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On Quine's Approach to Natural Deduction'

In Paolo Leonardi & Marco Santambrogio (eds.), On Quine: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 314--335 (1995)

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  1. Gentzen and Jaśkowski Natural Deduction: Fundamentally Similar but Importantly Different.Allen P. Hazen & Francis Jeffry Pelletier - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (6):1103-1142.
    Gentzen’s and Jaśkowski’s formulations of natural deduction are logically equivalent in the normal sense of those words. However, Gentzen’s formulation more straightforwardly lends itself both to a normalization theorem and to a theory of “meaning” for connectives . The present paper investigates cases where Jaskowski’s formulation seems better suited. These cases range from the phenomenology and epistemology of proof construction to the ways to incorporate novel logical connectives into the language. We close with a demonstration of this latter aspect by (...)
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  • A Brief History of Natural Deduction.Francis Jeffry Pelletier - 1999 - History and Philosophy of Logic 20 (1):1-31.
    Natural deduction is the type of logic most familiar to current philosophers, and indeed is all that many modern philosophers know about logic. Yet natural deduction is a fairly recent innovation in logic, dating from Gentzen and Jaśkowski in 1934. This article traces the development of natural deduction from the view that these founders embraced to the widespread acceptance of the method in the 1960s. I focus especially on the different choices made by writers of elementary textbooks—the standard conduits of (...)
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  • The enduring scandal of deduction: is propositional logic really uninformative?Marcello D'Agostino & Luciano Floridi - 2009 - Synthese 167 (2):271-315.
    Deductive inference is usually regarded as being “tautological” or “analytical”: the information conveyed by the conclusion is contained in the information conveyed by the premises. This idea, however, clashes with the undecidability of first-order logic and with the (likely) intractability of Boolean logic. In this article, we address the problem both from the semantic and the proof-theoretical point of view. We propose a hierarchy of propositional logics that are all tractable (i.e. decidable in polynomial time), although by means of growing (...)
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