Control accounts of moral responsibility argue that agents must possess certain capacities in order to be blameworthy for wrongdoing. This is sometimes thought to be revisionary, because reflection on our moral practices reveals that we often blame many agents who lack these capacities. This paper argues that Control accounts of moral responsibility are not too revisionary, nor too permissive, because they can still demand quite a lot from excused wrongdoers. Excused wrongdoers can acquire duties of reconciliation, which require that they (...) improve themselves, make reparations for the harm caused, and retract the meaning expressed in the original wrong. Failure to do these things expresses a lack of regard for the victims, and can make those wrongdoers appropriate targets of blame. (shrink)

According to the doxastic wrongs thesis, holding certain beliefs about others can be morally wrongful. Beliefs which take the form of stereotypes based on race and gender and which turn out to be false and are negatively valenced are prime candidates for the charge of doxastic wronging: it is no coincidence that most of the cases discussed in the literature involve false beliefs. My aim in this paper is to show that the thesis of doxastic wrongs does not turn on (...) the truth-value or valence of beliefs. (shrink)

Dave Chappelle took an extended leave from comedy for moral reasons. I argue that, while he had every right to leave comedy because of his moral concerns, he was not obliged to do so. To make this case, I present Chappelle’s argument that the potential negative consequences of his racial humor obliged him to leave. Next, I argue against Chappelle’s argument about avoidable harms as the harms are not his responsibility, he was not being negligent, and the benefits of his (...) humor outweigh the harms. I also argue in support of the intuition that another’s failure of comprehension or moral character, even if that failure will predictably result in harms to others, should not convert moral acts into immoral ones. (shrink)

In this paper, I first argue that sometimes freely and knowingly manipulating oneself does not fully preserve moral responsibility – namely, in cases of practically distinct self-manipulation. However, I argue that practically distinct self-manipulation preserves moral responsibility to some extent because such a self-manipulated person is more morally responsibility than an other-manipulated person. This is an important result: manipulating oneself doesn’t always fully preserve one’s moral responsibility for one’s actions. But in what sense is the self-manipulated person more morally responsible? (...) I argue the self-manipulated person is not a fitting target of the reactive attitudes but continues to have wrongdoing-incurred reparative obligations. This explains the intuitive judgement about the self-manipulated person, provides a better explanation of “tracing” cases, and reveals important requirements for a plausible theory of moral responsibility. (shrink)

The study considers the implementation of one of the top trends in modern society development – defending the role of morality in society and the value paradigm, the centre of which is increased attention to the formation of the value-semantic sphere of personality, which influences their worldview formation. Scientific research focuses on the moral values formation of the growing individual from the perspective of their worldview development, revealed by interaction with the world, specifically in interpersonal relationships and directly with themselves. (...) The essence and features of the moral values formation, in the context of interconnections and interdependence of components in the structure of an individual, are substantiated using the methods of analysis and synthesis, abstraction and concretization through the study of the scientific heritage of foreign and Ukrainian scientists. The article specifies moral values as a mechanism of human social behaviour that performs several functions in their life and affects the worldview and the formation of a personal worldview. Based on the generalization of the presented scientific array findings, the author’s concept of moral values formation in the worldview of the individual is modelled, it is presented as a diagram of the interdependence of three chain lines: 1) social morality – self-awareness – worldview; 2) values – world perception; 3) moral values – individual’s worldview. The algorithm for the studied phenomenon of an individual is seen in the moral education providing, which ensures the moral values formation in the structure of moral self-awareness and the development of the worldview of a growing personality. The individual’s worldview is determined by several factors: the system of moral knowledge and beliefs formed resulting from the acceptance of the acknowledged in society moral values that become personal; accumulated moral experience and striving for moral self-improvement. The findings outlined the issues of further scientific research, which will involve clarifying the state of students’ moral development in the educational process and the levels of their moral values formation as well. (shrink)