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Might anything be plain good?

Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3335-3346 (2016)

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  1. Demoting Promoting Objections to Epistemic Consequentialism.Daniel J. Singer - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):268-280.
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  • Left Subsectivity: How to Infer That a Round Peg is Round.Bjørn Jespersen - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (4):531-547.
    A property modifier is a function that takes a property to a property. For instance, the modifier short takes the property being a Dutchman to the property being a short Dutchman. Assume that being a round peg is a property obtained by means of modification, round being the modifier and being a peg the input property. Then how are we to infer that a round peg is a peg? By means of a rule of right subsectivity. How are we to (...)
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  • Who Needs ‘Just Plain’ Goodness: A Reply to Almotahari and Hosein.Fergus Jordan Peace - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):2991-3004.
    I address an argument in value theory which threatens to render nonsensical many debates in modern ethics. Almotahari and Hosein’s :1485–1508, 2015) argument against the property of goodness simpliciter is presented. I criticise the linguistic tests they use in their argument, suggesting they do not provide much support for their conclusion. I draw a weaker conclusion from their argument, and argue that defenders of goodness simpliciter have not responded adequately to this milder conclusion. I go on to argue that moral (...)
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  • How It All Relates : Exploring the Space of Value Comparisons.Henrik Andersson - 2017 - Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis explores whether the three standard value relations, “better than”, “worse than” and “equally as good”, exhaust the possibilities in which things can relate with respect to their value. Or more precisely, whether there are examples in which one of these relations is not instantiated. There are cases in which it is not obvious that one of these relations does obtain; these are referred to as “hard cases of comparison”. These hard cases of comparison become interesting, since if it (...)
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  • Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of ethics. Philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic.
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