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The Moral Point of View

Philosophy 51 (196):177 - 187 (1976)

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  1. Passionate objectivity.Corliss G. Swain - 1992 - Noûs 26 (4):465-490.
  • Hume on Motivating Sentiments, the General Point of View, and the Inculcation of "Morality".Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 1994 - Hume Studies 20 (1):37-58.
    That Hume 's theory can be interpreted in two widely divergent ways-as a version of sentimentalism and as an ideal observer theory-is symptomatic of a puzzle ensconced in Hume 's theory. How can the ground of morality be internal and motivating when an inference to the feelings of a spectator in "the general point of view" is typically necessary to get to genuine moral distinctions? This paper considers and rejects the suggestion that in moral education, for Hume, the inculcation of (...)
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  • History Will Judge: Hume's General Point of View in Historical Moral Judgment.Serge Grigoriev - 2021 - Journal of Political Philosophy 29 (1):94-116.
  • Toward a foundational normative method in business ethics.Lester F. Goodchild - 1986 - Journal of Business Ethics 5 (6):485 - 499.
    Business ethics as an applied inquiry requires an expanded normative method which allows both philosophical and religious ethical considerations to be employed in resolving complex issues or cases. The proposed foundational normative method provides a comprehensive framework composed of major philosophical and religious ethical theories. An extensive rationale from the current trends in business ethics and metaethical considerations supports the development of this method which is illustrated in several case studies. By using this method, scholars and business persons gain greater (...)
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  • Impartiality through ‘Moral Optics’: Why Adam Smith revised David Hume's Moral Sentimentalism.Christel Fricke & Maria Alejandra Carrasco - 2021 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 19 (1):1-18.
    We read Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as a critical response to David Hume's moral theory. While both share a commitment to moral sentimentalism, they propose different ways of meeting its main challenge, that is, explaining how judgments informed by (partial) sentiments can nevertheless have a justified claim to general authority. This difference is particularly manifest in their respective accounts of ‘moral optics’, or the way they rely on the analogy between perceptual and moral judgments. According to Hume, making (...)
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