In his commentary on theTimaeus, the Neoplatonist Iamblichus argues that time is logically antecedent to change inasmuch as time is no mere aspect of change. Naturally, scholars appraise this thesis in light of Neoplatonic metaphysics. Nevertheless, they neglect the philological framing of this thesis, and thence the philosophical implications thereof. Only J.M. Dillon acknowledges this framing, though even Dillon does not acknowledge the philosophical implications thereof. This article illustrates the logic of said thesis vis-à-vis the Iamblichean exegesis ofTi. 38b7–c1 (Iambl.apudSimpl.in (...) Phys.1.794.21–7 Diels, Iambl.in Ti. fr. 67 Dillon). Beginning from the intuition that time is no mere aspect of change, Iamblichus argues that time can persist apart from change, and thereupon, given the Platonic notion that time is the everlasting image of Eternityquaparadigm, Iamblichus intuits that time is no mere image but everlasting in its own right, being itself a paradigm. Yet this thesis rests upon the indeterminateness of the Platonic titleτὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως(‘the paradigm of a thoroughly everlasting nature’) atTi. 38b8 and, still more so, upon the reflexiveness of the ambiguousΑΥΤΩΙ(that is,αὐτῷ‘toit[the paradigm]’, if notαὑτῷ‘toitself[as paradigm]’) atTi. 38c1. Inasmuch as the subject of the Platonic title is indeterminate between Eternity and Eternal Beingquaintelligible everlastingness, Iamblichus construesΑΥΤΩΙnot as a mere reflexive but as self-reflexive, withαὑτῷreferring to Timequaintelligible paradigm. In this light, the Platonic lemma grounds the Iamblichean thesis. (shrink)