The current political climate is awash with groups that we might be tempted to label irrational, extremist, hyper-partisan; it is full of echo-chambers, radicalization, and epistemic bubbles. Philosophers have profitably analyzed some of these phenomena. In this essay, I draw attention to a crucial but neglected aspect of our time: the way in which certain groups are fanatical. I distinguish fanatical groups from other types of problematic groups, such as extremist and cultish groups. I argue that a group qualifies as (...) fanatical only if it has features that promote individual fanaticism. But how might a group promote individual fanaticism? I argue that a typical feature of fanatical groups is their tendency to encourage an emotion that philosophers sometimes call “ressentiment,” which differs from ordinary resentment. I explain what ressentiment is, how it can be fostered, and how it can lead to fanaticism. I contend that this account helps us to identify a disturbing and increasingly widespread feature of contemporary social and political groups. (shrink)

Purpose. The article deals with the problem of mutual perception of individuals, which implies the analysis of the anthropological prerequisites for the study of interpersonal communication. The work emphasizes the need to identify the gnoseological lacuna of the possibility and relevance of knowing someone else’s "I". As well as the need to point out implicit metaphysical attitudes, universal for many worldviews, which are implicitly included in the theory of personal communication. Theoretical basis. The author proceeds from the logical consequences of (...) the evolutionary premise in anthropology. He compares the psychophysical goals of the interpersonal communication task with its ideological theory, monitors the impossibility of the realizing the communication level declared in the consciousness. As an opposite evolutionary premise, the author cites the postulates of the "philosophy of dialogue" by F. Rosenzweig, F. Ebner, M. Buber, and others. The correlation of these philosophical positions reveals the inconsistency of materialistic reduction in anthropology. Originality. The author identifies four levels of communication: background, obstacle, function and dialogue. He represents the rationale for the fact that the first three levels do not need the existence of an individual "I". The first three levels leave the existential "I" unnecessary and therefore unclaimed. The philosophy of dialogue with the Other raises an equally important question about the conditions for the possibility of a metaphysical continuum in ontology, and in turn, suggests the acceptance of a philosophical premise about God as the space of subjectivity in the "I-You" dialogue. Conclusions. Philosophical understanding of the communication of two existential "I" demanded in communication is possible only within the framework of religious discourse. The phenomenal consciousness can enter into communication with a specific other phenomenal consciousness only when there is a metaphysical space between them, allowing for the possibility of communication of such a level. The materialistic conditioning by the human evolutionary needs in all its conceivable forms produces a reduction of the communicative inquiry, which makes the mutual perception of the two "I" impossible. In this psychophysiological anthropological model, there is no space for the possibility of a dialogue of individuals. (shrink)

I argue that fitting resentment tracks unacceptable ‘ecological’ imbalances in relative social strength between victims and perpetrators that arise from violations of legitimate moral expectations. It does not respond purely, or even primarily, to offenders’ attitudes, and its proper targets need not be fully developed moral agents. It characteristically involves a wish for the restoration of social equilibrium rather than a demand for moral recognition or good will. To illuminate these contentions, I focus on cases that I believe demonstrate a (...) corollary thesis, namely, that strength, broadly construed, is a necessary condition of resentment-worthiness. I argue that weakness can make resentment unfitting in two ways. First, weakness may prevent a wrongdoer from shifting the balance of social power. Second, a weak wrongdoer may do social damage but be so lowly that resentment, which would represent him as excessively strong, would be inapt. Finally, I consider how accepting the ecological view might affect our theorizing about moral responsibility and the ethics of blame. (shrink)

The reactive attitude of ‘resentment’ has been gaining increasing attention within contemporary philosophical literature. However, little attention has been given to the conceptions of resentment in Asian philosophy. In recent years, some philosophers have argued that there is a positive account of resentment in Confucian philosophy. This paper brings a recent Mencian account of resentment in conversation with contemporary philosophical discussions. The conversations revolve around aspects of resentment such as exculpatory conditions, payback, transition, and moral cultivation. The conversation not only (...) adds clarity to the Mencian account, it also demonstrates potential contributions this account has to contemporary discussions on resentment. (shrink)

Some reasons are thought to depend on relations between people, such as that of a promiser to a promisee. It has sometimes been assumed that all reasons that are relational in this way are moral obligations. I argue, via a counter example, that there are non-obligatory relational reasons. If true, this has ramifications for relational theories of morality.

In “Tragedy and Resentment” Ulrika Carlsson claims that there are cases when we are justified in feeling non-moral resentment against someone who harms us without wronging us, when the harm either consists in their attitude towards us or in the emotional suffering triggered by their attitudes. Since they had no duty to protect us from harm, the objectionable attitude is not disrespect but a failure to show love, admiration, or appreciation for us. I explain why unrequited love is the wrong (...) example to use when arguing for the possibility of justified non-moral resentment—and why, therefore, Carlsson’s claim remains unsubstantiated. Pace Carlsson, people who fail to return our love are not best described as harming us, but as merely failing to benefit us by saving us from harm. Moreover, their role in the causal chain that results in our coming to harm is insufficient to warrant our resentment; more plausibly, we ourselves play a greater and more direct causal role in this process. This is a welcome result: Responding with resentment to someone’s failure to return our love indicates that our love has not taken the form of a genuine gift. When we put conditions on successful gifting by allowing for justified resentment if the gift is not returned we are not in fact giving gifts but making a bid for an exchange: I love you so that you love me back. (shrink)

_ Freedom, Resentment and the Metaphysics of Morals _, by HieronymiPamela. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020. Pp. xx + 145.