This paper argues that Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy attempts to reopen the question of human transcendence in contemporary terms. While his conception of language as self-transcending is deeply Husserlian, Ricoeur also responds to the analytical challenge when he deploys a basic distinction in Fregean logic in order to clarify Heidegger’s phenomenology of world. Ricoeur’s commitment to a transcendental view is evident in his conception of narrative, which enables him to emphasize the role of the performative in literary reading. The meaning (...) of the self in time provides Ricoeur with a discursive basis for distinguishing his own position from that of Kant and other philosophers in the transcendental tradition. (shrink)

Eine vollständige Darstellung von Edmund Husserls Verhältnis zu Gottlob Frege steht noch aus, so dass es nicht verwundert, einige Missverständnisse, dieses Verhältnis betreffend, im Umlauf zu finden. Selbst scheinbar längst überwundene systematische Dogmen tauchen wieder auf, so z.B. die Auffassung, dass Husserl nicht nur entscheidend von Gottlob Frege beeinflusst wurde, sondern darüber hinaus auch seine schärfste Frege-Kritik 1891 zurückgenommen habe. Mein Beitrag enthält eine überwiegend historisch vorgehende Entgegnung auf solche fälschlich vertretenen Ansichten wie sie sich auch in dem neu erschienenen (...) und mit vielen dokumentarischen Belegen versehenen Frege-Kommentarbuch von W. Künne finden. Die wichtigsten Argumente, die in diesem Buch gegen Husserl gerichtet werden, stützen sich auf Stellen in Husserls Frühwerk, die zwar sehr aufschlussreich für die Beurteilung des philosophischen und menschlichen Habitus Husserls in den 1890er Jahre sind, nicht aber Künnes Thesen stützen oder gar beweisen können. Die als zurückgenommene Frege-Kritik verstandene Selbstkritik Husserls betrifft jedoch nach meinen Darlegungen gerade nicht die Kritik, die er an Freges Buch Grundlagen der Arithmetik geübt hatte, sondern seine eigene systematische Stellungnahme hinsichtlich der Begründung der Arithmetik. Ausgehend von dieser Einsicht werde ich auf ein wichtiges Spezifikum von Husserls Erstlingswerk (Philosophie der Arithmetik) aufmerksam machen, das voreiligen Interpretationen einen Riegel vorschiebt: Dieses Buch ist ein Mosaik aus Einsichten verschiedener Arbeits- und Denkperioden des Verfassers, die sich vor allem auch in dem zweifachen Begriff der Äquivalenz zeigen. Dies knüpft an einen langen geschichtlichen Entwicklungsprozess an, der in eine von Bolzano, Lotze, Brentano und Carl Stumpf geprägte Tradition zurückführt und das Problem der Unterscheidung zwischen Sinn und Gegenstand eines Aktes betrifft. (shrink)

Husserl’s conception of theology and God is a lesser noticed aspect in his phenomenological system. This paper is devoted to a return to Husserl’s text, reconstructing the implicit threads and essential features of his phenomenological theology. First, I will outline the general features of a phenomenology of religion and theology, arguing that it is not without historicity, which is not in conflict with the essentialism that phenomenology has always pursued. Then, Sec. 2 focuses on the analysis of teleology, considering which (...) is the true teleology leading to God, pointing out that it ultimately resorts to an ethical approach. Sec. 3 and 4 provide an in-depth textual analysis mainly based on the Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie, concluding that they are all fundamentally ethical-relevant and capable of being in harmony with each other. Last, I will respond to some criticisms of Husserl’s conception of God, the most major of which are Mall’s and Held’s. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that Husserl has perfectly integrated his project of theology and God into the phenomenology program—it is precisely these criticisms that motivate us to reconstruct Husserl’s fragmented narrative into a self-consistent system. (shrink)

The anticipation of the typical under the assumption of the non-occurrence of the atypical is the experiential schema governing the individuation of ordinary enduring objects and their properties. Against this background, a primitive form of “if-and-only-if” consciousness is implicit in our everyday perceptual intentions. The thematization of the fact that perception operates under this proto-tentative structure occurs at the level of reflection and is expressed by defeasible judgments of the form “if p, then q, unless r,” or “if p, then (...) q provided that not-r”. Here I will argue that what is made thematic by judgments containing such restrictive clauses is the structure of unpredictability inherent in what Husserl calls the horizon of latency and, indirectly, the world as background of normality. (shrink)

The implications of commonalities in the contributions of five key thinkers in twentieth century phenomenology are discussed in relation to both original aims and contemporary projects. It is argued that, contrary to the claims of Husserl, phenomenology can only operate as hermeneutic phenomenology. Hermeneutics arose within German idealism. It began with Friedrich Ast and Heinrich Schleiermacher and was further developed by, among others, Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger. Hermeneutics claims that current understanding is created on the basis of the prior (...) understanding taken to any new situation, in that what is initially understood or believed determines the direction and scope for inquiry or action. Subsequent action and conclustions are similarly based on what has been previously understood and believed. As a consequence, however, what may, in some cases, result is the confirmation of prior inaccurate understanding. For these reasons, it is important to be clear about how initial understandings are formed and how they inform a discipline, be it the Husserlian phenomenology of intentionality or any empirical phenomenological approach. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 8, Edition 1 May 2008. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone evaluar la apropiación marioniana de las nociones de “ciencia rigurosa” y “filosofía primera”. Marion defiende la necesidad de la primacía de la filosofía, pero propone entenderla como una “filosofía última”. Esta lectura marioniana puede ser iluminada a partir de una comparación con la fenomenología del joven Heidegger.

The article is an attempt to define reduction as the beginning of philosophy. The author considers such questions as: What motivates a phenomenologist to do reduction? Can one speak of philosophy before reduction? What is the essence of reduction? To answer these questions the author refers to Husserl, Fink and, Patočka, and tries to show that reduction is to be understood as an unmotivated expression of philosopher’s will to overcome evidence inherent to natural attitude. The author argues that reduction enables (...) one a problematization of the world as such. Finally, reduction is defined as an attempt to take doing philosophy seriously. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the methodical disclosure of the lowest level of the constitution of time in Husserl’s phenomenology of time (especially in the C-Manuscripts), following this leading question: is it at all possible to disclose phenomenologically the primal-phenomenal constituting stream of consciousness? First, I address the different levels of constitution in order to focus on the ultimate level. Second, I analyse the “intentionality” of the primal-stream, by means of differentiating it from act-intentionality. Third, I outline the methodical function of (...) the reduction and of the phenomenologizing ego. Fourth, I present Abbau as the methodical possibility of reaching primal-phenomenality. Fifth, I address the problem of grasping the primal-phenomenal dimension in its originality. I will argue that we can grasp this fundamental dimension by means of a “phenomenological deconstruction” of constituted experience and at the same time by putting this dimension in an intentional relationship with the phenomenologizing ego. (shrink)

Dorion Cairns was one of Husserl’s closest pupils, his closest American pupil, and a leading translator, interpreter, and teacher of phenomenology in the United States. His translations of Cartesian Meditations and Formal and Transcendental Logic remain authoritative, his Guide forTranslating Husserl and Conversations with Husserl and Fink are classic texts in the history of phenomenology, and a number of his students from his years at the New School for Social Research are leading figures in contemporary phenomenology.The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl (...) is Cairns’s previously unpublished 1933 Harvard dissertation. It is also the first volume of what will likely be six volumes of the Philosophical Papers of Dorion Cairns.The Editorial Committee for this project is comprised of Lester Embree, Fred Kersten , and Richard Zaner, the latter of whom serves as Cairns’s literary executor. Cairns composed the dissertation in the six months .. (shrink)

Resumen Husserl emprendió varias presentaciones sintéticas de la fenomenología con el propósito de darla a conocer ante públicos amplios. En el presente trabajo estudiaremos el enfoque de las Conferencias de París, su proyección en las Meditaciones cartesianas y el destino del proyecto de la versión alemana en tensión con la redacción del Sistema de filosofía fenomenológica, a los efectos de establecer sus rasgos distintivos, evaluar los alcances del abandono del neocartesianismo, que suele asociarse con el último período de producción de (...) Husserl y, situar la dirección de estas últimas presentaciones en el clima intelectual que les dio origen.Husserl undertooks several synthetic presentations of phenomenology in order to make it known to broader audiences. In the present work we will study the approach of the Paris Lectures, their projection in the Cartesian Meditations and the idea of the German version in tension with the writing of the System of phenomenological philosophy, in order to establish its distinctive features, to evaluate the abandonment of neocartesianism that is usually associated with the last period of Husserl's production and to identify the direction of these presentations in the intellectual climate that gave rise to them. (shrink)

Husserl claimed that reduction is the true starting point of phenomenological research, but to figure out how this deed should actually be accomplished has turned out to be a very challenging task. In this study, I explicate how Husserl accomplished reduction during his series of lectures entitled The Idea of Phenomenology. He does not state it explicitly, but what actually happened on the last day of the lectures can be seen as consistent with his descriptions of reduction as an act. (...) Understood in this way, reduction is the model of how to do philosophy. The result of Husserl’s reduction is the correlation between appearance and “that which appears” or, to use Husserl’s later terminology, between noēsis and noēma. When this correlation is understood as an outcome of reduction and not as a result of an analysis, we, as readers of Husserl, will be in a better position to avoid natural attitude in our interpretations. (shrink)

Evidence is the very core of Husserlian phenomenology, with the term “evidence” signifying for Husserl the phenomenological perspective on the question of truth. In contrast to the conventional philosophical understanding of “truth” in mainly epistemological terms, Husserl’s notion of “evidence”, as elaborated in his Logical Investigations (1900–1), is more essentially ontological, pointing to the way in which a phenomenon becomes clear to us in its constitution. Husserl’s main point in the Sixth Investigation was that we can “see” how evidence functions (...) when we compare something in the fullness of its presence with the emptiness of its absence. This paper considers the example Husserl offers of the room where the lights go off in order to illuminate the breakthrough for phenomenology achieved by Logical Investigations in its move beyond logic and epistemology to the primary level of pretheoretical experience as the reality of the real. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 6, Edition 2 August 2006. (shrink)

Defending the ancient thesis, that being and the true, or being and manifestation, are necessarily inseparable, is at the heart of transcendental phenomenology. The transcendental “reduction” disengages the basic “natural” naïve doxastic belief which permits the world to appear as essentially indifferent to the agency of manifestation. The massive work of transcendental phenomenology is showing the agency of manifestation of “absolute consciousness.” Yet the foundations of this agency of manifestation are pervaded by issues which, when addressed, reveal that the question (...) of a “second absolute” is basic and opens Husserlian phenomenology to metaphysical questions. This has to do not merely with the teleology of the agency of manifestation, i.e., the “whither” of the teleology of presencing, but also, in some sense, with the constituting “whence” of the transcendental I. Husserl argues for the teleology of truth pointing to both a divine subject as well as a divine entelechy. (shrink)

EinleitungDer Begriff Kinästhese ist in der Husserl-Literatur durchaus geläufig. Trotzdem fehlt bis heute eine umfassende Erörterung seiner Bedeutung und seiner Spielformen sowie auch seiner konkreten Entwicklungsgeschichte bei Husserl.Zu erwähnen wären in dieser Hinsicht besonders: Claesges (1964), Claesges’ „Einleitung des Herausgebers“ zu Hua XVI, Drummond (1984), Melle (1983), S. 114–120, Piedade (2001), Przybylski (2006) und Mattens (2009). Vermutlich würde fast jeder Husserl-Kenner – wenn danach fragt – ohne weiteres antworten, Kinästhesen seien jene Bewegungsmöglichkeiten des leiblichen Subjekts, durch die sich seine Wahrnehmungsgegenstände (...) auf ihrer elementarsten Stufe (jene der sogenannten „Sinnesdinge“) konstituieren. Das ist bestimmt richtig, da für Husserl in der Tat Wahrnehmung ihre Gegenstände eben nicht in einer augenblicklichen „Impression“ voll erschließt, sondern sie vielmehr in mannigfaltigen Zusammenhängen von „Abschattungen“, d. h. in zusammenhängenden Sequenzen pa. (shrink)

Cairns presents a plausible two-part, step by step, approach seemingly developed in Husserl’s “workshop” to transcendental phenomenology that is independent of culture and history, refines a concept of knowledge and its references to worldly things, encounters a difficulty, and resolves it through recognition of a non-worldly apodictic core of consciousness distinct from being in the real temporal, spatial, and causal world.

The last in a series of examinations, this paper articulates Husserl's mature position on the nature of a phenomenologically informed human science. Falling between the naïve positivity of a naturalistic approach to psychology and the transcendental view of consciousness at the base of phenomenological philosophy, we argue that a human scientific psychology—while not itself transcendental in nature needs to re-arise upon the transcendental ground as an empirical—but no longer transcendentally naïve—discipline through Husserl's notion of the "return to positivity." This notion (...) of the return allows us to avoid "transcendental psychologism," differentiating psychological from transcendental subjectivity but from a transcendental, rather than naïve perspective. In this way, the return to positivity reclaims psychology as a worldly, but no longer naïve, discipline. To facilitate an understanding of the different perspectives in question, and the process of leaving the naturalistic perspective in order to return to it once armed with a transcendental understanding and its associated tools, we continue to develop the illustrative example of anorexia provided in the first part of this series. In conclusion, we discuss the implications of this framework for transcendental reforms both of clinical practice and of psychological research. (shrink)

Nine short manuscript fragments by Dorion Cairns, one of Husserl’s closest followers, are edited and presented here from Cairns’ Nachlass , which are held at the Center for Advanced Research on Phenomenology, Inc. at the University of Memphis. The fragments address aspects of method for phenomenological psychology, namely: the natural theoretical attitude, reflection, psychological epochē and reduction, eidetic and factual description, understanding, and intersubjective verification.

In this article, I address the question of violence with respect to the phenomenological difference between the transcendental and the empirical field. In the first part, I phenomenologically address the notion of violence, developing a concept required for an account of the phenomenon of violence. Thus, I correlate it with the notion of vulnerability, arguing that violence cannot be understood irrespective of vulnerability. However, a proper phenomenological account has to indicate the subjective conditions of possibility of a phenomenon as it (...) is given in experience. Therefore, we should ask: what is the status of violence when we are talking about the transcendental field? This question leads to the second part of my article, where I address the notion of violence from the perspective of the difference between the pure and the empirical ego, as it has been traced out by Husserl. If from the point of view of an empirical ego the concept of violence is meaningful, from the point of view of the transcendental ego it seems to be absurd. This is particularly significant, because Husserl is talking about the transcendental ego as being immortal. The pure ego is thus invulnerable and this means that violence—understood from the point of view of both the violating subject and the violated one—is something that cannot be linked to the transcendental field. The question that arises—how is violence possible on the empirical level, since it is impossible on the transcendental level?—is a question to which Husserl cannot respond. (shrink)

This paper thematizes the operative kinaesthetic style of world-experiencing life by turning to the ongoing how of our habitual bodily comportment: to our deeply sedimented way(s) of making a body; to schematic inner vectors or tendencies toward movement that persist as bodily ghost gestures even if one is not making the larger, visible gestures they imply; and to inadvertent isometrics, i.e., persisting patterns of trying, bracing, freezing, etc. All such micromovements witness to our sociality insofar as they are not only (...) socially shaped, but perpetuate certain styles of intercorporeal interaction and sustain certain modes of responsivity. Reactivating the sediment -- retrieving the tacit choreography of everyday life from its anonymity and sensing our ongoing ways of living out the legacy of our communal body -- not only allows one''s individual bodily style to shift, but can open new possibilities for healthy interkinaesthetic comportment. Such work can thus contribute to an embodied ethics in both theory and practice. (shrink)

This investigation explores the methodological implications of choosing an unusual example for phenomenological description (here, a bodily awareness practice allowing spontaneous bodily shifts to occur at the leading edge of the living present); for example, the matters themselves are not pregiven, but must first be brought into view. Only after preliminary clarifications not only of the practice concerned, but also of the very notions of the “body” and of “protentionality” is it possible to provide both static and genetic descriptions of (...) the phenomena in question, leading to concluding meditations on the differences between an “integrating” consciousness engaged in a project of knowing and an “improvisational” consciousness open to radical transformation. In the end, however, the Urzeitigung in which what is protended is simply “more time” holds good as the invariant governing the deep structure of both of these styles of consciousness. (shrink)

The article first outlines Edmund Husserl’s idea of “complete transformation” (völlige Umwendung) and the philosophy of “the turn” (Kehre) of Martin Heidegger. In the following chapter it is shown that you can understand both Husserl as well as Heidegger in the light of “the essential turn” in the German mysticism of the fourteenth century. In this way it becomes clear that Husserl’s idea of a “complete transformation” seems to be a forgotten “mystical” impetus of phenomenology, which was much more realized (...) by Martin Heidegger than by Husserl. In this way Heidegger’s philosophy of “the turn” appears as an important modern approach of the mystical philosophy of transformation. (shrink)

Fernando Floresin ja Terry Winogradin Understanding Computers and Cognition poikkeaa perinteisistä ohjelmoinnin lähtökohtien pohdinnoista. Teoksessa asetetaan syrjään lähtökohta, jota tekijät kutsuvat rationalistiseksi perinteeksi, ja syvennytään sen sijaan fenomenologiaan. Keskeinen tekijä tässä siirtymässä on representaationhypoteesin hylkääminen. Kirjoittajat nojaavat lähinnä Martin Heideggerin, Hans-Georg Gadamerin ja Humberto Maturanan tuotantoon, mutta tässä artikkelissa lähden liikkeelle Edmund Husserlin fenomenologisesta reduktiosta. Tulkitsen Floresin suorittaneen reduktion hänen päätyessään hylkäämään representaatiot.

In this thesis I present a phenomenological investigation of our experience of time – of things as they fall within time – and suggest that something important goes missing in recent debates. This is the notion of a point of view. I believe that articulating the sense in which we have a point of view in time, and what this is a point of view upon, is crucial to an account of how things are for an experiencing subject. In the (...) first chapter, I elucidate the specious present. I argue that theorists appeal to the specious present under two guises without explicitly distinguishing between them; yet these two conceptions are not identical, while one entails the other the reverse is not true. In the second chapter I defend an appeal to the specious present against proponents of what I refer to as snapshot models of temporal experience. I argue that perceptual experience minimally presents something of some non-zero temporal extent as such. In the third chapter I discuss how we are to characterise experience over intervals of time of a greater extent than the specious present. I offer a proposal on which a subject is invariably presented with a positive temporal extent, with this interval marking the partition between the past and the future for the subject. In the fourth chapter I compare and contrast our experience of objects and events, and our experiential point of view in space and in time. Among other things, I argue that getting right how things are for the subject requires an appeal to the subject’s asymmetrical awareness of times either side of the specious present. In fifth and final chapter I demonstrate that appeal to an experiencing subject’s tensed temporal perspective can explain the sense in which time seems to pass. (shrink)

Resumen Las distintas dimensiones de la investigación fenomenológica y su vínculo intrínseco con las cuestiones de método llevan a prestar atención a la esfera de lo inaparente, y especialmente a la cuestión del acceso al plano trascendental. El inicio de la discusión se remonta al planteo sobre el abandono -o no- del cartesianismo en Husserl, tema que devino un tercer problema asociado con las vías de acceso a la reducción. En este trabajo estudiaremos este decurso con objeto de sugerir que (...) los desarrollos sobre generatividad y filosofía de lo inaparente invitan a redefinir el problema en términos más generales, explorando qué accesos a lo trascendental se despliegan en las diversas dimensiones de investigación fenomenológica. En este sentido, seguiremos la deriva de las dos primeras discusiones para bosquejar finalmente las direcciones que surgirían en una labor de desarrollo de la tercera.The different dimensions of phenomenological research and its intrinsic link to methodology lead to pay attention to this area and, within it, especially to the ways to transcendental dimension. The beginning of this discussion goes back to the abandonment -or absence of abandonment- of Cartesianism in Husserl, an issue that became a third problem in the issue of the ways to reduction. In this paper we study these problems in order to suggest that developments on generativity and phenomenology of the inapparent redefine the problem in more general terms, exploring the ways leading into the transcendental realm that unfold in the various dimensions of phenomenological research. In this regard, we will continue the first two discussions and finally point out the directions that arise in the development of the third question. (shrink)