The biophilosophic justification for the idea that “brain death” is death needs to support two claims: that what dies in human death is a human organism, not merely a psychological entity distinct from it; that total brain failure signifies the end of the human organism as a whole. Defenders of brain death typically assume without argument that the first claim is true and argue for the second by defending the “integrative unity” rationale. Yet the integrative unity rationale has fallen on (...) hard times. In this article, I give reasons for why we should think of ourselves as organisms, and why the “fundamental work” rationale put forward by the 2008 President’s Council is better than the integrative unity rationale, despite persistent objections to it. (shrink)

This paper discusses how alternative concepts of personhood affect the definition of death. I argue that parties in the debate over the definition of death have employed different concepts of personhood, and thus have been talking past each other by proposing definitions of death for different kinds of things. In particular, I show how critics of the consciousness-related, neurological formation of death have relied on concepts of personhood that would be rejected by proponents of that formulation. These critics rest on (...) treating persons as qualitative specifications of human organisms or as identical to human organisms. Since advocates of the consciousness-related, neurological formulation of death are not committed to either of these views of personhood, these critics commit the fallacy of attacking a straw man. I then clarify the substantive concept of personhood that may be invoked in the consciousness-related, neurological formulation of death, and argue that, on this view and contra Bernat, Culver, and Gert, persons have always been the kind of thing that can literally die. I conclude by suggesting that the discussion of defining death needs to focus on which approach to personhood makes the most sense metaphysically and morally. (shrink)

The recent case of Baby Theresa has once again raised the dilemma of organ donation from anencephalic infants. Baby Theresa's distraught parents wanted to create something good from something tragic, by donating the baby's organs so that other children could live. If the physician waited for their baby to die naturally, the organs would not be suitable for transplantation. If they took them before death they could be harvested. For this reason, the parents petitioned the Florida courts to declare their (...) baby dead at birth so the organs could be removed at an earlier, more propitious time. The court refused. The infant died, its vital organs unusable. (shrink)

We live in an age of great scientific and technological innovation, and what seemed out of the question or at least very doubtful only a few years ago, today lies almost within our grasp. In no area is this more true than that of human health care, where lifesaving and life-enhancing technologies have given, or have the enormous potential in the not so distant future to give, relief from some of the most terrible human illnesses. On two fronts in particular, (...) xenograft or cross-species transplantation and genetic engineering of animals on behalf of gene therapy in humans, such relief appears very promising, if not actually on the horizon. Certainly, extensive research work on both fronts is underway both in the United States and abroad. (shrink)

The study attempts to determine whether or not human fetuses have moral status. Three broad categories of answers to the question were analyzed. The arguments developed by Michael Tooley in Abortion and Infanticide are assessed as representative of the liberal view. Those of L. W. Sumner in Abortion and Moral Theory stand as moderate claims and in the position defended by William May in "Abortion and Man's Moral Being" represents a conservative position. The work of other authors is drawn upon (...) to help analyze the central arguments and to provide alternate interpretations. Among these are Jane English, Judith Thomson, Christina Hoff Sommers, Ronald Green, Joseph Donceel, Lawrence Becker, and Gareth Matthews. ;Though each of the three principal authors is found to present potentially forceful arguments, none of them is thought to provide a fully convincing account of the moral status of fetuses. Important difficulties stem from the use of particular theories of rights and from inadequate treatment of the concept of potentiality. ;The study arrives at two conclusions. The first is that arguments for or against the moral status of fetuses are grounded in more basic, conflicting moral theories about rights or moral behavior. Thus the question of the moral status of fetuses is not likely to receive a universally acceptable answer before moral philosophers come to agreement on basic moral principles. ;The second is that the discussions above have nonetheless yielded two important considerations which together form the basis of a tenable position on the moral status of fetuses. I suggest that an argument can be developed from two claims. One is a conservative claim that an embryo or fetus is the same entity as a later human being. The other is a moral principle discussed by Michael Tooley, viz. that where an entity will at some time in its life have rights, it is wrong to affect it so that the entity will be incapable of exercising those rights when the time comes. The argument supports the conclusion that, from the period of the embryo on, there is an entity that merits our moral consideration. (shrink)