Descartes’ metaphysics lays the foundation for the special sciences, and the notion of consciousness (conscientia) belongs to metaphysics rather than to psychology. I argue that as a metaphysical notion, ‘consciousness’ refers to an epistemic version of moral conscience. As a consequence, the activity on which science is based turns out to be conscientious thought. The consciousness that makes science possible is a double awareness: the awareness of what one is thinking, of what one should be doing, and of the possibility (...) of a gap between the two. (shrink)

This paper argues that Augustine did not take the proof inSoliloquia2.22-4, which centers on the Aristotelian notion of ‘being in a subject’, from a single source but constructed it in a deliberately imperfect manner from several passages from Porphyry’s works on Aristotle’sCategoriesin order to supplement it with further arguments in Book Three. InDe immortalitate animaeAugustine explicitly discloses the weaknesses of the proof and repairs them by means of a Neoplatonic notion of causality.

Abstract. The dangerous level of individuality in contemporary Western culture is informed by a conception of mind, self, and soul as internal to the central nervous system. The historical development of this view has produced a bounded and self-contained individual at odds with communal life. Happily, scientific and philosophical studies of mind are coming to view the human mind as embodied, enactive, encultured, and embedded in social and technical networks, and as a construction not limited to the boundaries of the (...) individual organism. Mental phenomena are hybrids of events in the head and events in the world to which they are often coupled, not least of which are with other people. There are mutual and reciprocal implications of this externalism for a number of religious themes. Our understanding of redemption might better be bound to our relationships with others, including our bodies and our sexuality, rather than to a private, individual relationship with the sacred. (shrink)

Husserl claimed that reduction is the true starting point of phenomenological research, but to figure out how this deed should actually be accomplished has turned out to be a very challenging task. In this study, I explicate how Husserl accomplished reduction during his series of lectures entitled The Idea of Phenomenology. He does not state it explicitly, but what actually happened on the last day of the lectures can be seen as consistent with his descriptions of reduction as an act. (...) Understood in this way, reduction is the model of how to do philosophy. The result of Husserl’s reduction is the correlation between appearance and “that which appears” or, to use Husserl’s later terminology, between noēsis and noēma. When this correlation is understood as an outcome of reduction and not as a result of an analysis, we, as readers of Husserl, will be in a better position to avoid natural attitude in our interpretations. (shrink)

Abstract. Given that the conception of the person as an autonomous agent is a cultural construction, inquiry is directed to its potentials and shortcomings for cultural life. While such a conception contributes to sustaining the moral order, it also supports an individualist ideology and social divisiveness. As an alternative to the conception of moral autonomy, I explore the potentials of relational being, an orientation that views relational process (as opposed to individual agents) as the wellspring of all meaning. Such an (...) orientation sees all moral concepts and action as issuing from coordinated action. However, at the same time that relational process generates moral orders, so does it establish the grounds for “immorality” and social conflict, which undermines the relational process of creating moral order. Thus, a concept of “second-order morality” is advanced, which seeks to reestablish a more inclusive first-order morality. Responsibility for productive processes of relationship is invited. Recent innovations in dialogic practices lend themselves to relational responsibility. (shrink)

Contemporary analytic theories of law attempt to provide hermeneutic answers to the metaphysical question about the nature of law with intuition playing a pivotal role in these attempts. It is doubtful, however, whether intuition can meet metaphysical and hermeneutic expectations of such theories. The article points out divergent ways of understanding intuition in analytic theories of law. Moreover, such theories face a dilemma of choosing between the „hard” ontology of law, to which intuition would have a privileged epistemic access, and (...) „soft” ontology which entails multiple types of intuition. If collective consciousness, to which the intuitions that constitute the concept of law allegedly belong, is indeed the metaphysical foundation of contemporary analytic theories, they are hardly discernible from empiricism. A promising complementary approach to such a way of theorizing about law—where the vocabulary of intuitions is prioritized—can be provided by analytic pragmatism extending analysis to the practices in which words acquire their meanings. (shrink)

Augustine converted to Christianity in 386 and described his conversion in his Confessiones a decade later. Much ink has been spilled concerning the question of the specific nature of Augustine’s conversion and the ‘historical accuracy’ of his description thereof 10 years later. The Confessiones seem to describe a volte face: he radically embraced Christianity. But to what kind of Christianity did he convert? We will readdress this question, not by investigating his conversion, but by a close exegesis of Confessiones 9, (...) in which he describes the so-called Ostia-ecstasy. In the first part of our article, we discuss the description of the latter experience in Confessiones 9 and situate it within his conversion narrative, with attention to the symbolical language he used. The second part compares the Ostia-experience with the ascent of the soul as described in Plotinus’ Enneads, and with similar ‘Neoplatonic ascents’ present in the Confessiones and in writings penned by Augustine prior to or simultaneous with the Confessiones in order to elucidate the relationship between Augustine’s ‘Christian’ conversion and ‘Ostia-ecstasy’ with the Neoplatonic anabasis. (shrink)

Abstract. The modern concept of the inner self containing a private inner world has ancient philosophical and religious roots. These begin with Plato's intelligible world of ideas. In Plotinus, the intelligible world becomes the inner world of the divine Mind and its ideas, which the soul sees by turning “into the inside.” Augustine made the inner world into something merely human, not a world of divine ideas, so that the soul seeking for God must turn in, then up: entering into (...) itself and then looking above itself at the intelligible light of God. In modernity, “ideas” become the immediate object of every act of mental perception, the essential inner objects of the mind's eye. Locke makes the inner space inescapably private, excluding the divine inner light. Postmodern attempts to reconceive the relation of mind and world, rejecting the modern conception of a private inner self, will need to deal with lingering Platonist intuitions about the immediacy of the mind's vision. (shrink)

This essay suggests that while Antony Duff's model of criminal punishment as secular penance is pregnant with possibilities for theological reception and reflection, it proceeds by way of a number of separations that are brought into question by the penitential traditions of Christianity. The first three of these—between justice and mercy, censure and invitation, and state and victim, constrain the true communicative character of his account of punishment. The second set of oppositions, between sacrament and virtue, interior character and external (...) action, and formal and moral reconciliation, subject the model of state punishment as secular penance to problematic liberal and libertarian constraints. A postsecular analogy, outlining a theology of the invitational nature of divine judgment, and drawing on Thomas Aquinas's account of penance as both sacrament and virtue, is proposed. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to explain how the concept of Illumination came to be a source of skepticism in the modern West. In ancient and medieval Christian thought it was essentially tied not only to Plato’s philosophy, but especially to Augustine’s invention of the notion that the soul is an inner chamber containing all his knowledge, but also the locus of his encounter with God. The concept of the soul or mind as an inner chamber re-emerged in early (...) modern western philosophy, but it was no longer open to illumination, John Locke having made revelation into an entirely distinct category of knowledge. The set of ocular metaphors of which illumination is a part still has an important place in ordinary language, but can no longer provide for a philosophical theory of knowledge. Thus, different complex metaphors need to be employed. Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of human reason begins with social practices, and can be described as an extensive thesis reflecting the metaphor Knowing as Doing. With his incorporation of Thomas Aquinas into his account of tradition-constituted rationality, it is suggested that interesting parallels might be found with the work of Mulla Sadra. (shrink)

Artikkelini käsittelee Jari Kaukuan monografiaa ’Self-awareness in Islamic Philosophy’. Kommenteissani pohdin ensimmäisen persoonan tematiikkaa ja ensimmäisen persoonan kokemusta keskiajan filosofiassa, sekä keskustelen lyhyesti Avicennan kuuluisasta lentävää miestä koskevasta argumentista. Tämän lisäksi esittelen latinalaisen keskiajan perinteen parissa käytyä tematiikkaa niin sanotusta kristillisestä sokratismista. Tässä yhteydessä kysyn, onko islamilaisessa perinteessä vastaavia näkemyksiä siitä, miten ihmisen itseen suuntautuva tutkimus voi toimia lähtökohtana Jumalan ymmärtämiselle. Antamani esimerkit ja paralleelit sijoittuvat 1100-luvun latinalaiseen mielenfilosofiaan. Toisena artikkelini teemana on tätä laajempi mielenfilosofinen kysymys minän rakentumisesta. Erityisen kiinnostava (...) on Kaukuan teoksessa usein toistuvat itsensä tunnistamisen tai tunnustamisen teema. Arvioin tätä aihetta suhteessa klassisiin ajattelijoihin sekä läntiseen keskiajan mielenfilosofiaan. Läntisessä modernissa kirjallisuudessa on tutkimuskirjallisuudessa käyty jo pitkään keskustelua siitä, onko ”minä” autonominen, itseohjautuva ja itse itsensä määrittelevä entiteetti, vai heteronominen, sosiaalisissa vuorovaikutussuhteissa rakentuva olio. Esitän kysymyksen, miten islamilainen mielenfilosofia suhtautuu tähän jaotteluun. Lopuksi totean, miten Kaukuan teoksessa itseä tai minuutta koskeva filosofinen peruskysymyksenasettelu pysyy lukuisista detaljeista ja argumenttien analyyseistä huolimatta selkeänä. Hänen teoksensa perusteella on selvää, että Islamilaisten filosofien itsetietoisuuden ilmiöille antama huomattava painoarvo ja keskustelujen analyyttinen tarkkuus kertovat, miten itsetietoisuus filosofisena kysymyksenä ja psykologisena ilmiönä ei ole uudella ajalla syntynyt uusi filosofinen teema. Se ei ole myös missään tapauksessa keskustelu, joka olisi ainoastaan läntisen kulttuuripiirin omistama tai hallitsema. (shrink)

My objective in this article is to question whether the problem of free will can, within our current conceptual system, be framed coherently. It is already widely recognized that a mental faculty, the will, needed to initiate action, no longer fits with current thought. However, we can still ask whether human decisions and actions are determined by something other than the agent. So the important question is whether we still have a cogent concept of determinism. The two prevalent alternatives are (...) a closed set of deterministic laws of nature, and a simple distillation of the principle of sufficient reason: all events must have a cause. I first provide examples showing that philosophical concepts come and go as categorial frameworks change. The modern concept of deterministic laws of nature was developed during the latter half of the modern period and is now being called seriously into question. G. W. Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason could only be justified in theological terms, which most contemporary Western scholars reject. I end with an inadequate account of a dawning worldview based on complex adaptive systems theory, in which most human actions are best described in terms of non-necessitating propensities. (shrink)

У античкој философској традицији, време је поимано као кинетичка просторност. Св. Августин задржава овакво поимање времена али га такође одређује и као памћење и очекивање, који означују сопство као место пресека вечног и пролазног, које он дефинише као временски простор. Св. Максим Исповедник, ослањајући се на Кападокијске Оце, даје одлучујући допринос конституисању нарочитог хришћанског схватања времена и просторности, сагледавајући га у контексту есхатолошке персоналности. Творевина треба да превазиђе временску и просторну интервалност која истовремено представља услов могућности промене начина постојања творевине (...) кроз ипостасно сједињење са Логосом. Коначну истину творевине св. Максим описује као вечнокрећуће мировање, које представља ипостасно/личносно сједињење са Богом, и тиме личносни преображај спацио темпоралног темеља створених бића. (shrink)

Las Confesiones de San Agustín son una obra muy peculiar. Lectores e investigadores convienen en ello. No es fácil ‘definir’ ni comprender ese escrito. El presente estudio intenta una aproximación a su contenido mediante un examen de ciertos rasgos característicos de la obra que derivan de su propia singularidad. Y denunciamos también algunos impedimentos de comprensión y lectura. Confiemos en que esta mirada pueda ofrecer una guía inicial, pero orientadora, a la misma. Además, el estudio formal y temático revela una (...) dinámica interna, de su estructura misma, que va del relato autobiográfico a la reflexión , de lo narrativo al pensamiento. Este avance tendencial culmina al concluir el libro IX, donde la dimensión narrativa de la obra termina. Razón por la cual los libros X-XI alcanzan el vértice teorético de las Confesiones, con su investigación de la memoria y del tiempo. El presente estudio concluye con una breve exposición del problema agustiniano de la subjetividad o el yo, en la base de esos dos libros.t. Augustine’s Confessions is a very particular work. Readers and Scholarsagree upon it. Therefore, it’s ‘definition’ and understanding are not so easy. These paper tries to provide an approach to the contents of this difficult writing, by means of an examination of some main special traits, arising from the particular work’s kind. And we betray also some new difficulties for it’s reading and understanding. It is hoped that these brief look to the famous Augustinian writing could offer an initial but adviser guide to it. Moreover, the formal and thematic inquiry reveal an internal dynamics of it’s structure, which moves from the autobiographycal account to the reflection , from the story to the thinking. This aimed advance culminates at the end of the book IX, where the work’s narrative side concludes. That’s why the books X and XI reach the theoretical summit of the Confessions through their search for memory and time. Our paper ends with an exposition of the Augustinian inquiry on the human subiectivity, underlying both these books. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to reconsider Augustine’s role in the history of the concept of self. Our analysis is based on Charles Taylor's account of the Augustinian inward turn. Taylor argues that Augustine's project played a key role in the development of the modern notion of self, because the idea of "inward turn" led the thinker to give the idea of "self-reflexivity" a major position and made him the forefather of the Cartesian cogito. However, we think that (...) it is inappropriate to take the notion of "self-reflexivity" as the essential component of the Augustinian inward turn. We argue that Augustine's real contribution to the history of the notion of self is to be found in the "private" character of his idea of inward turn, and not in the notion of self-reflexivity. Hence, by comparing the differences between Augustine's and Plotinus' notions of "inward turn," we show how Augustine broke with the tradition and put forward a new understanding of inward turn. (shrink)