Derrida's purpose in ‘Death Penalties’ (2004), is to show how both arguments in favour of capital punishment, exemplified by Kant's, and arguments for its abolition, such as those of Beccaria, are deconstructible. He claims that ‘never, to my knowledge, has any philosopher as a philosopher, in his or her own strictly and systematically philosophical discourse, never has any philosophy as such contested the legitimacy of the death penalty.’ (2004, 146) Derrida also asks how it is possible ‘to abolish the death (...) penalty in a way that is based on principle, that is universal and unconditional, and not because it has become not only cruel but useless, insufficiently exemplary?’ (2004, 137) In my paper, I examine Derrida's claim about the lack of systematic opposition to the death penalty on the part of philosophers and suggest an answer to his question concerning the possibility of a universal and unconditional opposition to capital punishment. (shrink)

This essay represents part of an effort to rewrite the history metaphysics in terms of what philosophy never said, nor could say. It works from the Neoplatonic commentary tradition on Plato's Parmenides as the matrix for a distinctively apophatic thinking that takes the truth of metaphysical doctrines as something other than anything that can be logically articulated. It focuses on Damascius in the 5—6th century AD as the culmination of this tradition in the ancient world and emphasizes that Neoplatonism represents (...) the crisis of Greek metaphysics on account of the inability to give a rational account of foundations for knowing and of the ultimate principle of beings. Neoplatonism discovered how all such ultimate principles were necessarily beyond the reach of reason and speech. This apophatic insight is drawn out with the help of contemporary criticism of Neoplatonic philosophy, defining also some points of divergence. The essay then discusses the motives for thinking the unsayable in postmodern times on the basis of this parallel with Neoplatonic thought. Discourse's becoming critical of itself to the point of self-subversion animates them both. However, the tendency in postmodern thought to totally reject theology, including negative theology, is a betrayal of its own deepest motivations. This tendency is debated through an examination of the thought of Jean-Luc Nancy. While any traditional discourse can be negated, the negating and self-negating capacity of discourse itself is infinite, and this is where a perennial negative theological philosophy of the unsayable is to be located. Language, eminently the language of philosophy, as infinitely open, points in a direction which becomes equally and ineluctably theological. (shrink)

The postmodern emphasis on human finitude encourages the reconsideration of religious traditions, and more particularly of Christianity. The doctrine of a vulnerable God dying on a cross speaks to postmodern civilization. Jesus Christ infuses transcendence into the realm of immanence by assuming the human predicament to its bitter end. The present essay critiques the recent attempts of deconstructionist philosopher John D. Caputo and systematic theologian Roger Haight to provide postmodern expositions for the Christian doctrine on the person of Jesus Christ. (...) With the help of the fundamental notion of agapeic love, we demonstrate that in Jesus Christ, Caputo's philosophy of the event and Haight's theology of the symbol can be meaningfully integrated and human finitude responsibly overcome. (shrink)

Situated historically at the beginning of the medieval period, Augustine’s thought expresses itself as one of the most influential metaphysical systems of the entire history of philosophy. Such a privileged status has often served to occlude some of the more radical implications of Augustinian thought. Paradoxically, it is precisely this radicality which has led to a resurgence of interest in Augustine, most particularly amongst twentieth century Continental philosophers such as Jacques Derrida. Through a careful analysis of Augustine’s thinking concerning morality, (...) my paper seeks to draw out the metaphysical and epistemological values which lie at the basis of Augustine’s disavowal of the possibility of human virtue. On my interpretation, Augustine is unequivocally arguing against the conception of ‘the freedom of the will’. Moreover, this position is, on my reading, consistently held by Augustine from his earlier to his latest writings. Here, I am arguing against the dominant view that this radical ‘immoralism’ is merely a late development in his thinking. (shrink)