The purpose of this article is to map the relationships of various moral arguments for action on climate change to each other in a particular case rather than to explore any single argument in depth or to make any abstract claims about the priorities among the arguments themselves. Specifically, it tries to show that “historical responsibility”, that is, responsibility for past emissions, is very important, although not quite in the way usually argued, but that it is not by itself determinative. (...) Other, independent considerations also greatly matter, although it happens that as a matter of fact all considerations strongly tend to converge towards the same conclusions about which states are responsible to act in order to slow climate change. “Historical responsibility” is shown to involve both contribution to, or causation of, climate change and benefit from climate change. Other factors that play roles in this case are ability to pay, the no-harm principle, and the duty to preserve the physical pre-conditions of human life. (shrink)

Care ethics is often criticized for being incapable of outlining what responsibilities we have to persons beyond our personal relations, especially toward distant others. This criticism centres on care theorists’ claim that the concerns of morality emerge between people, generated through our relations of interdependent care: it is difficult to see how moral duties can be applied to those with whom we do not forge a relationship. In this article, I respond to this criticism by outlining a care ethical justification (...) for an interest theory of human rights. This theory will argue that the demands of global justice include various positive actions that aim toward ensuring the conditions for good caring relations to flourish, which in turn protect and promote the vital interests of all persons. In doing so, I aim to concurrently advance the sparse work on human rights within the care literature, systematizing the ideas of care theorists such as Daniel Engster, Virginia Held, and Fiona Robinson. (shrink)

Human rights instruments exist to respond to serious dangers that human beings routinely face, what Henry Shue terms ‘standard threats.’ According to Shue’s influential account of the structure of a moral right, these threats are ‘the targets of the social guarantees for the enjoyment of … a right.’ They are ‘common, or ordinary, and serious but remediable.’ Yet for individuals who struggle daily against serious, remediable threats that are common to their peer group, but do not routinely threaten mainstream society, (...) this oversight has enormous implications for their security, subsistence, freedom, and dignity. This paper examines the three elements of Shue’s standard threat. It concludes by making the case that if we are to deploy this element of the structure of moral rights to justify social guarantees of protection, and to craft them in a way that takes proper account of human diversity, then we must ask: Standard for whom? (shrink)

Political philosophers commonly tackle the issue of climate change by focusing on fundamental interests as a basis for human rights. This approach struggles, however, in cases where one set of fundamental interests requires one course of action, and another set of fundamental interests requires another course of action. This article advances an alternative response to climate change based on an account of global justice that gives weight to utilitarian, prioritarian, and luck egalitarian considerations. A practical application of this pluralistic account (...) is provided, which shows that it handles trade-offs between individuals’ interests in an appealing way, and that it supports an aggressive policy of climate change mitigation. This account provides a more plausible justification for rights against the harms of climate change. (shrink)

It is becoming less and less controversial that we ought to aggressively combat climate change. One main reason for doing so is concern for future generations, as it is they who will be the most seriously affected by it. Surprisingly, none of the more prominent deontological theories of intergenerational justice can explain why it is wrong for the present generation to do very little to stop worsening the problem. This paper discusses three such theories, namely indirect reciprocity, common ownership of (...) the earth and human rights. It shows that while indirect reciprocity and common ownership are both too undemanding, the human rights approach misunderstands the nature of our intergenerational relationships, thereby capturing either too much or too little about what is problematic about climate change. The paper finally proposes a way to think about intergenerational justice that avoids the pitfalls of the traditional theories and can explain what is wrong with perpetuating climate change. (shrink)

As a collective action problem, climate change is best tackled by coordination. Most moral philosophers therefore agree on our individual responsibility as political citizens to help establish such coordination. There is disagreement, however, on our individual responsibilities as consumers to reduce emissions before such coordination is established. In this article I argue that from a Kantian deontological perspective we have a perfect duty to refrain from activities that we would not perform if appropriate coordination were established. Moral autonomy means that (...) we do not need to wait for an external lawmaker to tell us what we ought to do. In practice, this means basing our decisions on a shadow price for carbon: if we would not go out for a drive on a sunny Sunday afternoon in a gas-guzzling sport utility vehicle if gas prices were twice as high, we should not do it now. Moreover, we have imperfect duties to reduce emissions by more than our perfect duties require. (shrink)

The prospect of dangerous climate change requires Humanity to limit the emission of greenhouse gases. This in turn raises the question of how the permission to emit greenhouse gases should be distributed and among whom. In this article the author criticises three principles of distributive justice that have often been advanced in this context. He also argues that the predominantly statist way in which the question is framed occludes some morally relevant considerations. The latter part of the article turns from (...) critique and advances a new way of addressing the problem. In particular, first, it proposes four key theses that should guide our normative analysis; and, second, it outlines how these four theses can be realised in practice. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have resisted impersonal explanations of our obligation to mitigate climate change, and have developed accounts according to which these obligations are explained by human rights or harm-based considerations. In this paper I argue that several of these attempts to explain our mitigation obligations without appealing to impersonal factors fail, since they either cannot account for a plausibly robust obligation to mitigate, or have implausible implications in other cases. I conclude that despite the appeal of the motivations (...) for rejecting the appeal to impersonal factors, such factors must play a prominent role in explaining our mitigation obligations. (shrink)

This essay critically examines the intersections between news media and human rights in the context of the existing human rights framework. A survey of the fundamental provisions of international human rights law and of the evolving case law of human rights organs relating to media freedom and responsibilities reveals that existing gaps and underspecified obligations render problematic the normative guidance offered by the framework in addressing the pertinent human rights issues. However, this is part of the story. The problems associated (...) with normative guidance are compounded by media practitioners’ contending approaches on the role of the media as “promoters of human rights.” The interplay between these factors is then examined through the prism of the two communities’ converging commitment to “truth-seeking.” This commitment can provide entry points to a more constructive engagement between the news media and the human rights community. (shrink)

This thesis explores the relationship between rights-based moral systems and climate change. It argues that supporters of rights-based moralities must give the realisation of rights priority over non-rights-based moral concerns. It further contends that future persons cannot possess rights that would place current persons under correlative duties towards them before their conception. The thesis then highlights that climate change will need to be combatted through programmes of adaptation and mitigation. Unfortunately, the majority of those protected by such programmes will be (...) future persons. It is therefore argued that rights-based moralities struggle to endorse – and might even actively oppose – the imposition by states of extensive programmes of adaptation and mitigation. Such programmes actively and directly restrict the realisation of the rights of many current persons. Even if this were not the case, supporters of rights are unable to justify the kind of spending that would be needed to finance those aspects of adaptation and mitigation which aim to benefit future persons while the fundamental rights of a great many current persons go unmet due to a lack of funds. As a result, rights-based moralities must justify climate burdens solely through reference to current persons. It is argued that, in the case of Interest- and Choice-based theories of rights, this would encourage an increase in emissions through the implication that pollution was permissible provided adaptation burdens were met. Alternatively, support for a rights-based morality akin to that put forward by Robert Nozick would enable us to implement mitigation, but the system’s disavowal of positive rights would simultaneously cause excessive harm to the wellbeing of many. The inability of rights-based moralities to deal with climate change in an effective and ethical manner leads us to question their legitimacy more generally. (shrink)

In the present article, I will evaluate the utility of environmental human rights in the light of the global climate conditions prevailing in the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century. Human rights and their tools have proven useful on many occasions. Here I will promote the idea that the ecological situation we are facing now is so urgent that we should exploit their potential to the fullest. To that end, I will argue, there is a clear need (...) to render environmental rights as explicit, precise and thus legally binding as possible. It is tried to adopt a point of view that is informed by both scientific findings and the theory of human rights; the conclusions are definitely intended to be pragmatic. (shrink)