Computational explanations focus on information processing required in specific cognitive capacities, such as perception, reasoning or decision-making. These explanations specify the nature of the information processing task, what information needs to be represented, and why it should be operated on in a particular manner. In this article, the focus is on three questions concerning the nature of computational explanations: What type of explanations they are, in what sense computational explanations are explanatory and to what extent they involve a special, “independent” (...) or “autonomous” level of explanation. In this paper, we defend the view computational explanations are genuine explanations, which track non-causal/formal dependencies. Specifically, we argue that they do not provide mere sketches for explanation, in contrast to what for example Piccinini and Craver :283–311, 2011) suggest. This view of computational explanations implies some degree of “autonomy” for the computational level. However, as we will demonstrate that does not make this view “computationally chauvinistic” in a way that Piccinini or Kaplan :339–373, 2011) have charged it to be. (shrink)

Much research has linked surprise to violation of expectations, but it has been less clear how one can be surprised when one has no particular expectation. This paper discusses a computational theory based on Algorithmic Information Theory, which can account for surprises in which one initially expects randomness but then notices a pattern in stimuli. The authors present evidence that a “randomness deficiency” heuristic leads to surprise in such cases.

In this essay, I explore how cognitive science could illuminate the concept of beauty. Two results from the extensive literature on aesthetics guide my discussion. As the term “beauty” is overextended in general usage, I choose as my starting point the notion of “perfect form.” Aesthetic theorists are in reasonable agreement about the criteria for perfect form. What do these criteria imply for mental representations that are experienced as beautiful? Complexity theory can be used to specify constraints on mental representations (...) abstractly formulated as vectors in a high-dimensional space. A central feature of the proposed model is that perfect form depends both on features of the objects or events perceived and on the nature of the encoding strategies or model of the observer. A simple example illustrates the proposed calculations. A number of interesting implications that arise as a consequence of reformulating beauty in this way are noted. (shrink)

On observe une nouvelle tendance dans la philosophie des sciences cognitives, manifeste dans les écrits de Betchel et al. qui met en avant l’importance des explications mécanistes au détriment du rôle explicatif des principes. Cet article est un plaidoyer pour rétablir l’équilibre. Il met l’accent sur l’effort d’explication des effets du niveau de base, l’une des plus importantes découvertes empiriques dans l’histoire de la recherche en catégorisation. L’analyse de trois différentes périodes de cette histoire révèle que le recours aux principes (...) y a joué un rôle crucial. Cependant, afin de reconnaître pleinement le rôle explicatif des principes, nous devrions nous préparer à admettre que les explications déductives-nomologiques ne sont pas les seuls types d’explications basées sur des principes. (shrink)

On observe une nouvelle tendance dans la philosophie des sciences cognitives, manifeste dans les écrits de Betchel et al. qui met en avant l’importance des explications mécanistes au détriment du rôle explicatif des principes. Cet article est un plaidoyer pour rétablir l’équilibre. Il met l’accent sur l’effort d’explication des effets du niveau de base, l’une des plus importantes découvertes empiriques dans l’histoire de la recherche en catégorisation. L’analyse de trois différentes périodes de cette histoire révèle que le recours aux principes (...) y a joué un rôle crucial. Cependant, afin de reconnaître pleinement le rôle explicatif des principes, nous devrions nous préparer à admettre que les explications déductives-nomologiques ne sont pas les seuls types d’explications basées sur des principes. (shrink)