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  1. What’s Wrong with Restrictivism?William M. Simkulet - 2024 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 33 (2):296-299.
    Emily Carroll and Parker Crutchfield propose a new inconsistency argument against abortion restrictivism. In response, I raised several objections to their argument. Recently Carroll and Crutchfield have replied and seem to be under the impression that I’m a restrictivist. This is puzzling, since my criticism of their view included a very thinly veiled, but purposely more charitable, anti-restrictivist inconsistency argument. In this response, I explain how Carroll and Crutchfield mischaracterize my position and that of the restrictivist.
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  • Welfare, Abortion, and Organ Donation: A Reply to the Restrictivist.Emily Carroll & Parker Crutchfield - 2024 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 33 (2):290-295.
    We argued in a recent issue of this journal that if abortion is restricted,1 then there are parallel obligations for parents to donate body parts to their children. The strength of this obligation to donate is proportional to the strength of the abortion restrictions. If abortion is never permissible, then a parent must always donate any organ if they are a match. If abortion is sometimes permissible and sometimes not, then organ donation is sometimes obligatory and sometimes not. Our argument (...)
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