- Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts on Metaphysics, Language and Mind / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Metafísica, Linguagem e Mente.Rodrigo Cid & Pedro Merlussi (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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Cause and essence.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Synthese 93 (3):403 - 449.details
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Intentional system theory and experimental psychology.Michael H. Van Kleeck - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):533.details
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Absent qualia and the mind-body problem.Michael Tye - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.details
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Blindsight, the absent qualia hypothesis, and the mystery of consciousness.Michael Tye - 1993 - In Christopher Hookway (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 19-40.details
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What really matters.Charles Taylor - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):532.details
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Connectionism, Realism, and realism.Stephen P. Stich - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):531.details
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Disembodied minds and the problem of identification and individuation.Jesse R. Steinberg & Alan M. Steinberg - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (1):75-93.details
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Panglossian functionalism and the philosophy of mind.Elliott Sober - 1985 - Synthese 64 (August):165-93.details
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Styles of computational representation.M. P. Smith - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):530.details
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Why philosophers should be designers.Aaron Sloman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):529.details
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The realistic stance.John R. Searle - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):527.details
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Three Roles of Empirical Information in Philosophy: Intuitions on Mathematics do Not Come for Free.Deniz Sarikaya, José Antonio Pérez-Escobar & Deborah Kant - 2021 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):247-278.details
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Will the argument for abstracta please stand up?Alexander Rosenberg - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):526.details
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How to build a mind.H. L. Roitblat - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):525.details
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Outflanking the mind-body problem: Scientific progress in the history of psychology.Sam S. Rakover - 1992 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 22 (2):145–173.details
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Intentionality: How to tell Mae West from a crocodile.David Premack - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):522.details
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Conservation Laws and the Philosophy of Mind: Opening the Black Box, Finding a Mirror.J. Brian Pitts - 2019 - Philosophia 48 (2):673-707.details
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Access denied to zombies.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Unpublished (1):1-13.details
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Access Denied to Zombies.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):81-93.details
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The case for panpsychism: a critical assessment.Michael Pelczar - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-22.details
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On an argument for functional invariance.Michael Pelczar - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (3):373-377.details
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Defending Phenomenalism.Michael Pelczar - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):574-597.details
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Inverted intuitions: Occupants and roles.Michael Peirce - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):273-298.details
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The intentional stance and the knowledge level.Allen Newell - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):520.details
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What does the conservation of energy have to do with physicalism?Barbara Montero - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):383-396.details
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Three philosophical problems about consciousness and their possible resolution.Nicholas Maxwell - 2011 - Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1.details
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Causes and intentions.Bruce J. MacLennan - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):519-520.details
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Is property dualism better off than substance dualism?William G. Lycan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.details
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Dennett's instrumentalism.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):518.details
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Awarenesses of wanting to move and of moving.Benjamin Libet - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (2):320-321.details
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Conservation of Energy is Relevant to Physicalism.Ole Koksvik - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):573-582.details
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The devil, the details, and Dr. Dennett.Patricia Kitcher & Philip Kitcher - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):517.details
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Competence models are causal.David Kirsh - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.details
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What is the intentional stance?Gilbert Harman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.details
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An embarrassing question about reproduction.John Haldane - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):427-431.details
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Real intentions?Donald R. Griffin - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):514.details
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Derived intentionality?Alvin I. Goldman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):514.details
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Dennett on belief.Michael Dummett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):512.details
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The stance stance.Fred Dretske - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):511.details
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Science, philosophy, and interpretation.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):535.details
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Precis of the intentional stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):495-505.details
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What are W and M awarenesses of?Lawrence H. Davis - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (2):318-319.details
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The notional world of D. C. Dennett.Arthur C. Danto - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):509.details
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The modal argument improved.Brian Cutter - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):629-639.details
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Dennett's realisation theory of the relation between folk and scientific psychology.Adrian Cussins - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):508.details
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The ontological status of intentional states: Nailing folk psychology to its perch.Paul M. Churchland - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):507.details
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Another “Just So” story: How the leopardguarders spot.Dorothy Cheney & Robert Seyfarth - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):506.details
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Can the Russellian Monist Escape the Epiphenomenalist’s Paradox?Lok-Chi Chan - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1093-1102.details
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Why we should lower our expectations about the explanatory gap.Neil Campbell - 2009 - Theoria 75 (1):34-51.details
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