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On protocol sentences

Noûs 21 (4):457-470 (1987)

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  1. Experience and Structure: Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness.Paul M. Livingston - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (3):15-33.
    Investigation and analysis of the history of the concepts employed in contemporary philosophy of mind could significantly change the contemporary debate about the explainability of consciousness. Philosophical investigation of the history of the concept of qualia and the concept of scientific explanation most often presupposed in contemporary discussions of consciousness reveals the origin of both concepts in some of the most interesting philosophical debates of the twentieth century. In particular, a historical investigation of the inheritance of concepts of the elements (...)
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  • El principio de tolerancia en Rudolf Carnap y su interpretación pragmatista.Diego Morollón Del Río - 2018 - Human Review. International Humanities Review / Revista Internacional de Humanidades 6 (2):51-58.
    En el siguiente trabajo se explicará el Principio de Tolerancia en Carnap y su relación con valores derivados del pragmatismo en la elección de sistemas lógicos. La intención es la de hacer un sucinto repaso a la filosofía de Carnap que nos lleve a comprender las bases de tal principio, en el cual existen premisas pragmáticas que incluyen valores Ilustrados en el ejercicio de la ciencia. Tales valores nos ayudarían a elegir entre sistemas científicos que aunque igualmente lógicos, son seleccionados (...)
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  • Otto Neurath.Jordi Cat - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Helen Longino'nun Bilimsel Nesnellik Anlayışı.Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı - 2021 - SRA Academic Publishing.
    Bilimsel faaliyetin ve bilimsel bilginin en temel özelliklerinden bir tanesi olarak karşımıza çıkan bilimsel nesnellik bilim felsefesi alanı içerisinde sıklıkla tartışılan bir konu olagelmiştir. Bu doğrultuda, bilimsel nesnelliğin temin edilmesine yönelik çeşitli görüşler ileri sürülmektedir. Genel olarak bilimsel nesnellik bilim insanlarının çalışmalarında olguları doğrudan yansıtması ya da bilim insanlarının çalışmalarını tarafsız bir bakış açısıyla tamamlaması olarak anlaşılmaktadır. Bu görüşlerin bilim felsefesi içerisindeki yansımaları sırasıyla olgulara bağlılık olarak nesnellik ve hiçbir yerden bakış olarak nesnellik isimleriyle olmuştur. Bu bakış açısı, kişisel çıkarların (...)
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  • Bilimsel Nesnellik, Kültür ve Protokol Önermeleri Tartışması: Carnap, Neurath ve Popper.Zöhre Yücekaya & Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı (eds.) - 2021 - Ankara, Türkiye: Gazi Kitabevi.
    Bilimi ve bilimsel bilgiyi kültür, değer ve öznel yargılardan izole ederek nesnel bir şekilde ortaya koyabilmeye yönelik hararetli tartışmaların yaşandığı yirminci yüzyıl bilim anlayışının temel gayesi, deney ve gözleme tabi olabilecek fiziki dünyadaki olguları, mantıksal çözümlemeye tabi tutarak birleştirilmiş bilime ulaşmaktır. Bu amaca giden yolda olgulara dayanmayan ve sınanamayan her türlü metafizik öge yok sayılır. Bilimsel bilginin sadece deney ve gözleme tabi olana, diğer bir deyişle olgu verilerine dayandığı iddiasını taşıyan bu düşünce sistemi, özellikle Viyana Çevresi üyeleri tarafından benimsenmiştir. Bu (...)
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  • Carnap, Quine, and the Humean Condition.Sean Morris - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13283-13312.
    In his “Epistemology Naturalized,” Quine embraces a form of Humeanism. In this paper, I try to work out the significance of this Humeanism. In particular, I argue that it represents an anti-metaphysical position that Quine shares with Carnap. Crucial to my account is that contrary to much contemporary thinking on metaphysics, Carnap, and Quine following him, recognize both an ontological and an epistemological sense of metaphysics. As commentators have frequently acknowledged, Carnap and Quine disagree over rejecting metaphysics in the ontological (...)
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  • Carnap, the Principle of Tolerance, and Empiricism.Robert Hudson - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (3):341-358.
    Kurt Gödel criticizes Rudolf Carnap's conventionalism on the grounds that it relies on an empiricist admissibility condition, which, if applied, runs afoul of his second incompleteness theorem. Thomas Ricketts and Michael Friedman respond to Gödel's critique by denying that Carnap is committed to Gödel's admissibility criterion; in effect, they are denying that Carnap is committed to any empirical constraint in the application of his principle of tolerance. I argue in response that Carnap is indeed committed to an empirical requirement vis‐à‐vis (...)
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  • The Large Scale Structure of Logical Empiricism: Unity of Science and the Elimination of Metaphysics.Greg Frost-Arnold - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):826-838.
    Two central and well-known philosophical goals of the logical empiricists are the unification of science and the elimination of metaphysics. I argue, via textual analysis, that these two apparently distinct planks of the logical empiricist party platform are actually intimately related. From the 1920’s through 1950, one abiding criterion for judging whether an apparently declarative assertion or descriptive term is metaphysical is that that assertion or term cannot be incorporated into a language of unified science. I explore various versions of (...)
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  • Science as Will and Representation: Carnap, Reichenbach, and the Sociology of Science.Alan W. Richardson - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):162.
    This essay explores some of the issues raised as regards the relations of philosophy and sociology of science in the work of Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach. It argues that Hans Reichenbach's distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification should not be seen as erecting a principled normative/descriptive distinction that demarcates philosophy of science from sociology of science. The essay also raises certain issues about the role of volition, decision, and the limits of epistemological concern in the work of (...)
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  • Neurath's Protocol Statements: A Naturalistic Theory of Data and Pragmatic Theory of Theory Acceptance.Thomas E. Uebel - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (4):587-607.
    Neurath's proposal for the form of protocol statements explicates the multiple embedding of a singular sentence as specifying different conditions for the acceptance of such a sentence as a bona fide scientific datum. Before theories are accepted or rejected in the light of such evidence, however, a further condition must be met which Neurath did not formalize. The different conditions are discussed and shown to constitute a naturalistic theory of scientific data and a pragmatic theory of theory acceptance.
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  • Stroud’s Carnap.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):276-302.
    In “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” Carnap drew his famous distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ questions of existence, pronouncing the former meaningful and the latter meaningless. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud understands Carnap to be applying the verification criterion of meaningfulness in order to refute Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that Stroud misrepresents both Carnap’s aim and method. Carnap was responding to critics who suggested that his willingness to quantify over abstract entities in his work in semantics violated his (...)
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  • Language, Ontology, and the Carnap-Quine Debate.Jonathan Surovell - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):811-833.
    On a widespread reading, the Carnap-Quine debate about ontology concerns the objectivity and non-triviality of ontological claims. I argue that this view mischaracterizes Carnap’s aims in “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” : Carnap’s fundamental goal is to free up decisions about scientific language from constraints deriving from ontological doctrine. The contention, based on his internal/external distinction, that ontological claims are either meaningless or trivial was Carnap’s means to achieving this more fundamental goal. Setting the record straight on this point brings out (...)
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  • The Methodological Roles of Tolerance and Conventionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics: Reconsidering Carnap's Logic of Science.Emerson P. Doyle - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
    This dissertation makes two primary contributions. The first three chapters develop an interpretation of Carnap's Meta-Philosophical Program which places stress upon his methodological analysis of the sciences over and above the Principle of Tolerance. Most importantly, I suggest, is that Carnap sees philosophy as contiguous with science—as a part of the scientific enterprise—so utilizing the very same methods and subject to the same limitations. I argue that the methodological reforms he suggests for philosophy amount to philosophy as the explication of (...)
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  • Introspection and Change in Carnap’s Logical Behaviourism.Allard Tamminga - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):650-667.
    In the 1930s, Carnap set out to incorporate psychology into the unity of science, by showing that all cognitively meaningful sentences of psychology can be translated into the language of physics. I will argue that Carnap, relying on his notion of protocol languages, defends a physicalistic philosophy of psychology that shows due appreciation to 'introspection' as a strictly subjective, but reliable way to verify sentences about one’s own mind. Second, I will point out that Carnap’s philosophy of psychology not only (...)
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  • Carnap e o revisionismo.Gelson Liston - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):99-119.
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n1p99 This paper presents a possible but controversial characterization of two periods in Rudolf Carnap’s work: foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. I will argue that even with the identification of two periods, it is possible to argue in favor of the unity of Carnap’s work concerning the unity of science and the principle of linguistic tolerance. To do so, I will count on the analysis of some revisionist views advocated by Friedman and Uebel. Therefore I intend to contribute to a discussion that, (...)
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  • Carnap and Kuhn: Arch Enemies or Close Allies?Gürol Irzik & Teo Grünberg - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):285-307.
    We compare Carnap's and Kuhn's views on science. Although there are important differences between them, the similarities are striking. The basis for the latter is a pragmatically oriented semantic conventionalist picture of science, which suggests that the view that post-positivist philosophy of science constitutes a radical revolution which has no interesting affinities with logical positivism must be seriously mistaken.
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  • Philipp Frank: Philosophy of Science, Pragmatism, and Social Engagement.Amy N. Wuest - unknown
    Philipp Frank––physicist, philosopher, and early member of the Vienna Circle––is often neglected in retrospective accounts of twentieth century philosophy of science, despite renewed interest in the work of the Vienna Circle. In this thesis, I argue that this neglect is unwarranted. Appealing to a variety of philosophical and historical sources, I trace the development of Frank’s philosophical thought and, in so doing highlight the roles played by history, sociology, values, and pragmatism in his philosophy of science. Turning to contemporary literature, (...)
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  • Armchair Philosophy Naturalized.Sebastian Lutz - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1099-1125.
    Carnap suggests that philosophy can be construed as being engaged solely in conceptual engineering. I argue that since many results of the sciences can be construed as stemming from conceptual engineering as well, Carnap’s account of philosophy can be methodologically naturalistic. This is also how he conceived of his account. That the sciences can be construed as relying heavily on conceptual engineering is supported by empirical investigations into scientific methodology, but also by a number of conceptual considerations. I present a (...)
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  • Carnap and Quine: Analyticity, Naturalism, and the Elimination of Metaphysics.Sean Morris - 2018 - The Monist 101 (4):394-416.
    Rudolf Carnap is well known for his attack on metaphysics, and W. V. Quine is equally well known for his attack on Carnap’s analytic/synthetic distinction. Receiving far less attention is their basic agreement that a properly scientific approach to philosophy should eliminate the metaphysical excesses of the past. This paper aims to remedy this. It focuses initially on the development of Carnap’s rejection of metaphysics from 1932 to 1950 and the role that analyticity plays. It then turns to Quine, emphasizing (...)
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  • Conventions in the Aufbau.Thomas E. Uebel - 1996 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (2):381 – 397.
  • Carnap on Empirical Significance.Sebastian Lutz - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):217-252.
    Carnap’s search for a criterion of empirical significance is usually considered a failure. I argue that the results from two out of his three different approaches are at the very least problematic, but that one approach led to success. Carnap’s criterion of translatability into logical syntax is too vague to allow for definite results. His criteria for terms—introducibility by chains of reduction sentences and his criterion from “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”—are almost trivial and have no clear relation to (...)
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  • Carnap, Feyerabend, and the Pragmatic Theory of Observation.Daniel Kuby - 2018 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (2):432-470.
    Paul Feyerabend once made a remark to the effect that his pragmatic theory of observation can be traced back to proposals put forward by leading Logical Empiricists during the height of the protocol sentence debate. In this paper I want to vindicate the systematic side of Feyerabend’s remark and show that a pragmatic theory of observation can in fact be found in Rudolf Carnap’s writings of 1932. I first proceed to dispel a misunderstanding concerning the term “pragmatic” raised by Thomas (...)
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  • Stroud’s Carnap.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):276-302.
    In “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” Carnap drew his famous distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ questions of existence, pronouncing the former meaningful and the latter meaningless. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud understands Carnap to be applying the verification criterion of meaningfulness in order to refute Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that Stroud misrepresents both Carnap’s aim and method. Carnap was responding to critics who suggested that his willingness to quantify over abstract entities in his work in semantics violated his (...)
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  • The Vienna Circle's 'Anti-Foundationalism'.Thomas Oberdan - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):297-308.
    Uebel has recently claimed that, contrary to popular opinion, none of the philosophers of the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists were proponents of epistemological foundationalism. According to the considerations of the current discussion, however, Uebel's conclusion is erroneous, especially with respect to the work of Moritz Schlick. The chief reason Uebel offers to support his conclusion is that current attempts to portray Schlick's epistemology as foundationalist fail to overcome its ‘ultimate incoherence’. In contrast, it is argued that current interpretations, based (...)
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  • The Left Vienna Circle, Part 1. Carnap, Neurath, and the Left Vienna Circle Thesis.Sarah S. Richardson - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):14-24.
    Recent scholarship resuscitates the history and philosophy of a ‘left wing’ in the Vienna Circle, offering a counterhistory to the conventional image of analytic philosophy as politically conformist. This paper disputes the historical claim that early logical empiricists developed a political philosophy of science. Though some individuals in the Vienna Circle, including Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath, believed strongly in the importance of science to social progress, they did not construct a political philosophy of science. Both Carnap and Neurath were (...)
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