What I wish to do in this paper is to look at a part of John Stuart Mill's ‘one very simple principle’ for determining the limits of state intervention. This principle is, you will remember, that ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.’.

Paternalism has generally been thought of as forcible or coercive interference with a person's liberty of action which is justified because it will prevent harm to that person's welfare interests or the like. Opposition to paternalistic interference with adults, whether it involves the intervention of the state or another adult individual, has usually been based on a concern to preserve human autonomy or self-determination. More strictly it is opposition to so-called ‘strong’ paternalism - interventions to protect or benefit a person (...) despite the person's informed voluntary consent to the contrary- which has been grounded on such a commitment to self-determination. ‘Weak’ paternalism involves interference where there is a defect in the decision-making capacities of the person interfered with. It is claimed to be justifiable insofar asconsentto the interference would be forthcoming were these capacities restored. (shrink)

Paternalism has generally been thought of as forcible or coercive interference with a person's liberty of action which is justified because it will prevent harm to that person's welfare interests or the like. Opposition to paternalistic interference with adults, whether it involves the intervention of the state or another adult individual, has usually been based on a concern to preserve human autonomy or self-determination. More strictly it is opposition to so-called ‘strong’ paternalism - interventions to protect or benefit a person (...) despite the person's informed voluntary consent to the contrary- which has been grounded on such a commitment to self-determination. ‘Weak’ paternalism involves interference where there is a defect in the decision-making capacities of the person interfered with. It is claimed to be justifiable insofar asconsentto the interference would be forthcoming were these capacities restored. (shrink)

Much recent discussion in moral philosophy has focused on the contrast between those moral theories which are consequentialist in structure and those moral theories which admit independent side constraints on the means which can be used to achieve various ends. In this essay I shall attempt to show that this contrast provides an illuminating framework against which to understand two conflicting strategies for justifying paternalistic interference. The first, consequentialist strategy takes paternalistic interference to be justified when it will protect or (...) perhaps enhance some valued goal or end state, such as an agent's welfare or future ability to choose. Gerald Dworkin's essay “Paternalism” contains what is perhaps the most compelling recent development of this sort of rationale for paternalistic interference and accordingly much of my subsequent discussion will focus on this essay. (shrink)

Some philosophers believe that appeals to promoting or maximizing good consequences are a suspect way of attempting to justify coercive interference with another person's actions. Suppose that is true. If there is a presumption that individuals have a right not to be coercively interfered with, then, foregoing utilitarian type appeals, it would seem that the only way to justify coercive interference of a paternalistic sort would be to show that under certain conditions the presumption fails.

Some philosophers believe that appeals to promoting or maximizing good consequences are a suspect way of attempting to justify coercive interference with another person's actions. Suppose that is true. If there is a presumption that individuals have a right not to be coercively interfered with, then, foregoing utilitarian type appeals, it would seem that the only way to justify coercive interference of a paternalistic sort would be to show that under certain conditions the presumption fails.

In 1987, Machan provided a libertarian case against the right to occupational safety. Since before Machan’s essay appeared, many business ethicists and legal scholars have given considerable attention to the overall position Machan endorses: the acceptance of employment at will and the rejection of employee rights. No one yet has given adequate attention, however, to the fact that Machan’s argument against the right to occupational safety actually stands or falls independently of his overall position on employee rights. His argument ultimately (...) rests on two values: the promotion of employee interests and anti-paternalism. Insofar as those who support the right to occupational safety share those values, they must find a strategy for opposing Machan’s argument that preserves those values. In this paper, I demonstrate why Machan’s argument ultimately rests on the promotion of employee interests and anti-paternalism. Then, I develop an objection to Machan’s argument that preserves those values. (shrink)

If killing another human being is morally wrong on at least some occasions, what precisely makes it wrong on those occasions? I have framed the question thus to indicate that I shall not be considering the view that killing another human being is always and everywhere morally wrong. I take it as read that there are at least some morally justifiable killings. Once it is clear what is wrong with killing on some occasions it should become possible to explain why (...) it is not wrong on others. My immediate concern is with the killing of another human being, and with applying my answer to cases of voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, but light will be shed on whether and, if so, why it is wrong to kill oneself, to kill unborn human beings, and to kill non-human animals especially those whose life has most in common with the life of human beings. (shrink)

The recent and dramatic emergence of digital and other electronic technology in social work?such as online counseling, video counseling, avatar therapy, and e-mail therapy?has tested and challenged the profession's longstanding and widely accepted perspectives on the nature of both clinical relationships and core ethics concepts. These developments have transformed key elements of social work practice and require critical examination of the meaning and application of relevant ethical concepts in diverse cultures. This article explores pertinent ethical implications related to social workers' (...) commitment to clients; privacy/confidentiality; client self-determination and professional paternalism; informed consent; and professional?client boundaries and dual relationships. The author discusses the need for social workers to re-examine time-honored ethics concepts and explore their implications for the profession's ethical standards pertaining to the practitioner?client relationship. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper attempts to provide some new insights into the problem of justifying paternalism. To begin with, there is a general analysis of the concept of paternalism which examines the conditions that must be present for it to occur. A distinction is then drawn between two contexts in which paternalism exists—first, where it applies to individuals or clearly specifiable groups and second, where it applies to society in general. Different approaches to justification are required in each case. It is (...) argued that paternalism of the former type has to meet two necessary and sufficient conditions for it to be acceptable and a good deal of the paper is devoted to a discussion of these two conditions and the ways of determining when they are satisfied. Paternalism of the latter type which applies to the whole society is more difficult to justify, mainly because it applies indiscriminately to everyone regardless of their particular capacities, interests etc., but some suggestions are made as to when such paternalism may nevertheless be justified. (shrink)

What I wish to do in this paper is to look at a part of John Stuart Mill's ‘one very simple principle’ for determining the limits of state intervention. This principle is, you will remember, that ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.’.

This paper suggests that public health, due to its community orientation, may be ignoring certain ethical principles--namely the rights of individuals and communities to self-determination. The expectation of individual rights as a member of a community is reviewed and the additional right of a community for self-determination is proposed. The influences on ethical evaluations by the legal and economic environments are suggested, using US examples. The conclusion argues that as the focus of health-care delivery changes, it will become more important (...) to consider these questions of group ethics. (shrink)

Informed consent is normally understood as something that a patient gives prior to a medical intervention that can render it morally permissible. Whether or not it must be given prior to the intervention is debated. Some have argued that subsequent consent—that is, consent given after a medical intervention—can also render an otherwise impermissible act permissible. If so, then a patient may give her consent to an intervention that has already been performed and thereby justify a physician’s act retroactively. The purpose (...) of this paper is to argue that even if subsequent consent can render an otherwise impermissible act permissible, doctors are still blameworthy if they rely on it when prior consent could be given, because they would be banking on the justification of their interventions. Since doctors can only guess if patients will consent after the fact, they would be placing their patients at unreasonable risk of being disrespected as persons. (shrink)