This paper examines how Western humanitarianism has attempted to work through its simultaneous commitment to individualized moral universalism and ambivalence about substantive global egalitarianism via what is identified as humanitarian sentimentalism, namely an ensemble of narrative and visual mechanisms designed to cultivate charitable moral sentiments among Euro-American publics toward victims of humanitarian crises in the global South. After briefly discussing how the aforementioned ambivalence is rooted in the founding philosophical principles of humanitarianism, the paper examines the visual economy of humanitarian (...) sentimentalism, constituted through four iconographic tropes found in the history of Western representation of humanitarian emergencies and injustices (personification, massification, rescue, and care), each of which aims to trigger sentimentalizing responses on the part of viewers. Hence, it is argued that if the Western humanitarian movement's dependence on visually based sentimentalism has been effective in generating a sense of concern for distant others, such concern has not been converted into a more radical and egalitarian set of political practices of global solidarity, which would aim structurally to transform the current world order in an egalitarian manner to tackle the systemic sources of humanitarian crises. (shrink)

The Millennium Development Goals were effective from 2000 to 2015. Statistics show that most of the goals were met, and particularly success in the goal of reducing extreme poverty gained wide recognition. Despite the strong ethical language related to poverty reduction, there has been little analysis of the ethical significance of the MDG achievements. Since statistical and ethical definitions and representations of poverty never completely overlap, conclusions concerning ethical progress are not directly available from the statistics. This article shows how (...) this ethical significance can be analysed and what kinds of controversies and uncertainties relate to the issue. As part of this analysis, utilitarian issues, population ethics, and the social aspect of poverty are discussed. Keywords: poverty, Millennium Development Goals, statistics, ethics, poverty line. (shrink)

The TRIPS agreement has been widely discussed. Critics have accused it to favour property rights at the cost of public health in AIDS-stricken development countries. In this article, the conflict between on the one hand Intellectual Property Rights and on the other a right to subsistence is analysed with the help of a method for specification. The rationalization of TRIPS and its amendments raises two questions for ethics, one normative and one meta-ethical. First, which right has priority: the right to (...) property or the right to subsistence? Second, how can conflicting rights be reconciled in a coherent ethical system. The aim of the article is to answer these two questions and in order to do that the method of specification developed by the philosopher Henry Richardson is applied. The result is a specified norm applicable for this kind of rights conflicts. (shrink)

Which of the two dominant arguments for duties to alleviate global poverty, supposing their premises were generally accepted, would be more likely to produce their desired outcome? I take Pogge's argument for obligations grounded in principles of justice, a "contribution" argument, and Campbell's argument for obligations grounded in principles of humanity, an "assistance" argument, to be prototypical. Were people to accept the premises of Campbell's argument, how likely would they be to support governmental reform in policies for international aid, or (...) to make individual contributions to international aid organizations? And I ask the same question, mutatis mutandis, for Pogge's argument. (shrink)

According to ‘global institutionalism,’ individuals who do not share a state have duties of justice to one another, and this is explained, in part, by the institutional connections that obtain between them. In this chapter, I defend this view against two challenges. First, I consider challenges raised by ‘non-institutionalists,’ who deny that facts about global institutional interaction bear on the nature of duties of justice that arise between particular individuals. Second, I address challenges posed by ‘domestic institutionalists,’ who accept the (...) claim that facts about institutional interaction bear upon the scope of justice but deny that the right sort of interaction necessary to ground duties of justice is found in the global domain. (shrink)