How We Know is intended as a summary of Objectivist epistemology. Binswanger's treatment of a wide range of epistemological issues is examined. Because his theory of propositions is inadequate and his philosophy of mind is an extreme form of dualism, Binswanger has added little to previous efforts by “official” Objectivists. As a work of epistemology in the broad sense, Binswanger's effort is fatally impaired. It is undone by his bifurcation between consciousness and the physics of the brain, which, if accepted, (...) would largely deprive psychology and even computer science of their subject matter. (shrink)

Leonard Peikoff brought into Objectivist epistemology the doctrine that what is asserted arbitrarily cannot be true or false. In 2008 the author gave a detailed critique of the doctrine; it has not received a published response. But there have been restatements by Harry Binswanger, Ben Bayer, and Gregory Salmieri. Their re-presentations do not refute any old arguments; their new arguments make the doctrine worse. The doctrine is being used to justify ignoring known possibilities, and to “prove” that the current president (...) of the United States has a parrot's mind in a human body. Its public retraction is overdue. (shrink)

The prohibition against psychologizing has been a source of confusion to many Randians. Psychologizing is the practice of incorrectly or improperly inferring motives in other people instead of rendering moral judgment. Rand thought that it could manifest in two ways: inquisitorial and excuse-making. However, Rand's concrete examples are preponderantly of the excuse-making type; her bright line between psychology and philosophy is unsuccessfully drawn; and in offering extended, strongly condemnatory analyses of the supposed motives behind psychologizing, she yields to the very (...) temptation she claims to warn against. “Psychologizing” turns out to be an anticoncept. (shrink)

Think as If Your Life Depends on It puts Barbara Branden’s lectures on the Principles of Efficient Thinking in print at last, along with three later lectures. In Roger Bissell’s excellent transcription, the ten lectures introduce readers to psycho-epistemology, the difference between directed and undirected thinking, the role of the subconscious in problem-solving, common faults in thinking, and motivational issues that interfere with thinking. Her contributions were effectively erased from Objectivism after the Nathaniel Branden Institute closed; the original lectures were (...) the most significant part of the Objectivist corpus that remained to be recovered. (shrink)

. Reading The Psychology of Self-Esteem helped the author to choose psychology as a career, yet he became a theoretician and a researcher rather than a clinician. These are his personal thoughts about Nathaniel Branden, with particular emphasis on the gulf between academic research and clinical practice, and Branden's incomplete success at bridging it.

The author contends that the Objectivist epistemology has lacked a viable model of propositional knowledge for nearly fifty years, due to neglect of Rand's unit-perspective view of concepts. This pioneering insight, he says, not only is an essential building block of her concept theory, but also welds together the three levels of logical theory and provides the clearest X-ray picture of our multilayered conceptual knowledge. Using the unit-perspective to expand Rand's theory of concepts, the author then devises a theory of (...) the proposition, giving considerable attention to axioms and statements about nonexistent subjects. (shrink)

The author discusses how Rand’s largely underdeveloped concept of the “dual-aspect objective,” first introduced in the 1960s, is vital for understanding how knowledge is grounded in reality. He defines it, then applies it to perception and introspection, and to concepts, propositions, and syllogisms. The author also defines content of awareness, carefully distinguishing it from both object and form of awareness, and applies those distinctions throughout. In addition, he discusses how truth is both dual-aspect and contextual, and he extends his discussion (...) in Part 1 of Rand’s “unit-perspective,” showing how units, too, have a dual-aspect, even on the level of syllogisms. (shrink)