Jürgen Habermas has for decades been recognized as a leading European philosopher and public intellectual. But his global visibility has obscured his rootedness in German political culture and debate. The most successful historical accounts of the transformation of political culture in West Germany have turned on the concept of German statism and its decline. Viewing Habermas through this lens, I treat Habermas as a radical critic of German statism and an innovative theorist of democratic constitutionalism. Based on personal interviews with (...) Habermas and his German colleagues, and by setting the major work alongside his occasion-specific political writings from 1984 to 1996, I interpret Habermas's political thought as an evolving response to two distinct moments in German history: first, the mid-1980s, and second, the revolutions of 1989 and German reunification in 1990. This essay challenges the dominant interpretations of Habermas's mature statement of his political theory. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Democracy, which have described it as marking a distinct break with, and reversal of, the commitments of his earlier work. By contrast, I describe the work as an intellectual summa, consistent with Habermas's previous thought and career, and containing remarkable historical interpretations of two intertwined phenomena: the intellectual and institutional dimensions of the Bonn Republic and Habermas's own biography. (shrink)

The paper's aim is to tackle some significant challenges faced by democratic theory in plurinational societies. Claims to recognition challenge the assumption of a ‘people speaking in one voice’ and therefore, some basic tenets of liberal democracy. In a context where one cannot assume anymore a homogeneous demos, it is tempting to believe that there may be an independent, yet democratic, principle that may help us to solve the problem of the ‘constitution of the demos.’ Goodin argues that the all-affected (...) interests principle is in fact the best principle of inclusion in democratic decision-making. Yet I argue that the all-affected interests principle is not really useful, at least as a starting point. But if this is so, and if the picture underlying modern democratic theory is seriously undermined by claims to recognition, how are the communities to which self-rule necessarily relates to be bounded? (shrink)

This article examines two distinct ways in which anticolonial thinkers in early twentieth-century Korea reconstructed their nondemocratic tradition in an attempt to justify (rather than take for granted) the claim of self-determination. The exposure to modern education and ideas of democracy prompted these thinkers to critically engage their tradition in the struggle for self-determination. That said, they could not simply abandon the cultural foundation of their nation. Japanese colonial rule drew its legitimacy from not only an assimilation ideology that the (...) Japanese and Koreans shared the same ethnic origin but also a developmentalist conception of the colonized that they were premodern and incapable of self-rule. To reject imperial domination, Korean anticolonial thinkers needed to invent out of their country’s nondemocratic tradition (1) an unassimilable nation/people (2) capable of self-rule. Drawing upon the political writings of two early twentieth-century thinkers in colonial Korea, Yi Kwang-su (1892–1950) and Cho So-ang (1887–1958), I discover from their political thought two nuanced approaches to this project of inventing “the people” in the colonial world. I argue that while Yi succeeded in rebutting the colonial ideology of assimilation, he fell into the trap of developmentalism. I contend that Cho, on the contrary, sidestepped this trap with his revisionist reading of the Confucian past as a history of democratic transformation, thus providing an immediate alternative to imperial sovereignty. (shrink)

This article presents Minobe Tatsukichi’s emperor organ theory as a novel understanding of the temporality of founding. In contrast to a conventional framework of founding which legitimizes the constitution by postulating the pre-constitutional power of “the people,” emperor organ theory invents “the people” out of the Meiji Constitution as a democratically empowered subject to-come. In so doing, emperor organ theory calls upon the transformation of shin-min (臣民), the presumed subject of the emperor, into koku-min (国民), the people of this constitutional (...) state. However, emperor organ theory also highlights the contingency of founding moments: though koku-min emerged through the Diet as a conceptually new political actor in Japan’s nascent constitutional state, it never solidified its sovereign status as “the people.”. (shrink)

Many philosophers, past and present, have attempted to eradicate the notion of sovereignty. The most interesting and most ambitious attempt to do so, comes from those philosophers who claim that sovereignty is in principle incompatible with the rule of law. The purpose of this paper is to repel this latter attack. In order to do so, I investigate the analogy between sovereignty and individual autonomy. The resulting conception of sovereignty, ‘sovereignty as autonomy’, shows that sovereignty and the rule of law (...) are utterly compatible. At the same time, this conception conserves what I believe to be the normative core of our modern notion of sovereignty: when speaking of sovereignty, we invoke the perspective from which a political community can consciously understand itself as an autonomous agent. (shrink)

Taking seriously the task of sustaining the democratic project requires debunking pessimism, thinking critically about what constitutes the distinctive character of democracy, and taking a future-oriented perspective on democratic transformations.

Habermas’ theory of popular sovereignty has received comparatively little sustained critical attention in the Anglo-American literature since initial responses to Between Facts and Norms. In light of subsequent work on group agency, this paper argues that Habermas’ reconstruction of popular sovereignty—in its denial of the normative force of collective citizen action—is best understood as a renunciation of the doctrine. The paper is structured in three sections. Section 1 examines Habermas’ treatment of popular sovereignty prior to Between Facts and Norms as (...) both (i) a principle of constitutional legitimacy or normative justification for the modern Rechtsstaat and (ii) a concept of legitimation for the rule of the ascendant liberal bourgeoisie. Section 2 then argues that Habermas’ reconstruction of popular sovereignty in Between Facts and Norms, by discounting the role of collective citizen agency in the justification of the modern constitutional state, empties the doctrine of its core normative content. The final section briefly elaborates on this claim by reference to Habermas’ theory of the public sphere. (shrink)