This paper compares two ways of holding that logic is special among the sciences in that it has no restricted class of entities as its subject matter, but instead concerns all entities alike. One way is Williamson’s explanation of how inquiry into logical consequence and logical truth only superficially concerns the linguistic or conceptual entities that bear these properties. Williamson draws on ideas familiar from deflationism about truth, and his account has been called “deflationary.” I argue that the analogy is (...) misleading. While there’s a broad sense in which Williamson offers a deflationary account of logical inquiry, his view differs from deflationism about truth in being best understood as a form of instrumentalism. By contrast, I elaborate a deflationism about logical properties modeled on deflationism about truth. I defend this expressive device deflationism as an explanation of our use of logical predicates. (shrink)

This paper aims to call into question the customary division of logically revisionary responses to the truth-theoretic paradoxes into those that are “substructural” and those that are “ structural.” I proceed by examining, as a case study, Beall’s recent proposal based on the paraconsistent logic LP. Beall formulates his response to paradox in terms of a consequence relation that obeys all standard structural rules, though at the price of the language’s lacking a detaching conditional. I argue that the same response (...) to paradox can be given using a consequence relation that preserves detachment rules for a conditional, though at the price of restricting structural rules. The question “Is paradox being blocked by invoking a substructural consequence relation?” is thus ill-posed. The lesson of this example, I conclude, is that there is no useful explication of the idea of a substructural approach to paradox. (shrink)

Proof-theoretic semantics is an alternative to model-theoretic semantics. It aims at explaining the meaning of the logical constants in terms of the inference rules that govern their behaviour in proofs. We argue that this must be construed as the task of explaining these meanings relative to a logic, i.e., to a consequence relation. Alas, there is no agreed set of properties that a relation must have in order to qualify as a consequence relation. Moreover, the association of a consequence relation (...) to a logical calculus is not as straightforward as it may seem. We show that these facts are problematic for the proof-theoretic project but the problems can be solved. Our thesis is that the consequence relation relevant for proof-theoretic semantics is the one given by the sequent-to-sequent derivability relation in Gentzen systems. (shrink)

Proof-theoretic semantics is an alternative to model-theoretic semantics. It aims at explaining the meaning of the logical constants in terms of the inference rules that govern their behaviour in proofs. We argue that this must be construed as the task of explaining these meanings relative to a logic, i.e., to a consequence relation. Alas, there is no agreed set of properties that a relation must have in order to qualify as a consequence relation. Moreover, the association of a consequence relation (...) to a logical calculus is not as straightforward as it may seem. We show that these facts are problematic for the proof-theoretic project but the problems can be solved. Our thesis is that the consequence relation relevant for proof-theoretic semantics is the one given by the sequent-to-sequent derivability relation in Gentzen systems. (shrink)

This paper presents a novel position in the philosophy of logic: I argue that _validity_ is a thick concept. Hence, I propose to consider _validity_ in analogy to other thick concepts, such as _honesty_, _selfishness_ or _justice_. This proposal is motivated by the debate on the normativity of logic: while logic textbooks seem simply descriptive in their presentation of logical truths, many have argued that logic has consequences for how we ought to reason, for what we ought to believe, or (...) for what we ought to infer. How can logic be normative, if it appears to be descriptive? According to the proposal of this paper, the normativity of logic can be explained because a thick concept is in play: _validity_. Thus, I argue that the debate on how to best characterize validity and the debate on logic’s normativity are more connected than we think, because _validity_ is a thick concept. (shrink)

The application of paraconsistent logics to theological contradictions is a fascinating move. Jc Beall’s (J Anal Theol, 7(1): 400–439, 2019) paper entitled ‘Christ—A Contradiction: A Defense of ‘Contradictory Christology’ is a notable example. Beall proposes a solution to the fundamental problem of Christology. His solution aims at making the case, and defending the viability of, what he has termed, ‘Contradictory Christology’. There are at least two essential components of Beall’s ‘Contradictory Christology’. These include the dogmatic statements of Chalcedon and FDE (...) logic. The first is the theological contradiction in question. The second is the type of paraconsistent logic. Both components are integral to a contradictory theology in general. I argue that there can be no such thing as an Islamic contradictory theology. I make the case by establishing two points. These points correspond to both integral components of a contradictory theology in general. The first is that an Islamic theological contradiction does not entail an actual (logical) contradiction. The second is that FDE logic, including alternative sub-classical systems of logic, are not adequate in tolerating an Islamic theological contradiction. (shrink)

Zapadna suvremena logika korištena je za unapređenje islamske filozofske teologije, koja je povijesno koristila aristotelovsko-avicenovsku logiku, na temelju toga što se logika shvaćala kao inherentno normativna. To je usprkos kontroverzama o statusu logike u islamskoj teološkoj tradiciji. Normativni autoritet logike znači da ona utječe na sadržaj onoga u što bismo trebali vjerovati i na to kako bismo trebali revidirati ta uvjerenja. Ovaj rad nastoji pokazati da je, bez obzira na nekompatibilne razlike između dvaju sustava, temeljna značajka zapadne suvremene logike i (...) aristotelovsko-avicenovske logike njihova normativnost. Zatim se tvrdi da je inherentna normativnost logike u islamskoj teološkoj/filozofskoj tradiciji nemotivirana. Umjesto toga, kao održivu alternativu rad predlaže ponovno uspostavljanje logike kao anti-ekscepcionalističke unutar islamske teološke/filozofske tradicije. (shrink)

Western contemporary logic has been used to advance the field of Islamic philosophical theology, which historically utilised Aristotelian-Avicennian logic, on grounds of there being an inherent normativity in logic. This is in spite of the surrounding controversy on the status of logic in the Islamic theological tradition. The normative authority of logic means that it influences the content of what we ought to believe and how we ought to revise those beliefs. This paper seeks to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the incompatible (...) differences between the two systems, the underlying feature of both Western contemporary logic and Aristotelian- Avicennian logic is logical normativity. It then argues that an inherent normativity of logic in the Islamic theological/philosophical tradition is unmotivated. Instead, it proposes to reinstate logic as anti-exceptional within the Islamic theological/philosophical tradition as a viable alternative. (shrink)