The aim of this paper is to analyze those passages of the Black Notebooks where Heidegger mentions Søren Kierkegaard and to see how Heidegger interprets Kierkegaard’s impact on his own philosophical thought. The paper intends to clarify whether, and to what extent, Heidegger’s rejection of an existentialist reading of his early thought is plausible and justified. The conclusions reached will be twofold. First, Heidegger tries to reinterpret his existential analytic by using the approach he has developed in his work after (...) Being and Time. In so doing, Heidegger tries to understate or diminish the Kierkegaardian background of his analytic of existence. Second, Heidegger’s retrospective self-interpretation argues for a continuity between the approach he develops in Being and Time and that which he calls the question of ‘the truth of beyng’. In so doing, he does not recognize the inconsistencies and mismatches that characterize his thought during the transition from the existential analytic to the philosophy of the event. The passages dealing with Kierkegaard in the Black Notebooks are important sources that allow us to note how problematic Heidegger’s self-interpretation is. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article explores the influence and reception of the Kierkegaardian self in modern theology, focusing on the philosopher Martin Heidegger and the theologian Eberhard Jüngel. In an attempt to transcend the atheistic philosophy of modernity, Eberhard Jüngel responded to the active, choosing self of modernity, as propounded Heidegger, by proposing an account of existence that is instead passive before God. However, as Heidegger’s philosophy itself is deeply in debt to Kierkegaard’s account of existence, Jüngel’s response to this active, choosing self (...) both echoes and is radically distant from Kierkegaard’s account of selfhood, wishing to have transformative faith in God but to move away from the individual relationship to God to a more communal, relational model. This article explores the debt that these thinkers have to Kierkegaard, and whether, in changing the active repetition of faith for the passivity of relational faith, Jüngel manages to overcome his own debt to Kierkegaard’s account of the self before God. (shrink)

This article is concerned with how a particular concept of ontology switched from theistic to atheistic to theistic again due to the influences and disciples of Martin Heidegger. It is agreed that Heidegger took aspects of Christian thought, namely from Augustine of Hippo, Martin Luther, and Søren Kierkegaard, stripping them of their relation to God and instead orientating them to nothingness. Despite Heidegger’s methodological atheism, his ontology was taken up by a number of theologians such as Ernst Fuchs and Rudolf (...) Bultmann, who in their turn influenced Eberhard Jüngel, who in turn mentioned the direct influence that Heidegger has on his thought. Whilst Jüngel acknowledges his debts to Heidegger in the area of ontology, Jüngel also seeks to incorporate the history of God into ontology, where the history of God as Trinity is defined by the passivity of Christ on the cross, and how that event redefines evil’s work in nothingness. This article initially explores how Heidegger formulated his account of ontology, then explores how Jüngel re-Christianized Heidegger’s ontology; evaluating what can be drawn from these shifts about the relationship between ontology and history. (shrink)

This dissertation produces a systematic account of anxiety, and does so by way of interpreting the account of anxiety given to us by Kierkegaard and Heidegger. The methodology of this dissertation is such that it interprets the anxiety in Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens, and also interprets the anxiety in Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens. By this method this dissertation harmonizes the accounts of anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and in this way produces a systematic account of anxiety by way of these (...) two authors. In particular, this dissertation argues that anxiety in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger has a particular structure: that it is ambiguous, which means that it is structurally constituted by an antipathy and a sympathy. In harmonizing Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s accounts of anxiety in this way, this dissertation produces a systematic account of ambiguous anxiety. (shrink)