across two samples (N = 1,047) from the United Kingdom and United States, structural equation models demonstrated that cognitive inflexibility predicted endorsement of violence to protect the national ingroup, which in turn predicted a willingness to die for the group. These statistical models accounted for an average of 31.4% of the variance in willingness to die for the group, after accounting for demographic variables. Furthermore, cognitive inflexibility was related to greater confidence in the decision to sacrifice one’s life in an ingroup trolley problem scenario. Analysis of participants’ performance on the cognitive tasks revealed that cognitive rigidity – distinctly from other aspects of cognition – was specifically implicated as a cognitive antecedent of extremist attitudes. Implications for the study of radicalization and identity fusion throug... (shrink)

Parkinson's disease patients receiving dopaminergic treatment may experience bursts of creativity. Although this phenomenon is sometimes recognized among patients and their clinicians, the association between dopamine replacement therapy in PD patients and creativity remains underexplored. It is unclear, for instance, whether DRT affects creativity through convergent or divergent thinking, idea generation, or a general lack of inhibition. It is also unclear whether DRT only augments pre-existing creative attributes or generates creativity de novo. Here, we tested a group of PD patients (...) when “on” and “off” dopaminergic treatment on a series of tests of creative problem-solving, and related their performance to a group of matched healthy controls as well as to their pre-PD creative skills and measures of inhibition/impulsivity. Results did not provide strong evidence that DRT improved creative thinking in PD patients. Rather, PD patients “on” medication showed less flexibility in divergent thinking, generated fewer ideas via insight, and showed worse performance in convergent thinking overall than healthy controls. Pre-PD creative skills predicted enhanced flexibility and fluency in divergent thinking when PD patients were “on” medication. However, results on convergent thinking were mixed. Finally, PD patients who exhibited deficits in a measure of inhibitory control showed weaker convergent thinking while “on” medication, supporting previous evidence on the importance of inhibitory control in creative problem-solving. Altogether, results do not support the hypothesis that DRT promotes creative thinking in PD. We speculate that bursts of artistic production in PD are perhaps conflated with creativity due to lay conceptions of creativity. (shrink)

The essential role of creativity has been highlighted in several human knowledge areas. Regarding the neural underpinnings of creativity, there is evidence about the role of left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) on divergent thinking (DT) and convergent thinking (CT). Transcranial stimulation studies suggest that the left DLPFC is associated with both DT and CT, whereas left IFG is more related to DT. However, none of the previous studies have targeted both hubs simultaneously and compared (...) transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) and random noise stimulation (tRNS). Additionally, given the relationship between cognitive flexibility and creativity, we included it in order to check if the improvement in creativity may be mediated by cognitive flexibility. In this double-blind, between-subjects study, 66 healthy participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups (N = 22) that received a transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), transcranial random noise stimulation (tRNS), or sham for 20 min. The tDCS group received 1.5 mA with the anode over the left DLPFC and cathode over the left IFG. Locations in tRNS group were the same and they received 1.5 mA of high frequency tRNS (100–500 Hz). Divergent thinking was assessed before (baseline) and during stimulation with unusual uses (UU) and picture completion (PC) subtests from Torrance Creative thinking Test, whereas convergent thinking was evaluated with the remote association test (RAT). Stroop test was included to assess cognitive flexibility. ANCOVA results of performance under stimulation (controlling for baseline performance) showed that there were significant differences in PC (F = 3.35, p = 0.042, np2 = 0.10) but not in UU (F = 0.61, p = 0.546) and RAT (F = 2.65, p = 0.079) scores. Post-hoc analyses showed that tRNS group had significantly higher scores compared to sham (p = 0.004) in PC. More specifically, tRNS showed higher performance in fluency (p = 0.012) and originality (p = 0.021) dimensions of PC compared to sham. Regarding cognitive flexibility, we did not find any significant effect of any of the stimulation groups (F = 0.34, p = 0.711). Therefore, no further mediation analyses were performed. Finally, the group that received tDCS reported more adverse effects than sham group (F = 3.46, p = 0.035). Altogether, these results suggest that tRNS may have some advantages over tDCS in DT. (shrink)

The aim of this present study is to investigate the influence of three learning contexts on the development of motor creativity of young footballers. In team sport, creativity is a fundamental issue because it allows players to adapt in an environment of high social uncertainty. To carry out this work, we suggest a method for assessing motor creativity into ecological situations based on the analysis of praxical communications. Creativity originates from an interaction between divergence and convergence. In our case, the (...) number of communications and the diversity of updated communications are our divergence indicators. Convergence, understood as the ability to make good decisions, is assessed by two expert judges. Sixty boys’ football players coming from three football clubs participated in this research. The study lasted 2 years. Each year, a team of 10 players from each club participated in the research twice a week for 32 weeks, these groups attended different training sessions: the control group followed a classical learning; the decoding group attended training focused on learning the praxemes of football; the traditional sporting games group followed a training session that was jointly focused on praxemes and the practice of traditional sporting games. The motor creativity of players and groups was assessed both at the beginning and at the end of the year during football matches. Compared to the control group, in the post-test, the group with the highest fluidity is the decoding group and the one with the highest fluidity is the traditional sporting games group. The latter group is also the one with the best convergence. The results showed that traditional games can help develop players’ creative abilities. This research invites us to investigate the complementarity between the different offered training. (shrink)

Individual differences in convergent and divergent thinking may uniquely explain variation in analogical reasoning ability. Across two studies we investigated the relative influences of divergent and convergent thinking as predictors of verbal analogy performance. Performance on both convergent thinking and divergent thinking uniquely predicted performance on both analogy selection and analogical generation tasks. Moreover, convergent and divergent thinking were predictive above and beyond creative behaviours in Study 1 and a composite measure of crystallised intelligence in Study 2. Verbal analogies in (...) Study 2 also varied in semantic distance, with results demonstrating divergent thinking as a stronger predictor of analogy generation for semantically far than for semantically near analogies. Results thus further illuminate the link between analogical reasoning and creative cognition by demonstrating convergent and di.. (shrink)

This study examined the effects of mood and risk-taking on divergent and convergent thinking using a Q-learning computation model. The results revealed that while mood was not significantly related to divergent or convergent thinking (as creative thinking types), risk-taking exerted positive effects on divergent thinking in the face of negative rewards. The results were consistent with the representational change theory in insight problem solving. Although this theory accounts directly for insight, the underlying idea of going beyond current contexts and implicit (...) constrains could be applied to creative thinking as well. The results indeed accounted for the relevance of this theory to divergent thinking. The current study is one of the first empirical studies simultaneously examining the role of mood and risk-taking in creativity. In particular, no related studies exist that took a computational approach to estimate the relevant parameters in the framework of dynamic optimization. Our Q learning model enables to distinguish and identify the different roles of mood and risk-taking in updatingQvalues and making decisions. (shrink)

Recent neuro-psychoanalytic literature has emphasized the view that our subjective identity rests on ancient subcortical neuro-psychic processes expressing unthinking forms of experience, which are “affectively intense without being known” (Solms and Panksepp, 2012). Devoid of internal representations, the emotional states of our “core-Self” (Panksepp, 1998b) are entirely “projected” towards the external world and tend to be discharged through instinctual action-patterns. However, due to the close connections between the subcortical and the cortical midline brain, the emotional drives may also find a (...) way to be reflected within an intrinsic self-referential processing, evident when the organism is not actively engaged with the external world. Thanks to such endogenous functioning, the core-Self emotional dispositions are not overtly executed, but they are organized within coherent dynamic mental structures, called “feeling-toned complexes” by C.G. Jung and “unconscious phantasies” by Melanie Klein. The intrinsic self-referential dynamism of the ‘brainmind’ originated from REM sleep arousal and then evolved in the resting-state activity of a complex of cortico-limbic midline brain structures (CMS), also called Default Mode Network (DMN). From our neuro-ethological perspective, it is sustained by an “introverted” SEEKING activity leading to the subjective exploration of internally constructed virtual scenarios. This “mind wandering” function, implicated in dreaming, fantasy processing, remembering and thinking, is the essence of the imaginative function and constitutes the first form of reflection, where intentions and drives gain a primordial form of conscious (but not self-conscious) representation. During postnatal development, this original (“archetypal”) imaginative function is slowly attuned in a relational “transitional” space and may be expressed first in non-verbal and eventually in abstract-verbal social communicative patterns. Our view has noticeable implications for psychotherapy. Instead of trying to directly modify interpersonal, extrinsic relationships (a top-down approach), dysfunctional emotional-relational patterns may be modified by a process in which the patient is helped to let-go of the perceived feeling-objects in favor of an immersion, via the actual feeling, from the superficial level of perception towards a void feeling-state, empty of images. Only starting from this “anoetic” feeling-state, the deep imaginal creative and re-structuring self-referential activity may be reactivated by a process of spontaneous imagination. (shrink)